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1 KANT – THE LIMITS OF REASON

The German philosopher Immanuel Kant is a towering figure in the development of philosophy. A university professor, Kant spent his entire life in Konigsberg in East Prussia, which he never left once. Kant is the philosopher’s philosopher in that his work and his life makes clear the extent to which philosophers consider the inner landscape to be a much more interesting terrain to explore than the outer landscape. They say travel broadens the mind. Kant’s mind travelled all over, even as his body stayed in one place.

Although his philosophy is difficult, and his writing even more so, Kant repays serious study. Kant shows how human beings are creators of their own reality, and therefore possess a creative, constitutive power, that is independent of some external source. To Kant, the human species is in a special sense a demiurge, creator of its own world. At the same time, Kant firmly establishes the power and possibilities of reason upon the limits of reason. Kant is clear that it is only in knowing the limits of reason that one can appreciate the possibilities of reason. Those intoxicated with power are prone to ignore those limits, realising not the freedom promised by reason but its opposite. 

In simple terms, the question, which preoccupies Kant, seems a very general epistemological one: what can be known and how do we know it. But Kant invests this traditional question about the limits of human reason with new life. In answering the question of what human reason capable of and what reason can legitimately claim to know, Kant establishes morality on a new, more firm foundation.

2 REASON AND FREEDOM

Marx criticised Kant’s highest good a religious ideal rather than a political project with real transformatory significance. Against such an ideal, Marx conceived communism in terms of materialist immanence. The problem is, as Eric Hobsbawm noted back in the 1970s, that ‘The various mechanisms on which Marxists .. have relied for the replacement of capitalism by socialism are not working..’ 

Capitalist society is at present in global crisis, but few can believe that its probable, or even in the short term, its possible outcome in any country will be socialism.

Hobsbawm, New Left Review 105 Sept/Oct 1977 15/6

It no longer suffices to presented communism as immanent in the necessary unfolding of history. Instead, there is an active role for political and moral praxis. Communism needs to be defended morally as an ideal. In this respect, Kant's philosophy establishes the 'rational’ foundation for any political project concerned with freedom as a collective good. Whilst Kant is treated as an ancestor of deontological liberalism (see Rawls' ‘procedural’ interpretation of Kant 1980), it is clear that Kant’s philosophy was driven by clear ethical concerns which were to understand the nature of human being and its flourishing. Kant possesses a philosophical anthropology which places him in a 'rational' tradition of political philosophy, dating from Plato and Aristotle and characterised by a normative concern with the most appropriate mode of life for human beings. The tradition of 'rational freedom' is defined by the notion that the freedom of each individual and all individuals is interdependent and thus entails notions of reciprocity, interaction and solidarity. This 'rational' concept defines freedom in relational and communal terms, as something, which emerges through the interactions between individuals. Habermas defines this 'rational' concept concisely. Freedom, even personal freedom, is conceivable only in 'internal connection with a network of interpersonal relationships', in the context of the communicative structures of a community, so that 'the freedom of some is not achieved at the cost of the freedom of others'. This points to the need to ‘analyse the conditions of collective freedom' so as to remove the 'potential for Social-Darwinist menace' inherent in individualist conceptions of freedom. 'The individual cannot be free unless all are free, and all cannot be free unless all are free in community. It is this last proposition which one misses in the empiricist and individualist traditions' (Habermas 1992:146). With its roots in Plato and Aristotle, the ‘rational’ conception affirms freedom as something that is achieved through the unity of individuals as against their separation. Human being lies in community, in the unity of individuals as social and rational beings. In The Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, Kant demands a constitution which allows ‘the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom of each can co-exist with the freedom of all others.’ (1965 B.373-374). Such a notion rests on an implicit philosophical anthropology which conceives the good life in terms of the capacity for universal human potentialities to flourish (Boucher and Kelly 1994:7/8; Kant CF 1991:187; Korner 1969:128/32). Kant was just as interested as Rousseau had been in the search for the human essence (Cassirer 1963:23). This concern with philosophical anthropology distinguishes Kant from individualist liberalism, with Kant assigning a moral-preparatory function to the legal state in the realisation of the ethical order, setting liberal ends such as the protection of private property and the individual pursuit of happiness within the overarching purpose of realising moral community.

In this respect, Kant continues Rousseau's project. Although Rousseau is frequently caricatured been interpreted as a ‘back to nature’ philosopher against civil institutions and the law, Kant's merit was to have understood Rousseau's inherent rationalism in developing a conception of freedom under law. Kant's 'Rousseauan' influence is apparent in many respects: in coming to respect the dignity of the 'common man’, in arguing that there is no value to human existence without the triumph of justice, in defining the greatest task for humankind as that of establishing a society of citizens administering the law universally to themselves, and in conceiving human history as the fulfilment of a hidden plan of nature bringing about an internally and externally perfect civil constitution. All these central Kantian doctrines can be traced to Rousseau (Cassirer 1963:21 70 82).
This thesis will explore the democratic implications of Kant's ethics. In affirming that each individual is deserving of respect as a rational agent (Taylor 1992:41; Norman 1983:120), Kant affirms every person as competent to make universally legislative decisions. Kant establishes the moral foundations for the realisation of the central political principles of the French Revolution – liberty, equality and fraternity. 
1.	Liberty - each member treating all others as moral beings (each individual is able to decide for themselves); 
2.	Equality - each individual equally has the power to make choices and decisions; 
3.	Fraternity - each individual is a member of a moral community (Raphael 1981:57; Norman 1983:102/3). 

With the realisation of the ideal, reason is in control and dehumanising social forms are abolished. In these ideal conditions, the legal-institutional framework constraining individuals to the good is replaced by a conscious identification on the part of individuals with the good.

The success or otherwise of Kant's ideal of a noumenal community is shown to depend upon the synthesis of morality and politics. Kant is shown to inherit the tensions at the heart of Rousseau's notion of freedom as resting on the distinction between culture and nature. Culture is thus constituted in the sphere of reason apart from nature, the empirical world. This means that reason is transcendentally constituted and legislates to the empirical world from the outside (Rundell 1989:14). As a result of this dualism, rather than transforming politics, morality remains outside the temporal sphere. To succeed, Kant’s project requires that morality has a critical purchase within the empirical realm, transforming politics so as to enable ‘perpetual peace.’





This first section focuses on Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy, the shift from object to subject in cognition. Kant’s construction model contrasts with the old application model. Whereas in the old model, concepts were applied to the independently existing objects, something which requires the conformity of concepts to objects, Kant’s new model does not recognize the independent existence of objects and entails the conformity of objects to concepts. Objects are constructed by the synthetic function of categories. 

For Kant, the human mind is not a blank sheet ready to be filled with sense impressions, the particular things of everyday life which our senses perceive all around us. Rather, the human mind possesses basic organising categories or frames of reference which enable us to make sense of these impressions. These categories or frames are 'innate ideas'. We are born with these categories and they precede any individual human being's experience of life. These categories constitute the core of our faculty of reason, the central faculty which distinguishes human beings as members of the species homo sapiens. 

Kant argues that our image of the world around us could not be a mirror image of things as they are in themselves since the human mind imposes its own structures of thought onto the world. These concepts of things enable human beings to understand the world around them.

For Kant, the empiricist account of knowledge was obscure and vague with respect to how simple sense impressions become 'associated' or 'combined' into more complex ideas and concepts. For example, one could see how sense impressions could 'give' one the idea of red, yellow, blue, green, etc., but not how, in themselves, they could ever 'give' one the idea of colour as such. There is no sense impression which is 'colour'. There are other even more fundamental concepts for human beings which are not derivable by association, contrast, or anything else, from sense impressions. Kant referred particularly here to the concepts of time and space.

Kant therefore concluded that the human mind is not a tabula rasa, a blank sheet which is ready, at birth, to be filled with sense impressions. On the contrary, the human mind must already at birth be possessed of certain basic organizing categories or frames of reference into which those sense impressions are fitted or through which they are filtered so as to make sense of - to use - sense impressions. These organizing categories or frames of reference are often called 'innate ideas', 'innate' because they precede any individual human being's experience of life. Kant is clearly in the tradition of Plato, who identified innate concepts as the key to the apprehension of true reality. These innate ideas or concepts come with all human beings 'out of the womb', and are independent of experience. We are born with them, they are part of our heritage as members of the species homo sapiens. These categories constitute the core of the faculty of reason, which, for Kant, as for Aristotle, is the central faculty distinguishing human beings as homo sapiens.

Kant makes a distinction between two kinds of statements, 'analytic' and 'synthetic'. In analytic statements, the predicate is contained in the subject: 'All squares have four sides sides', for example, or 'My brother’s wife is my sister-in-law'. In these examples, if we know the meaning of the subject of the sentence, we do not require any additional information to know that the predicate is also true of it. Synthetic statements, by contrast, require additional information, and are true or false by virtue of more than just the meaning of their words: “My sister-in-law has dyed her hair pink”. The predicate is not contained in their subject. To know the truth of a synthetic statement, there is a need to check. The truth is not contained in the words themselves. For Hume and those who followed him, all our knowledge consists of analytic or a priori kinds of statements, on the one hand, and empirical statements, derived from experience, on the other hand. Further, Hume argues, all synthetic statements are based on experience. As a result, our knowledge is either empty of content or inevitably uncertain, since we cannot deduce anything about laws of nature or necessary causal connections on the basis of the sentences that describe our impressions.

To resolve this impasse between analytical and synthetic statements, Kant developed a third category of statements, the 'synthetic a priori'. A synthetic a priori statement not only says something about the world but is also necessary and universally true. Such a statement is true by definition and is not derived from experience. Whilst we are not allowed to deduce anything necessary from experience, if we are to have any knowledge at all of those things that go beyond experience —God, the universe, free will, the human soul and its immortality — then this knowledge must consist of statements which are synthetic a priori.
Whilst this conclusion makes metaphysics – knowledge beyond experience - possible, it seems to deny the possibility of a rational metaphysics, since synthetic a priori statements can only be about the objects of possible experience. The world of experience contains passive and contingent elements, but also necessary ones: space and time. For Kant. time and space consist of synthetic a priori statements, necessary forms, or categories, of our experience. Space and time are not autonomous entities, but constructions of the human mind. Human beings can grasp the idea of empty space, but cannot conceive of physical objects outside space, lacking spatial characteristics; human beings can grasp the idea of empty time, but cannot conceive of events taking place outside time. Like time and space, geometry and arithmetic consist of synthetic a priori statements, necessary forms, or categories, of our experience. Geometry and arithmetic say something about the world, whilst being necessary and universal. The simplest proposition of arithmetic, '1+1=2', is not analytic, since the predicate '2' is not contained in the subject: 1+1 does not contain the idea of 2. Similarly, the truth that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is not contained in the idea of a triangle. Synthetic a priori statements are not abstractions, but constructions of the human mind which are indispensable tools of reason, without which nothing could be known. 
For Kant, our knowledge — the knowledge that is necessary and universal — can only be about the objects of our perception. Kant argues that certain features of experience, space and time, cause and substance, are not in themselves features of the external world, but are the ways in which the mind organizes its experiences. In thus pointing to the active role of human agency in bringing about the world we see around us, Kant proposed a revolutionary way of looking at the theory of knowledge and at metaphysics. 

In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that all knowledge requires both input from the senses and organization by concepts. Kant is not therefore establishing a crude opposition of the mental apparatus to empirical nature. Rather, Kant is arguing that both sensory inputs and organizing concepts have pure forms that we can know a priori, and hence which we know to be universally and necessarily valid. The pure forms of ordinary sensory inputs - what Kant calls empirical intuition - are the structures of space and time studied by mathematics; the pure forms of ordinary empirical concepts are the pure concepts of the understanding - the categories – and these are what makes it possible to apply the various aspects and forms of judgment studied by logic to objects of experience. Mathematics contains synthetic a priori judgments that are universally and necessarily true of all appearances, and must be derived from the construction of mathematical objects in pure intuition rather than from the analysis of concepts; the categories yield synthetic a priori principles when applied to experience with its necessarily spatio-temporal structure - the principles of the conservation of substance and of the universality of causation for instance. This is the constructive theory of the Critique of Pure Reason. The Critique also contains a critical theory. 

The human mind constructs the categories of space and time, cause and substance, in such a way as to shape experience. For Kant, the physics of Newton and the modern natural sciences in general are necessarily true on account of the categories. The truths of physics are a priori truths, meaning that physics does not describe experience and that Newton's laws cannot be derived from the content of our perception. The same applies to geometry and arithmetic. Our knowledge of physical objects is the result of being shaped by the way that forms, or categories, are imposed upon them. This does not mean that the phenomenal world is ‘made-up’ as a mental construction on the part of each individual human subject. Whilst phenomenal forms — the categories of time and space, causality and substance — are the constructs of the perceiving human mind, they are a collective creation common to all human beings. The world in which we live is common to all human beings, the perceiving subjects. Objects can exist independently of the perceiving subjects. However, the idea of an appearance presupposes that there is something beyond the appearance, even though we cannot know anything of those things ‘in themselves’. Since we cannot see independently of the subjective conditions of experience, we cannot know anything of things 'in themselves', other than that they are not the same as their appearances.

For Kant, human beings do not see the world as the world is, but as it appears. Certain aspects of reality are internal rather than external in that they are present in the conceptual apparatus of the human mind rather than being in the world outside. A table appears to a human being to be a particular shape or colour on account of the particular constitution of the human visual apparatus. The visual apparatus of a different species, one that could, for instance, process a wider range of light waves (infrared, ultraviolet), would show this table differently. 

And what applies to colour applies also to other aspects of reality which Kant called ‘categories’ of experience, such as space and time, cause and effect. These categories are a part of the conceptual apparatus of human beings and determine how human beings experience the world. The world human beings that human beings experience is a human world constituted by these innate categories. Without these innate categories, human experience would be an inchoate jumble. It would make no sense. The human mind therefore imposes a human order upon the external world as a objective, natural datum.

Kant’s philosophy emphasises the creative, constitutive power of human agency and is therefore full of reality making possibilities. At the same time, Kant is careful to emphasise limits. In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that ‘It is precisely in knowing its limits that philosophy exists.’ Kant sought to describe exactly what can be said by reason and what cannot. This notion of limits is important in that it is only in knowing what reason cannot do that it is possible to realise reason’s true liberatory potential.

The innate categories impose order on chaos but also impose limits on experience, determining what human beings can know. Human beings can seek causal explanations regarding everyday experience - who put that chair there? what made that noise? However, there are questions to which causal explanations cannot be given - human free will, the origin of the universe, and so on. Answers to such questions can often result in antinomy, equally rational and plausible possibilities which are nevertheless mutually exclusive. For instance, it is possible to present equally rational and plausible arguments which claim either that human beings possess freedom and that every human act is the product of free moral choice or that human beings are unfree and that every human act has a determined cause. Similarly, it is possible to present equally rational and plausible arguments that the universe at one time didn't exist and was created out of nothing or that it has always existed and always will exist (Aristotle’s eternalism). Such arguments appear equally plausible, or equally implausible.

Such antinomies indicate that there are limits to reason and that these limits ensure that human beings can never fully understand certain things. For this reason, Kant’s philosophy is a transcendental idealism. Whilst human beings can only ever experience their own innate perceptions through categories of experience (idealism), there is a reality that exists beyond (transcends) these categories.

Kant’s crucial argument is that the various features of experience, including space, time, causality and substance, are not in themselves features of the external world, but are things which the human mind imposes on experience to make sense of the external world. With this argument, Kant transformed epistemology and metaphysics. Kant offered a whole new way of looking at the world. To take one example, whenever we see a sequence of events, with one thing following another, we say that time is passing. This may seem obvious, since we can easily grasp the sequence of things. However, where is the time? Time is not something that exists 'out there' which we are able to see. Rather, for Kant, time is part of our mental apparatus. This is an example of the ways in which the mind organizes its experiences.

For Kant, all scientific and moral judgements are imposed by the mind on the world. This imposition on the part of our mental apparatus is the only way that we are able to apprehend the things of the world. This does not mean that Kant denies that these things exist independently of the mind, they do. Kant’s point is that since things in themselves are beyond mind, they cannot be known. Kant therefore distinguishes between the world of phenomena, the apparent world, and the world of noumena, the unknown and unknowable world of the thing in itself. This is why Kant’s philosophy is a transcendental idealism, meaning that whilst the noumenal world can be inferred from reason, it is in itself another order of being. Throughout his various Critiques, Kant went to painstaking lengths to establish precisely what reason can and cannot say. In delineating the limits of reason, Kant showed just what the power of reason could achieve. 
Kant’s logic didn’t impress everyone. Hegel criticised that an enquiry devoted to setting limits to reason presupposes that 'we must know the faculty of knowledge before we can know'. The objection is that in embarking upon such a project, Kant inevitably embroils himself in a vicious circle. In considering the limits of reason, it is necessary to make use of reason, something which presupposes that reason is a reliable instrument. Whilst this objection is valid, it can be made to all philosophers who ask about cognitive limits and capacities. There's no avoiding the problem if one wishes to say something meaningful about reason, since no thought proceeds from nowhere, lacking presuppositions. The idea of innate categories is helpful here since, in thinking, human beings are always some way down the path in the direction of where they want to go, never at the beginning. The use of categories innate to the human mind makes this inevitable.

It is important to keep both aspects of Kant’s transcendental idealism in mind so as to ensure that the question of knowing ‘why’ is set alongside the question of knowing ‘how’. Detached from moral purpose, reason as ‘know how’ can degenerate into a technics which turns the emancipatory possibilities of reason into a repressive reality.
This is the moral of Goethe’s Faust, the discrepancy between human virtuosity and human substance becoming so wide as to separate what human beings can do in a technical sense from human beings and human life as such so as to create an inhuman world. The symptoms of such a disparity come to be manifested in all aspects of life. The world in which means have been enlarged to the status of ends comes to be frightened out of its highly enlightened wits through the return of ancient nightmares. ‘Man ought not to know more of a thing than he can creatively live up to', Nietzsche argued, affirming the Goethean ideal of personality as a state of balance between what man is and what he can do. It follows that human beings should only have such powers as they can creatively live up. Announcing the death of God, as a result of science or theoretical reason, Nietzsche set human beings the task of becoming gods themselves. Whether human beings are capable of living up to that responsibility determines whether or not the death of God is experienced as a liberation or as a tragedy. With the death of God, we are all Faustians now. Are human beings capable of exercising a Faustian responsibility for their magic and mind?
As Marx wrote: ‘Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past, the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society.’ (Manifesto of the Communist Party).
Marx writes of ‘enforced destruction’ through the ‘epidemic of overproduction’. ‘Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce.’

We are back to the Delphic watchwords of ‘know thyself’ and ‘nothing to excess’. Except that, as social beings, knowing thyself is conditional upon knowing the society in which we live. We are living in an age of excess and do not yet appreciate that we ourselves are responsible, that we are not creatively living up to our powers. We are living in a Faustian world, but as the sorcerer’s apprentices, not gods but dwarfs with magic powers. The poor in spirit were promised Heaven but, here on a rationalised, mechanised Earth, this is understood to mean being trained and educated into becoming clever, certified, people capable of manipulating and unleashing the technical installations of Gehenna, in the service not of moral truth but of the idolatrous rites of the new Moloch.

Although he was a scientist, Goethe possessed the religious sensibility to understand that technical knowledge and achievement also point to the active realization of certain values in the lives of human beings. The ‘how’ and the ‘why’ are the two sides of the same question of the nature of human being. In the words of Nietzsche, the moral question, the question of ‘why’, 'is more fundamental than the question of the certainty [of knowledge]: the latter becomes serious only   if the question of values is answered'. 

We are now as gods, the engineer and scientist Steward Brand asserts in Whole Earth Discipline (2010). Not yet. If divinity was simply a matter of technics, we certainly ought to be gods. And, in order to prevent forces of creation becoming forces of destruction, we certainly have to assume moral responsibility as a moral imperative. We need a culture as high as exceptional people in order to harmonize the inner faculty of discernment with the extended vision without. In his posthumous notes Nietzsche opines that ‘there must have been a time when the religious, aesthetic and moral perceptions were at one.' The time has to come when these perceptions merge with the technical and scientific.

Nietzsche’s view is consistent with Kant’s philosophy. The basis of this distinction between the questions of knowing ‘how’ and knowing ‘why’ is established in Kant’s philosophy. 
This is not a critique of science and scientific rationality, nor the repudiation of science, nor even the advocacy of a superior science but an emphasis on the limits to reason and a commitment to values in human life. This commitment to values as giving human life meaning is undermined and destroyed through the adoption of an exclusively analytical-mechanical method in the human interchange with nature. In the guise of Wilhelm Meister, Goethe, as a disciple of values in human life, addresses these words to the astronomer: ‘I can well understand that it must please you, sages of the sky, to bring the immense universe gradually as close to your eyes as I saw that planet just now. But allow me to say ... that these instruments, with which we aid our senses, have a morally detrimental effect on man. ... For what he thus perceives with his senses is out of keeping with his inner faculty of discernment; it would need a culture, as high as only exceptional people can possess, in order to harmonize, to a certain extent, the inner truth with the inappropriate vision from without. ...'

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant furnishes the moral and intellectual means with which to resolve the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ into the one question. 

‘Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily they are reflected on: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.’ (Critique of Practical Reason (1788). In L. W. Beck (ed. and trans.), Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy (1949), 258.

‘In scientific matters . . . the greatest discoverer differs from the most arduous imitator and apprentice only in degree, whereas he differs in kind from someone whom nature has endowed for fine art. But saying this does not disparage those great men to whom the human race owes so much in contrast to those whom nature has endowed for fine art. For the scientists' talent lies in continuing to increase the perfection of our cognitions and on all the dependent benefits, as well as in imparting that same knowledge to others; and in these respects they are far superior to those who merit the honour of being called geniuses. For the latter's art stops at some point, because a boundary is set for it beyond which it cannot go and which has probably long since been reached and cannot be extended further.’ (The Critique of Judgement (l 790), trans. J. C. Meredith (1991), 72.)

Which begs the question of the relation between belief and knowledge, between science and religion. Kant rejected the traditional arguments for the existence of God. Against the ontological argument he argued that existence isn't a necessary part of the idea of God, since ideas do not 'possess' the quality of existence. Against the teleological argument, the view that the world shows evidence of design and hence was therefore designed, Kant agreed with Hume that we cannot argue from effect to cause. Kant rejected the cosmological argument, the view that the world must have a definite origin, since this would be to argue beyond the limits of reason. For Kant, the existence of God rests on the moral law implanted within each and all. God makes sense of morality. 

'The moral law commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all my conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the world' (Critique of Practical Reason).

For Kant, moral acts aim at the summum bonum (the highest possible good). This highest possible good has two aspects: moral justice and happiness. Although good acts do not always provide happiness, moral acts and happiness would coincide in an ideal world: rescuing a neighbour’s cat is both good and gives a warm feeling of well-being. However, regardless of whether a moral act yields happiness or not, morality for Kant necessarily implies a duty to strive for this perfect state of affairs. Further, since ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ for Kant, duty implies possibility. This means that if you ought to help your neighbour, then that's because you can do it. Therefore, if it is possible that moral acts can result in happiness then this is because God must have linked morality and possibility in this way.

A moral act for Kant is performed out of duty and not out of interest, self or otherwise. For Kant, human beings could not have created a disinterested morality - good for goodness' sake which assumes 'moral' actions are disinterested. For utilitarianism, in contrast, morality is just about individuals seeking happiness and requires no divine explanation and cannot act as divine proof. However, for Kant, a utilitarian morality does not issue in a true happiness, merely ‘pleasure’. For Kant the summum bonum holds moral justice together by connecting each individual with all other individuals, something which the self-interested acts of utilitarianism is incapable of doing. Where utilitarianism seeks happiness as a merely individual pleasure, this does not enrich social relationships with others, it reifies them. With individuals are mere means to selfish ends, relations between individuals are instrumentalised. This is why, for Kant, human individuals must seek the summum bonum as a collective endeavour. In this way, happiness accompanies virtue.

A divine morality of this kind serves to reminds human beings that creativeness is accompanied by creatureliness, that alongside power there is also impotence. It is all about finding proportion between the cosmic preciousness and the cosmic minuteness of human beings so that cosmic power does not breed an arrogance that engulfs the world in a cosmic violence. To appreciate the full potential of reason is to know the limits of reason. 

Back in 1905, Henry Adams wrote these words to Henry Osborn Taylor (developing the ideas further in Phase Rule in History).

‘At the present rate of progression since 1600, it will not need another century or half century to tip thought upside down. Law, in that case, would disappear as theory or a priori principle and give place to force. Morality would become police. Explosives would reach cosmic violence. Disintegration would overcome integration.’

Although this prediction has been fulfilled with the invention of nuclear weapons, the notion of ‘cosmic violence’ is capable of wider application. The technical assault upon nature means that human society, at the height of its technical achievement, cannot rest easy with its with its conquest, given the ever present sense of looming environmental crisis. An all-encompassing ecology of fear is in turn replacing morality within self-governing communities with force. There is a militarization of the social fabric and a hardening of the urban surface. Police is indeed replacing polis. Cosmic violence is being designed into the social metabolism.

Every human being must now consider the implications of this cosmic power. The task before us is to engender the political, cultural and moral protective devices to prevent knowledge, not only from destroying civilisation, but from causing life forms in many of its aspects to disappear from the planet.
Separating the how from the why, modern humanity has shown tendencies to cosmic arrogance; intoxicated by technics, human beings have turned means into ends and have abandoned one of the most important ingredients of human advance - the practice of restraint. 

The great achievement of Kant is to have found a way of resolving the supposed clash between science and religion in such a way as to recognise the legitimate claims of both. Kant shows how it is possible to integrate the how and why questions so as to realise the full liberatory potential of reason within a morally meaningful framework of life. 
Kant’s moral law is crucial. The cosmic time sense of religious intuition was achieved long before astronomy furnished the exact calculations, and it is this that acts as a braking device that prevents humanity from sacrificing the own long future for some temporary gratification or some transitory gain. The moral law within is a latent power for humanity’s self-preservation, possessing the potential and the capacity for the unified effort that will make wider renewal possible.

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant is an intellectually sublime synthesis of ethical and cognitive perspectives which opens up a path beyond the sterile conflict of knowledge and belief, reason and empiricism. Kant distinguishes between the world of phenomena, the world as it appears to use, and the world of noumena, the unknown and unknowable 'thing in itself’. The knowledge of the external world of 'phenomena' comes from the experience of the senses as made intelligible and organised by the innate categories of human reason. Human beings can know things in the world of phenomena, the apparent world. The world of ‘things-in-themselves’, however, is beyond human experience and is therefore inaccessible to human reason. Human beings cannot know ‘things in themselves’ in the world of noumena. There can therefore be no transcendence here. Human agency creates the phenomenal world, but not the noumenal world. This distinction provides Kant with a rational foundation for religion. Kant saw the noumenal world as evidence for the existence of God - because it is unknown. There is therefore no equating human knowledge and power with notions of God. 

Kant was particularly concerned with the fact that the mind constantly strives to make sense of human existence and endow it with meaning by means of ideas - God, the soul as an autonomous substance, the universe and its order - which encompass all things. The human mind cannot help but reflect upon these things, even though such reflection cannot yield knowledge, since there is no way from our experience to God, the soul or the universe. In refuting each of the proofs for the existence of God, Kant’s point is not that God and the soul do not exist, only that their existence cannot be demonstrated by facts or by the aid of the instruments of theoretical reason.

Kant writes that he ‘found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith’ (B xx). Kant’s point is that whilst knowledge of the existence of God and our own freedom and immortality cannot be theoretically demonstrated, neither can they be disproven. They are necessary presuppositions of moral conduct — objects of moral belief or faith rather than knowledge. Which is why intellectual criticisms on faith and belief succeed only in undermining rational arguments for the existence of God but do not touch faith and belief as such. The cosmological argument for the existence of God, the ontological argument, the argument from design, Aquinas’ five proofs may or may not be rationally satisfying. Dawkins has some fun with Aquinas here:

That's an argument? You might as well say, people vary in smelliness but we can make the comparison only by reference to a perfect maximum of conceivable smelliness. Therefore there must exist a pre-eminently peerless stinker, and we call him God. Or substitute any dimension of comparison you like, and derive an equivalently fatuous conclusion. 

Dawkins 2006 ch 3

Very clever. Dawkins’ argument does actually make sense, not as the idealistic God somehow apart from nature and all natural processes that traditional religion likes to imagine, but as Spinoza’s God of physical creation and regeneration. Of course, Dawkins hasn’t actually engaged with Aquinas’ argument here. Further, as Kant long ago made clear, the arguments are inadequate and are bound to be inadequate. And they are irrelevant to boot. These are matters of faith and belief, not reason. But they are arational or non-rational rather than irrational. Kant brought this controversy between science and religion to a conclusion which both sides could live with. 

In his Critiques, Kant established the limits of reason in order to establish what can be known. The importance of Kant’s philosophy as a whole lies in the way in which the claims of belief and knowledge are balanced, thus allowing for a conception of rational faith. Kant's most striking statement in this respect is his claim that faith has priority over knowledge. Hence Kant’s confession in the Preface to the second edition of the Critique that he had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith (B xxx). Kant explained what he meant by this in Section III of Chapter II of the "Dialectic" of the second Critique, the section aptly entitled "On the Primacy of Practical Reason." This text bears a close examination (Beiser in Guyer ed 2006). 

Kant was fond of stating his case in architectonic terms: 'there is yet another consideration which is more philosophical and architectonic in character; namely to grasp the idea of the whole correctly and thence to view all parts in their mutual relations' (Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason). Kant’s approach has clear affinities with Plato’s view that to discover the true nature of political and social justice it is necessary to ‘first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less’ (Plato, Republic, trans. Paul Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, eds., Collected Dialogues, 368e-369a).  The architectonic is Kant's favourite expression (Heller 1984:16 note 8), and neatly encapsulates the way that he structured his philosophy from firm foundations upwards. 

In the Preface to the second edition of the Critique, Kant informs us that the Critique is an essential preparation for a proper grounding of morality, even though it will not in itself supply a theory of morality (Bxxv). This will in turn provide the correct, rational foundation for religion. It is at this point that Kant states that he 'found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith' (Bxxx). In a section entitled ‘The Canon of Pure Reason’, contained in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, Kant concludes his strategy for solving the problem of metaphysics by demonstrating that Critical philosophy is able to bring harmony to reason and thus validate the moral order through its vindication of the metaphysics of experience and criticism of transcendent metaphysics. The Canon therefore outlines the contours of the future development of the Critical system, the architecture of which is built upon three key questions (A804—5/B832-3):

1	What can I know?
2	What ought I to do?
3	What may I hope?

Kant presented the concepts of hope and faith as the central theme of the doctrine of the postulates. He states that the doctrine of postulates is concerned with the question, "What may I hope for?" (C1, A 805/B 833). On first impression, the view that it is necessary ‘to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith’ (C1, B xxx) sets hope and faith in opposition, whereas in fact they are complementary and constitute a single matter. This faith is a special type of knowledge, common (in principle) to all rational beings. Hope (as grounded hope) is the affective response that faith arouses in each individual. Faith and hope are therefore two interrelated aspects of the same awareness. The relation is one-way, from faith to hope, faith being prior to hope both logically and temporally (Yovel 1980 ch 2). 

The critical theory of the Critique holds that we can use the pure concepts of the understanding to conceive of objects that lie beyond the limits of our sensible intuition through our power of inferential reason. We can, for instance, imagine a spatio-temporal universe that has a kind of completeness that our indefinitely extendable actual intuitions can never have; we can imagine objects that cannot be represented in sensory experience at all, such as God or an immaterial soul. However, such conceptions do not amount to knowledge. The errors of traditional metaphysics can be attributed to claims that such conceptions do amount to knowledge. However, Kant’s point goes further than denying claims to knowledge on the part of metaphysics. Kant affirmed a view of human powers which held that none of these powers fails to have a proper use, so long as we understand them correctly (G, 4:395). Working in the tradition of Plato (see CPuR, A312-20/B369-77), Kant argues that the ideas of pure reason have a legitimate use, or yield a "canon" (A 795—831 /B 823—59), but in morality rather than science. Kant denies the possibility of knowledge of the existence of God, of immortality and of the immaterial soul as a result of theoretical reason. Such notions are incapable of rational theoretical demonstration. For strict rationalists, this would seem to bring the matter to a conclusion. Not so for Kant. Knowledge of human freedom is also incapable of theoretical demonstration. Whilst, adhering to theoretical reason, this would appear to be the end of freedom as a value, human beings continue to think and act as though human freedom is real, as an integral part of human Being. For Kant, whilst God, immortality and freedom cannot be theoretically proven, neither can they be disproven. This is because they are objects of moral belief or faith necessary presuppositions of moral conduct. They are not objects of knowledge and cannot, therefore, be proven by theoretic reason. Neither can they be disproven by theoretic reason. Such reason has nothing relevant to say in the realm of faith and belief. Hence Kant’s statement that he found it necessary "to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" (B xx). It is impossible to destroy or support faith by means of knowledge. In refuting all the proofs for the existence of God, Kant was emphasising the limitations of reason in the realm of faith. He was not trying to disprove the existence of God, he was exposing the inadequacy of the rational proofs for the existence of God.

Ultimately, Kant took the unknown and unknowable noumenal world to be evidence for the existence of God - because it is unknown and unknowable. One is tempted to refer here to the Tao as the unnameable way. This begs the question of just what comprises ‘the One’ and whether or not human beings are a part of it and what role we play. If the human mind plays no active role in the noumenal world of things in themselves, then in what way does human agency relate to divinity?

Reason does more than interpret experience. In addition to speculative reason, Kant offers ‘practical reason’, with its own a priori principles, which are normative. 

The concept of freedom, insofar as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason. All other concepts (those of God and immortality) which, as mere ideas, are unsupported by anything in speculative reason, now attach themselves to the concept of freedom and gain with it and through it, stability and objective reality.

Critique of Practical Reason.

Practical reason is crucial to Kant’s architectonic. The world of 'practical reason' or morality is radically different from the phenomenal world. Human beings are co-creators and co-legislators of this moral world, the world of ‘noumena’, and partake of a real world as distinct from a merely 'phenomenal' world. The moral law is crucial to this world.

The a priori principles of practical reason are moral rules and are just as valid and just as absolute as the a priori truths of mathematics. These a priori principles pertain to moral duties. Kant is famous for arguing that a duty is something that ought to be fulfilled on account of being a duty, rather than being something we desire or like at the time. The supreme moral rule is the Categorical Imperative, which is an absolute and universal requirement of reason. The Categorical Imperative requires that we act in such a way as we would wish everyone to act, and to follow only those rules we would wish everyone to follow. This requirement holds that moral truths are the same for every rational being, and that personal desires are of no bearing in moral matters.
For Kant, practical reason has primacy over speculative reason and can ascertain the metaphysical truths which are beyond speculative reason. Practical reason is postulated upon three things. Firstly, practical reason is postulated upon free will, since moral rules make sense only on condition that we have free will, even though it cannot be deduced in the world of experience. Like everything else in the phenomenal world, human beings are subject to universal causal necessity, but as things in themselves we are free. Secondly, practical reason is postulated upon the immortality of the soul, a condition of the possibility of moral rules, since a moral injunction presupposes that the highest good is possible, and moral perfection is the aim of the human will. However, moral perfection is possible only on the condition of the possibility of infinite progress, and this is possible only if our existence is infinite. Thirdly, practical reason is postulated upon the existence of God, since the highest good, whose possibility is entailed by moral rules, entails the perfect harmony of moral perfection and happiness. Moral perfection and harmony are not conjoined in the world of our experience, but coexist in perfect unity only thanks to God, forming two aspects of the one world.

Whilst the fundamental questions of metaphysics — God, the immortal soul and free will — cannot be resolved by theoretical reason, they can be resolved as postulates of practical reason. The validity of moral rules is demonstrated by reason, since moral rules are not arbitrary rules but are grounded in reason, which in turn presupposes the demonstration of certain metaphysical truths.

Whereas once either revelation (religion) and nature (science) had been the fountain-head of morality, Kant makes human reason the source of being able to understand good and evil, to author the universal and prescribe right conduct through the ‘categorical imperative’. The moral law of reason enjoins human beings to live in accordance with the ‘categorical imperative’. The categorical imperative affirms the fundamental equality of rational moral agents, arguing that human beings be treated as 'ends in themselves'. True freedom is achieved if, in moral conduct, human beings follow the law of reason only, in contradistinction to natural inclinations and without regard to practical consequences. This is the moral and rational foundation which enables culture and civilization to flourish and enables  human beings to forward to a future of what Kant calls 'perpetual peace'. 

Kant’s philosophy transfigures the ideals of transcendence into the ethico-rational freedom of citizens who live as co-legislators in a moral world of their own making. Without any recourse to supernaturalism, Kant’s ethico-rational freedom transcends the world of empirical reality through the power of human reason, thus rising above the limitations of a world beset by antagonism, desire and natural inclinations. 

Kant’s ethico-rational freedom encompasses Plato’s sublime morality, the Gospel love of thy neighbour as thyself, the righteous, the poor in spirit, the Protestant emphasis on good works, and it does all this without requiring any recourse to such elitist or selective notions as Platonic guardians, the ‘chosen people’, the elect, or, in the century after Kant, ‘the party’. Kant achieves this by emphasising the creative power of reason which each and all possess as part of their essential humanity, conceiving human beings as co-authors of their moral existence and as co-legislators in a universal kingdom of ends. The sphere of human freedom is thus expanded by reason impressing its sign upon empirical reality. In establishing the limits of reason within the confines of nature, Kant established the intellectual and moral foundations of an expansive rational freedom. This is the 'kingdom of ends' as realised in the three dimensions of nature, society and the mind. Kant’s normative philosophy thus expounds an ideal of human association as a realm of ends composed of autonomous individuals who, as rational natural beings, are co-legislators of their freedom.

4 THE MORALITY OF ENDS

The argument in this chapter establishes the moral requirement to transform society to realise the summum bonum, highest good as the core of Kant's philosophical:

The moral law .. determines for us . . a final purpose toward which it obliges us to strive, and this purpose is the highest good in the world possible through freedom (CJ 1951:30). 

Human beings, therefore, have a duty to promote the highest good:

Human beings 'are a priori determined by reason to promote with all our powers the summum bonum, which consists in the combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the highest condition of the good itself, i.e., in universal happiness conjoined with morality most accordant to law' (CJ 1951:304).

Kant’s highest good is 'a moral kingdom of purposes., viz., the existence of rational beings under moral laws' (CJ 1951:295; cf Prac 1956:114/5). The question is whether this highest good is merely a regulative ideal orienting behaviour or a realisable goal. Marx accused Kant of transferring 'good will' - and 'the harmony between it and the needs and impulses of individuals' - to 'the world beyond’ (GI 1999:97), something which made the highest good a religious ideal rather than a realisable political project. This chapter argues that Marx’s criticism applies only if the highest good is detached from Kant's moral order of colegislators who seek to enhance one another's ends. Marx ignores the praxis-related character of Kant’s highest good. He also ignores Kant's view that the highest good is the kingdom of God on earth. Kant's categorical imperative yields the 'result' Marx demands in the here and now in the requirement that individuals pursue the moral kingdom so that each individual enhances the ends of all individuals, obeys the moral law and cooperates in the promotion of universal happiness (Van Der Linden 1988:77/8).

In A Commentary on Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason, Lewis White Beck also argues that the duty to promote the highest good is vacuous:

For suppose I do all in my power—which is all any moral decree can demand of me—to promote the highest good, what am I to do? Simply act out of respect for the law, which I already knew. I can do absolutely nothing else toward apportioning happiness in accordance with desert— that is the task of a moral governor of the universe, not of a laborer in the vineyard.

Beck, Lewis White, A Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Practical Reason' (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960) pp. 244-45). 

The argument is correct insofar as attention is focused on the highest good as such, that is, the highest good lacking grounding in the categorical imperative. Beck contends that "Kant is almost casual in introducing his readers to this command of reason" and that "[n]one of the formulations of the categorical imperative have had this content" (1960:244). In arguing that the duty to promote the highest good as such is vacuous, Beck repeats the mistaken view that Kant affirms a private ethics. Kant’s thought possesses a social dimension in that the duty to promote the highest good is a social duty which follows from the moral law. 

Kant's notion of the highest good rests upon an ambiguity in that it is not always clear that whether Kant is arguing that we have a duty to promote the highest good or to realize this good. Kant usually says the former, arguing that the transformation of nature so as to ensure that each individual will be happy in the moral society is not within our power. This would imply that a moral society in which human beings attempt to make one another happy, but do not necessarily succeed, is the highest good as the final end set by the moral law. Kant does not, however, state this conclusion explicitly. Instead, the two conceptions of the highest good run alongside each other, with the notion of the highest good as the union of universal virtue and universal happiness most prominent. 
Recognising this ambiguity, this thesis will define Kant’s highest good as a moral society in which human agents seek to make one another happy. Whether this highest good is realised as the union of universal happiness and virtue on the basis of universal cooperation remains open to debate. 
The main point is that Kant's ethics entails the demand that the realization of ideal institutions is actively sought. This identifies Kant’s ethics as a social ethics. A moral theory which limits moral initiatives and efforts to the private realm is a private ethics. Whilst the moral agent of private ethics may participate in institutions and fulfil duties assigned by these institutions, he or she fails to question these duties in a moral sense. The moral agent of social ethics sees it as his or her task to support just institutions or challenge and change unjust institutions in light of some moral ideal. 
In fine, private ethics limits duties to individual duties and passive social duties. (Van Der Linden 1988 ch 1). The way that Kant’s end of the highest good as a moral society enjoins individuals to promote the happiness of each other implies a social ethics. Rather than confine moral efforts to the private realm, Kant's view expresses a social demand oriented towards realising an ideal, the ideal of the perfect state and of international peace.
This social ethics concerned with promoting the highest good is also expressed in the way that the categorical imperative entails ideal co-legislative institutions in which human beings treat each other as ends. The end of the categorical imperative is the harmony of free and rational wills.

The criticism that Kant offers an other-worldly ideal emphasises the need to ground Kant's highest good in the categorical imperative as implying a social ethics and moral praxis. Kant's end of the highest good as a moral society in which human beings promote the happiness of each other thus affirms a social ethics which regulates individual actions through a harmony of free and rational wills. This implies a socially embodied morality which is practised through social ties and functions.





This idea establishes Kant's ethics as an ethics which is concerned with the public life of human beings as social and rational beings who realise their nature in association with each other. The moral law, as defined in the categorical imperative, grounds the pursuit of the perfect civil constitution and perpetual peace, leading to the highest good of the moral community, as a social duty. 
Rather than confine moral efforts to the private realm, Kant's moral law grounds a social duty to pursue the perfect constitution and international peace, leading to the highest good of the moral co-legislative community in which individuals treat each other as ends (Van Der Linden 1988:4/5). 

For Kant, the combination of constructive and critical argumentation provided an adequate foundation for all of philosophy, his attention turning from ‘transcendental philosophy’ to a revision of ‘metaphysics’ through the application of the synthetic a priori principles of experience in the Critique to the most elementary concepts of natural science and morality. However, before Kant could begin the ‘Metaphysics of Morals’ he had been promising since the 1760s, he saw the need for more foundational work. In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Kant demonstrated that the fundamental principle of morality can be derived from both the common-sense notion of a good will as the only thing of unconditional value (Section I) and the philosophical conception of a categorical imperative (Section II). Kant proceeded to argue that we must have free will and that any being with free will can act only in accordance with the fundamental principle of morality (Section III).

Whilst Kant did not resolve the problem of the action of the moral ideas upon the world of events, he did make the idea of freedom the essential core of his ethics as he examined the moral world as separate from the world of experience. Kant thus constructed a moral system which was based upon values which were independent of these of the empirical world. 

Thus the question 'How is a categorical imperative possible?' can be answered to this extent: We can cite the only presupposition under which it is alone possible. This is the idea of freedom . . But how this presupposition is itself possible can never be discerned by any human reason.. To presuppose the freedom of the will is not only quite possible .. but it is also unconditionally necessary that a rational being conscious of his causality through reason and thus conscious of a will different from desires should practically presuppose it.

Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ch 14 121

For Kant, the central aspect of the human predicament concerns how human beings are able to transcend their natural inclinations that keep them chained to natural necessity by ascending to their higher rational nature. Resolving this question entails humanity moving beyond the limitations of egoism and individual self-interest to realise the greater good that is attained through acting in common. Kant’s philosophy therefore involves a distinction between culture, as constituted in the sphere of reason, and nature. Reason is transcendentally constituted and legislates to the empirical world from which it is separated (Rundell 1989:14). Morality remains outside the empirical limitations of the temporal sphere as a point towards which human beings aspire.

Kant's morality is therefore formal or transcendental in the sense that it seeks a ground for right not by means of an extrapolation from the empirical properties of human beings but in something that transcends empirically limited inclinations (1965 B.473-480). For Kant, this is the will. Universality transcends empirical necessity. Moral values cannot be drawn from nature and must inhabit some supersensible, 'ideal', realm. Only in relation to this supersensible 'noumenal' realm could individuals become moral beings. Only in this respect can empirical actions be judged (1965 B.334/6 498ff 1956 50ff).
Freedom is the capacity to act independently of natural causality and against natural 'inclinations', the desires and impulses elicited in the human psyche through objects (1965 B.561f; cf. 1956:72 118f 161). A free act is morally significant in being exempt from 'blind  causality' in both physical and psychological senses (1965 B.826f; 1956:95). Kant’s rational will is thus free from any ground of determination in nature (Taylor 1975:368/9).

Moral principles which are logically independent of experience can be justified only if human beings are understood to be not merely phenomenal beings, subject to causal necessity, but also noumenal beings who are free. Morality is possible only if the will is free to act. The concept of freedom is wholly a priori and forms part of a coherent system of 'ideas of reason' (1965 B.390-396), a rationally constructed standard not found in experience but according to which empirical actions can be judged (1965 B.370ff). This system of ideas is constructed by the systematic application of reason through a faculty shared 'by all human beings itself and is 'objective’ in that human beings can agree about its nature and resolve disputes by reference to it.

Kant's aim was to give the idea of freedom the greatest possible scope and the greatest possible validity. To meet both conditions Kant had to define a form of freedom which was a principle of individuality but which also secured the universality and necessity required for its absolute autonomy. Freedom must create an order for itself. If it does not do so then the individual personality would be split through the heteronomous pull of other ordering principles and would, therefore, lose that capacity for self-movement which is essential to freedom.
Kant defines freedom positively as the obedience of the will to the moral laws of practical reason, which the will imposes upon himself. 'Therefore a free will and a will under moral laws is identical' (Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 101-2). There is nothing, therefore, contradictory about arguing that positive freedom is compatible with, indeed conditional upon, obedience.

5 THE MORAL LAW AS THE UNIVERSAL

The categorical imperative is at the very core of the Metaphysics of Morals. The categorical imperative is the form that the fundamental principle of morality assumes when applied to imperfectly rational creatures like human beings. The principle originates in human reason; it is something we impose upon ourselves rather than being something externally imposed upon us by another ruler, divine or human. Nevertheless, despite its origins in human reason, the principle has the character of a constraint given the existence of natural human inclinations which incline us to act contrary to the principle if unrestrained (G, 4:412—14). The categorical imperative requires us to act only on "maxims" or principles of action that can be ‘universalized’ in the sense that they can be accepted and acted on by all who would be affected by individual actions. Further, principles must be universalizable since every person, ourselves as well as all others, must always be treated as ends and never merely as means (4:429). If everyone respected the principle of universalizability and acted on the categorical imperative in accordance, the result would be a "realm of ends," a "whole of all ends in systematic connection (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that each may set himself") (4:433). In the realm of ends each person is intrinsically valuable and is treated as such, not as a mere means to the ends of others. This is a realm in which the particular ends set by each person are promoted by all persons to the extent that this can consistently be done. 

Before examining the categorical imperative at length, it is worth stating the various forms of the moral law.

The Formula of Universal Law
'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'.

The Formula of the Law of Nature
'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.'

The Formula of the End in Itself
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.

The Formula of Autonomy
So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim.

The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends
So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends.

Review of the Formulae
A new version is given for the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends.
'All maxims as proceeding from our own making of laws ought to harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature.''

The categorical imperative is expressed in three basic formulations. The first concerns its form, the second its content, the third linking these together:
(1)	Act as if you were legislating for everyone.
(2)	Act so as to treat human beings always as ends and never merely as a means.
(3) Act as if you were a member of a realm of ends.

The ethics of the categorical imperative has political implications insofar as ‘realm' can be understood as the state as a politically organised society. Formulation (3) connects (1) and (2) together. Kant’s essential idea is that individuals should act as a community of persons, each one making moral decisions together. This implies that each member treats all other members as moral beings, having regard to their desires, allowing them freedom of decision, and recognizing that each should and can decide as though legislating for all. Kantian ethics is a democratic ethics in affirming that every person is competent to make universally legislative decisions. (Raphael 1981:57).

Freedom for Kant is the capacity of reason to initiate action, individuals acting independently of ‘blind’ natural causality and against 'inclinations', the desires and impulses elicited in the human psyche through objects (1965 B.46 50 B.561f B.566ff B.826f; 1956:72 95 118f 161). With the moral law as a 'fact of reason' (e.g. FMM), Kantian autonomy is thus defined as the idea of freedom as the causality of reason in accordance with the moral law, a 'necessary' concept which human beings must construct on account of knowledge of the moral law (1965 B.476 585f; 1956:21-29 32).

The 'categorical imperative' is the general moral law, the objective principle of morality which categorically enjoins individuals to act in accordance with morality.

As distinct from an hypothetical imperative, which indicates the means which must be willed or employed relative to the realisation of some further end (GMM 1991:79), an imperative is categorical when expressed as an unconditional demand that possesses its own validity. This yields a universal principle for all rational beings and valid and necessary principles for every volition. ‘A categorical imperative … bids us act in accordance with universal law as such—that is, it bids us act on a principle valid for all rational beings as such, and not merely on one that is valid if we happen to want some further end. Hence it bids us accept or reject the material maxim of a contemplated action according as it can or cannot be willed also as a universal law.’ (GMM 1991:84). This is The Formula of Universal Law: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' (GMM 1991:84).

This formula is not to be limited to defining a procedure for the pursuit of private ends, achieving happiness only indirectly, since it applies to all so that everyone acts only on maxims that can be willed to become universal laws (Van Der Linden 1988:20). 

To limit this formula to being a procedure for determining the conditions of the pursuit of one's private ends is a very partial reading that is contrary to Kant's meaning. Kant is clear that the virtuous agent who adopts the standpoint of practical reason wills not only that his or hew own maxims are subjected to the universality test, but that all individuals act only on maxims that can be willed to become universal laws. Kant therefore characterizes anyone who wills that everyone except himself obey the moral law as an immoral agent.

Kant clearly argues that the coherence of rational wills can be achieved only through the obedience of all to one and the same universal law. In seeking to obey universal law as such, virtuous agents are seeking to realize the condition of coherence among rational wills. 
Once maxims are submitted to the test of universality in this manner, the pursuit of private ends no longer issues in conflict but in a harmony of free and rational wills. The moral agent thus comes to respect the categorical imperative through respect for the moral law in abstraction from objects. Kant's harmony of free and rational wills is, therefore, more than a framework for the individual pursuit of private ends, in which any claim to achieving universal happiness can only be realised indirectly. The end of the moral community affirms that individual members directly contribute to the happiness of each other, so long as this meets the test of universality (DV). Not the individual alone but all individuals together make the ends of others their own end so that universal happiness is directly promoted. The obligation to obey the moral law implies that humanity is charged with the duty to promote the highest good. In submitting their maxims to the test of universality, individual agents are creating a moral community in which each person is reciprocally end and means (CJ 1951:222). Not only the individual alone but all make the ends of others their own end so that universal happiness is directly promoted.
This universal practical law derives from the objective principle of the will formed out of the conception of 'rational nature’ as an 'end in itself’ (GMM 1991:91). Kant affirms that human beings are ends in themselves, not merely as means for instrumental use by other wills.





Objects of inclination possess only a conditional value rather than an absolute value. Kant therefore makes a distinction between things and persons.





'Man in the system of nature' 'has an ordinary value' but as the 'subject of a morally practical reason' he is 'exalted above all price'. As homo noumenon 'he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of other people, or even to his own ends, but is to be prized as an end in himself (Kant 1964:96/7). Beings dependent on nature rather than on will have only a relative worth as means and are therefore called 'things'. Rational beings are 'persons' since their nature indicates that they are ends in themselves. The individual as a rational being 'exists as an end in himself, not merely a means for arbitrary use by this or that will', but 'must in all his actions .. always be viewed at the same time as an end' (GMM 1991:90).





The concept of rational being, legislating universally by all maxims of its will so as to judge itself and its actions from this perspective, leads directly to the Formula of the End in Itself: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' (GMM 1991:91).

Kant's categorical imperative is his supreme moral principle and this is its most politically and historically influential formulation. Kant's reference to 'humanity' as a whole rather than to 'persons' in particular is significant. In addressing the universal humanity in each individual, how humanity can and ought to be, Kant's ethics are social rather than private. The duties that one owes to oneself are duties to all. 'Humanity' is the final end of the individual, the highest good as the conception of the moral community applied to transform the human condition. The duties to oneself are at the same time duties to all: 'To destroy the subject of morality in one's person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world, so far as this is in one's power; and yet morality is an end in itself. Consequently, to dispose of oneself as a mere means to an arbitrary end is to abase humanity in one's own person (homo noumenon), which was yet entrusted to man (homo phaenomenon) for its preservation' (DV 1964:85).

Thus, whilst the realm of means is equated with the world of natural things, the realm of ends is equated with that of pure, self-determined intelligences. The ethic of ends puts 'flesh on the bones’ of the first formulation by indicating what kind of maxims could be willed as universal laws; human beings not using themselves or others as means to subjective ends implies a view of what right actions are. The view that the individual ought not be subject to another will implies that the individual should be considered as his/her own law-giver. Thus, whilst the: realm of means is equated with the world of natural things, the realm of ends is equated with that of pure, self-determined intelligences. The rational being legislates universally by all maxims of its will so as to judge itself and its actions from this perspective. 

Treating humanity in oneself and in others as an end in itself is to act according to only those maxims which can become universal laws or laws of nature. ‘From this there now follows our third practical principle for the will —as the supreme condition of the will's conformity with universal practical reason—namely, the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law.’ (GMM 1991: 93). The Formula of Autonomy establishes that 'the will is .. not merely subject to the law but is so subject that it must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)' (GMM 1991:93). In acting out of respect for the moral law, the moral agent wills himself/herself and others as legislative selves (noumenal selves) and as colegislators in a moral order of universal cooperation (GMM 1991:98/9; Van Der Linden 1988:30). 





To treat others as ends in themselves respects the demand that individual agents should create a society of legislators concerned to promote each other's ends. Thus the formulation demands that the moral agent act always so that the will through its maxims could regard itself at the same time as 'making universal law' (GMM 1991:94).

This is a conception of a community of rational beings under law, constituting their selfhood in relation with the moral individuality of all others. The fundamental worth individuals seek for themselves from other subjects they also acknowledge in other subjects (Cassirer 1981:248/9).

This concept of every rational being 'as one who must regard himself as making universal law by all the maxims of his will' leads to the 'closely connected' concept of the realm of ends (GMM 1991:95): 'every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxims always a lawmaking member in the universal kingdom of ends' (GMM 1991:100). Kant defines the ‘kingdom of ends’ as a democratic realm. 

I understand by a 'kingdom" a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws. Now since laws determine ends as regards their universal validity, we shall be able—if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends—to conceive a whole of all ends in systematic conjunction (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and also of the personal ends which each may set before himself); that is, we shall be able to conceive a kingdom of ends which is possible in accordance with the above principles.




This 'systematic union of different rational beings' (GMM 1991:95) establishes an ideal of humanity as it ought to be, an ideal realm in which moral agents respect each other as legislators and as ends in themselves: 

A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he makes its universal laws, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as its head, when as the maker of laws he is himself subject to the will of no other.




In the realm of ends each individual upholds and promotes the conditions of autonomy.

By making the moral law their own end, individual agents make their end the moral community in which each furthers the ends of the other, realising the highest good (Van Der Linden 1988:32/3 38). This realm, then, is composed not merely of monadic legislators lacking relation and interaction, but of co-legislators in a reciprocal community: 'every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxims always a lawmaking member in the universal kingdom of ends' (GMM 1991:100).

The categorical imperative is the cornerstone of Kant’s Copernican revolution in ethics. The categorical imperative originates in human reason; it is not something which is externally imposed upon us by another ruler, divine or human, but is something we impose on ourselves. Nevertheless, whilst the categorical imperative has its origins in human reason, it has the form of constraint  given the fact that human beings are imperfectly rational creatures. Natural inclinations incline human beings to act contrary to the principle and therefore require rational restraint (G, 4:412—14). This restraint is what the categorical imperative achieves. The categorical imperative requires us to act only on "maxims" that can be ‘universalized’ in being accepted and acted on by all those affected. Such principles must be universalizable in that every person must always be treated as ends and never merely as means (4:429). If each person respected the principle of universalizability in acting on the categorical imperative, the result would be a "realm of ends," a "whole of all ends in systematic connection (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that each may set himself") (4:433). In the realm of ends each person is intrinsically valuable and is treated as such, not as a mere means to the ends of others. This is a realm in which the particular ends set by each person are promoted by all persons to the extent that this can consistently be done. 

In the Review of the Formulae, Kant argues that the three ways of representing the principle of morality are at bottom merely so many formulations of precisely the same law, one of them by itself containing a combination of the other two. All maxims have, in short,
1.	a form, which consists in their universality; and in this respect the formula of the moral imperative is expressed thus: 'Maxims must be chosen as if they had to hold as universal laws of nature';
2.	a matter—that is, an end; and in this respect the formula says: 'A rational being, as by his very nature an end and consequently an end in himself, must serve for every maxim as a condition limiting all merely relative and arbitrary ends';
3.	a complete determination of all maxims by the following formula, namely: 'All maxims as proceeding from our own making of law ought to harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature'. This progression may be said to take place through the categories of the unity of the form of will (its universality); of the multiplicity of its matter (its objects—that is, its ends); and of the totality or completeness of its system of ends. 

In the Review of the whole argument, Kant argues that the will is absolutely good if its maxim, when made into a universal law, can never be in conflict with itself. This principle is therefore also its supreme law: 'Act always on that maxim whose universality as a law you can at the same time will'. This is the one principle on which a will can never be in conflict with itself, and such an imperative is categorical. 

Teleology views nature as a kingdom of ends; ethics views a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the first case the kingdom of ends is a theoretical Idea used to explain what exists. In the second case it is a practical Idea used to bring into existence what does not exist but can be made actual by our conduct—and indeed to bring it into existence in conformity with this Idea.
GMM 1991: 99

Rational nature separates itself out from all other things by the fact that it sets itself an end. An end would thus be the matter of every good will. The principle 'So act in relation to every rational being (both to yourself and to others) that he may at the same time count in your maxim as an end in himself’ is at bottom the same as the principle 'Act on a maxim which at the same time contains in itself its own universal validity for every rational being'. To argue that in using means to every end, each person ought to restrict his or her maxim by the condition that it should also be universally valid as a law for every subject is the same as arguing that a subject of ends, the rational being himself or herself, ‘must be made the ground for all maxims of action, never merely as a means, but as a supreme condition restricting the use of every means—that is, always also as an end.’
From this it follows that every rational being, as an end in himself or herself, must be able to regard himself or herself as the maker of universal law, since it is precisely the fitness of his maxims to make universal law that marks him out as an end in himself. It also follows from this that a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) is possible as a kingdom of ends in which laws are made by all persons as members. Accordingly every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxims always a law-making member in the universal kingdom of ends. The formal principle of such maxims is 'So act as if your maxims had to serve at the same time as a universal law (for all rational beings)'. 
Kant therefore argues that a kingdom of ends is possible only on the analogy of a kingdom of nature; yet the kingdom of ends is possible only through maxims —that is, self-imposed rules—while nature is possible only through laws concerned with causes whose action is necessitated from without. 

In spite of this difference, we give to nature as a whole, even although it is regarded as a machine, the name of a 'kingdom of nature' so far as—and for the reason that—it stands in a relation to rational beings as its ends. Now a kingdom of ends would actually come into existence through maxims which the categorical imperative prescribes as a rule for all rational beings, if these maxims were universally followed. Yet even if a rational being were himself to follow such a maxim strictly, he cannot count on everybody else being faithful to it on this ground, nor can he be confident that the kingdom of nature and its purposive order will work in harmony with him, as a fitting member, towards a kingdom of ends made possible by himself—or, in other words, that it will favour his expectation of happiness. But in spite of this the law 'Act on the maxims of a member who makes universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends' remains in full force, since its command is cate​gorical. And precisely here we encounter the paradox that without any further end or advantage to be attained the mere dignity of humanity, that is, of rational nature in man—and consequently that reverence for a mere Idea—should function as an inflexible precept for the will; and that it is just this freedom from dependence on interested motives which constitutes the sublimity of a maxim and the worthiness of every rational subject to be a law-making member in the kingdom of ends; for otherwise he would have to be regarded as subject only to the law of nature—the law of his own needs. Even if it were thought that both the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of ends were united under one head and that thus the latter kingdom ceased to be a mere Idea and achieved genuine reality, the Idea would indeed gain by this the addition of a strong motive, but never any increase in its intrinsic worth; for, even if this were so, it would still be necessary to conceive the unique and absolute law-giver him​self as judging the worth of rational beings solely by the disinterested behaviour they prescribed to themselves in virtue of this Idea alone.

Kant has been taken by both neo-Kantians (Rawls) and anti-Kantians (Sandel, Maclntyre) to be indifferent to ends in arguing that only actions done 'from duty' possess moral worth and exhibit a good will (GMM 1991:62/5 1956:84 85 37/8 DV 1964:50 52/3 R 1960:25) since to act 'from duty' is to act out of respect for the moral law rather than from inclination or from expectation of desirable consequences (GMM 1991:66). 
Kant's main concern is to argue that only actions which are done 'from duty' possess moral worth and exhibit a good will (GMM 1991:62/5 1956:84 87/8 DV 1964:50 52/3 R 1960:25). To act 'from duty' is to act out of respect for the moral law, rather than from inclination or from expectation of desirable consequences (GMM 1991:66). 





Whilst it is easy to decide whether the action which accords with duty has been done from duty or from some purpose of self-interest, ‘this distinction is far more difficult to perceive when the action accords with duty and the subject has in addition an immediate inclination to the action.’ (GMM 1991:64). 
It is morally significant whether an act is done from duty or from inclination since for Kant it is only in actions done from duty that individuals exercise their freedom, their capacity to act as autonomous beings independent of and superior to the natural or sensible world (1956:89/90). It is not enough that action should accord with duty, it must be done for 'the sake of duty'. Otherwise the accordance is merely contingent and spurious because, though the unmoral ground may indeed now and then produce lawful actions, more often it brings forth unlawful ones (GMM 1991:63ff). The view that the moral worth of an action resides in its consequences reduces the good will to being an efficient cause of good actions rather than as an end in itself. It is only in actions done from duty that individuals exercise their freedom, exercising their capacity to act as autonomous beings independent of and superior to the natural or sensible world (1956:89/90).

Further, whilst the concept of duty entails subjection to the law, this entails a certain sublimity and dignity, since moral agents subject themselves to a law that they themselves have made. 





Sublimity and dignity lie not in subjection to law but in its authorship. Human beings as rational beings and moral agents are subject to laws of their own making. 
Nevertheless, for Hegel, Kant’s pure motive of duty can never produce the good since it is abstracted from everything that comprises a real life, from desires, interests, and needs that real individuals have. Hegel's demand that the good be made an integral part of the everyday empirical life of individuals follows Aristotle's conception of a virtue as an intelligent disposition to behave in certain ways and act for certain reasons through feeling pleasure or pain at certain things (PR para 150R; Aristotle NE 1980:35/9). Hegel considers Aristotelian virtue to transcend Kant's dualism of duty and inclination.





Whereas for Aristotle reason had to persuade desire what it should want, for Kant a truly moral act is performed out of respect for the moral law, without regard to inclinations. 
For Kant, reason is immanent in the mind of the autonomous moral agent and is unrelated to external objects. The problem is that if reason is noumenally structured, the empirical realm is left free from moral significance. Whereas Aristotle could make public life crucial to individual self-realisation as the essential field of human interaction, Kant's approach assumes a set of rational ideas inherent in the human mind from which the state as the prime political object derives. Hegel thus charges Kantian ethics with being an 'empty formalism' which is incapable of generating an 'immanent doctrine of duties' (PR para 135R). Kant's pure motive of duty becomes a 'preaching' of 'duty for duty's sake’ providing no content or direction of action (PR para 135R).

In concentrating upon the form of moral judgment, Kant is open to the criticism that he neglected the content, being more concerned with how something is willed than with what is willed. Kant limits his comments to the statement that whatever is done must be in accord with duty (GMM 1991:101). Duty is ‘the objective necessity to act from obligation.’ For Hegel, Kant cannot prescribe the content of the moral law without violating his canon of universality, that the essence of pure will and pure practical reason is to be abstracted from all content. 'Thus it is a self-contradiction to seek in this absolute practical reason a moral legislation which would have to have a content, since the essence of this reason is to have none' (Hegel NL 1975:76).

However, Hegel's criticism is valid only if the categorical imperative is identified with the Formula of Universal Law, emphasising the universality of its form. 
Hegel's criticism is valid only if attention remains fixed upon the Formula of Universal Law, focusing upon the categorical imperative's universality in terms of its form. 

Kant's morality is indeed formal, but it is not empty in the sense of sheer consistency and non-contradiction. Kant is not indifferent to ends. 

Kant's standard of universalisation is tied to the ethic of ends which imposes the duty upon each to treat all others with the respect that they expect to receive in return. This ethic has practical implications, ruling out institutions and practices which treat human beings as means to external ends and leading directly The imperative to treat humanity as an end and never as a means puts some 'nonheteronomous teleological flesh' upon 'the bare bones of universality’ (Riley 1982:49), thus tying the standard of universalisation to an ethic which imposes the duty upon each to treat all others with the respect they expect to receive in return. This leads directly to the 'realm of ends' composed of free and equal members, a moral community of autonomous, self-legislating agents.

The basis of the conflict between Kant and Hegel lies in their different conceptions of objective ends. Hegel's more Aristotelian teleology makes the ends of moral action a condition in the world, making actions instrumental to some good yet to be achieved. Whereas Kant considered the moral will to be part of the 'rational nature' of human beings, hence prior to actions, Hegel made it part of historical development, attached to  commitments in the objective world and embodied in of political and legal institutions (PR para 75A). For Kant, this denies the moral status of action since the end is not extrinsic to action but is part of the 'rational nature' of human beings, as ends capable of shaping and pursuing ends (DV 1971:45/6 51).

Set alongside Aristotelian notions of the richly endowed happy individual, the Kantian self does appear to be socially, culturally and historically deracinated, as 'thin as a needle’ in the words of Iris Murdoch (Murdoch 1985:53). But it is simply not true to argue that the Kantian self is subjected to the empty ethic of duty for duty's sake and lacks moral and affective ties to others. Kant was as interested as Aristotle in developing the right kind of moral personality. The difference is that Kant's good character possesses a democratic character in being open to anyone, regardless of gifts of intelligence, beauty, wealth or good luck. Kant realises that universal principle alone, at a formal level, cannot ensure morality. He therefore ties it to an ethic of ends which treats all individuals as beings endowed with dignity by virtue of their humanity, their capacity for moral action. Kant's ethic taught respect for the rational moral element in each individual and is 'built to preserve its own self-respect and that of others, neither demanding nor enduring servility' (Shklar 1984:233). 

The apparently thin conception of rational agency in the Universal Formula is thus developed into an intersubjective ethic of objective ends and a moral community. Kant does therefore possess an intersubjective dimension. The capacity to universalise the principles of actions is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the morality of these actions. Principles are only moral when tied to objective ends, specifically the injunction to treat human beings as ends rather than means. The conception of rational agency in the universal Formula is thin when considered in itself, which is why Kant connected it to an ethic of objective ends and a moral community. Without this teleology, Kant states, morality would be 'destroyed'.

Kant departs from the classical conception of happiness as an intrinsic component of the highest good. Kant recognises the extent to which the modern principle of subjectivity has subverted the overarching ethical framework of the good, severing the necessary connection between individual happiness and the universal good in the classical conception.
Kant recognises the extent to which the modern principle of subjectivity has severed the necessary connection between individual happiness and the universal good in the Aristotelian conception. 

As a result, the notion of the good is subjectivised, becoming the product of individual desire and preference, in opposition to the individual good of others and the common good of all. The notion of the good is subjectivised, becoming the product of individual desire and preference, in opposition to the individual good of others and the common good of all. 
To deal with this situation, Kant's ethics demote happiness from being the first principle of practical philosophy: 'it is the moral disposition  which  conditions  and  makes  possible  the participation in happiness, and not  conversely the prospect  of happiness that makes possible  the  moral disposition' (1965 B.841).

For Kant, the task of moral philosophy is not to prescribe the ends that individuals ought to pursue in order to achieve happiness but to ensure that this pursuit meets the universality test and respects the external freedom of others (DV 1964:47). At the most basic level, Kant identifies happiness with the 'maximum' of well being of a finite rational being, its total and lasting advantage through the satisfaction of natural desires or inclinations (GMM 1991:59 61 64 79 Prac 1956:20; Pure 1965: B.834). But this hedonistic view is subordinate to 'contentment in fulfilling a purpose .. determined by reason alone, acknowledging the 'highest practical function' of reason to be the establishment of a good will (GMM 1991:62). Happiness and the good are no longer directly connected but require the mediation of moral virtue. The rational value of happiness - the 'complete good' - now depends upon the possession of moral virtue and is made the condition of the worthiness to be happy through moral conduct or goodwill (GMM 1991:59 1965 B.837-838 B.841).
In the first instance, Kant identifies happiness with the well being of a finite rational being (GMM 1959:61), its total and lasting advantage through the satisfaction of natural desires or inclinations. Kant goes further in arguing that happiness is an 'idea' in which 'all inclinations are combined into a sum total’ (GMM 1991:64), an 'absolute whole or maximum of well-being' (FMM 1959:35). 'Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires' (1965: B.834). Kant subordinates the hedonistic view that objects of desire are willed for the pleasure they  may  bring  (Prac  1956:20)  to  'contentment  in fulfilling  a  purpose  ..  determined  by  reason  alone, acknowledging the 'highest practical function' of reason to be the establishment of a good will (GMM 1991:62). 'Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of the rational beings who are thereby rendered worthy of it, alone constitutes the supreme good of that world wherein, in accordance with the command of a pure but practical reason, we are under obligation to place ourselves' (1965 B.342).
The reality of this systematic unity of ends occurs in the intelligible - hence moral - world rather than in the sensible world (1965 B.842). This 'leads inevitably also to the purposive unity of all things, which constitute this great whole, in accordance with universal laws of nature (just as the former unity is in accordance with universal and necessary laws of morality), and thus unites the practical with the speculative reason' (1965 B.843). The world must be in harmony with that moral employment of reason founded on the idea of the supreme good (1955 B.844).

Kant thus develops a concept of happiness as the harmony of ends. Happiness, as free and rational activity, is more than self-preservation, instinctual gratification, and pleasure, but consists of knowledge, insight and creativity (Van Der Linden 1985:70/1).

The actions of a being having will have to be determined by reason rather than instinct (GMM 1991:60/111). To this end, natural inclinations are to be 'tamed': 'instead of clashing with one another they can be brought into a harmony in a wholeness which is called happiness’ (R 1960:51). Happiness is the unification of 'all the ends which are prescribed by our desires' (1965:632), a harmony of ends. 

‘Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of the rational beings who are thereby rendered worthy of it, alone constitutes the supreme good of that world wherein, in accordance with the commands of a pure but practical reason, we are under obligation to place ourselves' (1965 B.842). The systematic unity of ends in the intelligible - hence moral - world (1965 B.842) leads to 'the purposive unity of all things, which constitute this great whole, in accordance with universal laws of nature' (1965 B.843). The world must be in harmony with that moral employment of reason founded on the idea of the supreme good (1965 B.844).

This section concludes with an examination of the realm of ends as a possible world in which all individuals really are the pure moral agents following the moral law which reason asserts they ought to be (GMM 1991: 95/6). 

Thus morality consists in the relation of all action to the making of laws whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible. This making of laws must be found in every rational being himself and must be able to spring from his will. The principle of his will is therefore never to perform an action except on a maxim such as can also be a universal law, and consequently such that the will can regard itself as at the same time making universal law by means of its maxim. Where maxims are not already by their very nature in harmony with this objective principle of rational beings as makers of universal law, the necessity of acting on this principle is practical necessitation—that is, duty. Duty does not apply to the head in a kingdom of ends, but it does apply to every member and to all members in equal measure.




Kant's moral law, as self-legislated, asserts the rationality, freedom and equality of all and is applicable to each and all as noumenal persons. Kant offers an ideal aiming to emancipate individuals from the phenomenal world of causal laws. In contradistinction to legislation in the actual world, members always heed moral legislation in the realm of ends. Since each member is both legislator and the subject of the laws, giving the moral law and obeying it, all are equal.

The realm of ends is an idea of reason which is practically necessary if there is to be moral action (1965 B.372). The moral world is the world as it 'ought to be' as revealed by the necessary laws of morality. This moral is 'so .. far thought .. as a mere idea' since an account of its conditions in the sensible world of experience, the 'is', is lacking. Which isn’t to argue that Kant lacks an ideal to be achieved, far from it. The realm of ends is

at the same time a practical idea, which really can have, as it also ought to have, an influence upon the sensible world, to bring that world, to bring that world, so far as may be possible, into conformity with the idea. The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality .. as referring to the sensible world , viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment that is, as a corpus mysticism of the rational beings in it, so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every other.

Kant Critique of Pure Reason

This is a significant passage in that it suggests that Kant was searching for a way to overcome the infamous 'Kantian' dualism of Sein and Sollen, 'is' and 'ought', targeted by Hegel. Kant pursued this aim by looking to bring moral freedom into the sensible world of experience. In this way, the realm of ends becomes a practical idea.

Since each member is both legislator and the subject of the laws, giving the moral law and always obeying it, the realm of ends is an ideal human community composed of free and equal members (Kant 1965: B.372), a concept and goal of future society (1965: B.836f). In the sensible realm, its counterpart is progress towards communal autonomy, which Kant puts forward as the 'real object of our willing’ (1956:121f).

The question is how the ideal can be realised through human action. This is a question of the relation of theory to practice, to be discussed shortly. Freedom seems to be an unsituated concept on Kant’s premises, meaning that it cannot even be pursued let alone realised in the empirical world. As a result, freedom is unable to break out of the impotent noumenal sphere and enter the sphere of politics. 

Though its purpose is to authorize the application of coercion against those who violate freedom, as an ideal, the realm of ends exists as a criterion by which to critically evaluate the existing political order. Seen in this light, the realm of ends has radical, future oriented possibilities as an ideal civil constitution in which coercion has been replaced by moral reason. Discussing Plato's idea of the perfect city, Kant puts forward the ideal of the free civil constitution:





This is a statement of the principle of rational freedom, the idea that the freedom of each individual is conditional upon and compatible with the freedom of all individuals. Kant draws out the political implications of this ethical position. This ideal, Kant goes on to argue, cannot be criticised for its alleged impracticality given that no one knows how great or how small are the limitations on the capacity of human beings to realise their ideas. (This was also Spinoza’s defence of the potentialities of reason and freedom, see Peter Critchley Spinoza and the Rule of Reason 2007). 

This perfect state may never, indeed, come into being; none the less this does not affect the rightfulness of the idea, which, in order to bring the legal organisation of mankind ever nearer to its greatest possible perfection, advances this maximum as an archetype. For what the highest degree may be at which mankind may have to come to a stand, and how great a gulf may still have to be left between the idea and its realisation, are questions which no one can, or ought to, answer. For the issue depends on freedom; and it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any and every specified limit.

Kant Critique of Pure Reason

Kant's ethics are democratic in affirming every person to be competent to make universally legislative decisions. Kant’s ethics realise the principles of the French Revolution – liberty, equality and fraternity - with each member of the realm of ends deciding for themselves and treating all others as moral beings, each member equally having the power to make choices and decisions, and each member being a member of a moral community.

Kant's view of politics in the 1780's is defined by his failure to establish the relationship between the moral world and the sensible world of experience. However, as a democratic ethics, Kant's ethics surely aim against the identification of the realm of ends with an authoritarian and undemocratic state. As moral and rational beings, human beings are able to organise political society without the need for the coercive instrument of the state, since coercion rests upon the irrational nature of human beings. This realises Kant's moral imperative which holds that moral behaviour is action in conformity to the moral law. Prescribed by reason, moral action is behaviour dictated not by self-interest but by duty (Thompson 1994:106).

With the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant came to concentrate upon the substantive precept of the categorical imperative.





Kant's categorical imperative is his supreme moral principle. Its most politically and historically influential principles concern the ethic of ends  and the republic of ends: 

'Act in such a way that you treat humanity, both in your own person and in the person of all others, never as a means only, but always equally as an end'. 

‘and thus become through your maxims a legislative member of a possible republic of ends’.

These two principles deduced from the categorical imperative ground the moral foundations of the noumenological civil society and project that society as an ideal to be achieved. This republic of ends is, for Kant, a moral community or association composed of rational beings systematically united under the common law. This ethic prescribes that human beings as free and equal beings should treat both themselves individually and all others as ends in themselves and never merely as means. The person may be treated as a means, but never merely as a means. To treat a person as an end is to act on the recognition that he or she has purposes just like you (Raphael 1981:56/7).

Kant would thus, in his republic of ends, have appeared to have supplied himself with the ethical basis upon which to construct a political constitution. Certainly Kant's republic of ends is suggestive, packed with revolutionary political Implications. Restricted to theoretic purposes, however, it is lacking in social content and transformatory significance. Kant’s purposes are more cognitive than political. Thus Kant prescribes the plan of nature, in which the history of human beings culminates in a free and just civil constitution, as a regulative idea of reason, applicable more to knowledge than to political action resting upon morality. Kant's ideal civil constitution was ideal after all. Nevertheless, Kant's ethical society does exist as a moral standard by which to evaluate and critique an existing political society which rests upon compulsion rather than reason, thus demonstrating the failure of human beings to have attained their higher being. The question is whether the ideal be ever be realised.

The French Revolution plays an important role here, suggesting to Kant a path forwards by breaking down the barrier between the world of nature and the world of freedom. Kant refers to the French Revolution as both a 'phenomenon' and as 'something moral in principle'. And as phenomenon and moral, the Revolution was also political. Thus Kant came to affirm, in the actual, 'the right that a people must not be hindered by alien forces from giving itself the civil constitution it deems good for itself. And this involves the acceptance of the 'republican constitution' as the only constitution which is 'lawful and morally good' (Kant Werke VII 598-600).

6 THEORY AND PRACTICE
Having elaborated upon an ethical state or commonwealth in 'a certain analogy' to the political commonwealth, but without, as yet, establishing its connection to the temporal political world of experience (Religion 404-09), Kant shifted emphasis to construct a theoretical political structure from the world of political experience, excluding morality. In Theory and Practice, Kant argued against deriving principles of constitutional laws from political experience and instead called for the creation of a constitutional theory based upon a priori principles unrelated to morality. Thus Kant refers not to ethical but to 'external laws', 'external duties', 'external rights' and 'freedom in the mutual external relationships of human beings' (Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:73).

Nevertheless, there are clear similarities between Kant's constitutional principles and his ethical principles. Kant argued that constitutional principles could not be derived from the world of experience, since experience manifests too great a diversity to be able to form the common basis that law requires. Thus, these principles have to be willed by a pure a priori legislating reason and possess objective practical validity without our considering what good or ill may result (Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:73). In the argument developed by Kant here, 'right is the restriction of each individual's freedom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else (in so far as this is possible within the terms of a general law' (Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:73). Law is the general coercive rule which achieves this harmony. 'Since every restriction of freedom through the arbitrary will of another party is termed coercion, it follows that a civil constitution is a relationship among free men who are subject to coercive laws, while they retain their freedom within the general union with their fellows' (Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:73).
Kant derives three a priori principles, the only principles according to which the civil state, 'regarded purely as a lawful state', could be constituted, from these concepts.

1.	The freedom of every member of society as a human being.
2.	The equality of each member with all the others as a subject.
3.	The independence of each member of a commonwealth as a citizen.

Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:74

‘These principles are not so much laws given by an already established state, as laws by which a state can alone be established in accordance with pure rational principles of external human right.’
Kant thus refers to 
1)	Man's freedom as a human being, as a principle for the constitution of a commonwealth, can be expressed in the following formula. No-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general law—i.e. he must accord to others the same right as he enjoys himself. A government might be established on the principle of benevolence towards the people, like that of a father towards his children. Under such a paternal government (imperium paternale), the subjects, as immature children who cannot distinguish what is truly useful or harmful to themselves, would be obliged to behave purely passively and to rely upon the judgement of the head of state as to how they ought to be happy, and upon his kindness in willing their happiness at all. Such a government is the greatest conceivable despotism, i.e. a constitution which suspends the entire freedom of its subjects, who thenceforth have no rights whatsoever. The only conceivable government for men who are capable of possessing rights, even if the ruler is benevolent, is not a paternal but a patriotic government (imperium non paternale, sed patrioticum). A patriotic attitude is one where everyone in the state, not excepting its head, regards the commonwealth as a maternal womb, or the land as the paternal ground from which he himself sprang and which he must leave to his descendants as a treasured pledge. Each regards himself as authorised to protect the rights of the commonwealth by laws of the general will, but not to submit it to his personal use at his own absolute pleasure. This right of freedom belongs to each member of the commonwealth as a human being, in so far as each is a being capable of possessing rights.
2)	Man's equality as a subject might be formulated as follows. Each member of the commonwealth has rights of coercion in relation to all the others, except in relation to the head of state. For he alone is not a member of the commonwealth, but its creator or preserver, and he alone is authorised to coerce others without being subject to any coercive law himself. But all who are subject to laws are the subjects of a state, and are thus subject to the right of coercion along with all other members of the commonwealth; the only exception is a single person (in either the physical or the moral sense of the word), the head of state, through whom alone the rightful coercion of all others can be exercised…. This uniform equality of human beings as subjects of a state is, however, perfectly consistent with the utmost inequality of the mass in the degree of its possessions, whether these take the form of physical or mental superiority over others, or of fortuitous external property and of particular rights (of which there may be many) with respect to others. Thus the welfare of the one depends very much on the will of the other (the poor depending on the rich), the one must obey the other (as the child its parents or the wife her husband), the one serves (the labourer) while the other pays, etc. Nevertheless, they are all equal as subjects before the law, which, as the pronouncement of the general will, can only be single in form, and which concerns the form of right and not the material or object in relation to which I possess rights….. From this idea of the equality of men as subjects in a commonwealth, there emerges this further formula: every member of the commonwealth must be entitled to reach any degree of rank which a subject can earn through his talent, his industry and his good fortune. And his fellow-subjects may not stand in his way by hereditary prerogatives or privileges of rank and thereby hold him and his descendants back indefinitely….All right consists solely in the restriction of the freedom of others, with the qualification that their freedom can co-exist with my freedom within the terms of a general law; and public right in a commonwealth is simply a state of affairs regulated by a real legislation which conforms to this principle and is backed up by power, and under which a whole people live as subjects in a lawful state (statin iuridicus). This is what we call a civil state, and it is characterised by equality in the effects and counter-effects of freely willed actions which limit one another in accordance with the general law of freedom. 
3)	The independence of a member of the commonwealth as a citizen, i.e. as a co-legislator, may be defined as follows. In the question of actual legislation, all who are free and equal under existing public laws may be considered equal, but not as regards the right to make these laws. Those who are not entitled to this right are nonetheless obliged, as members of the commonwealth, to comply with these laws, and they thus likewise enjoy their protection (not as citizens but as co-beneficiaries of this protection). For all right depends on laws. But a public law which defines for everyone that which is permitted and prohibited by right, is the act of a public will, from which all right proceeds and which must not therefore itself be able to do an injustice to any one. And this requires no less than the will of the entire people (since all men decide for all men and each decides for himself). For only towards oneself can one never act unjustly. But on the other hand, the will of another person cannot decide anything for someone without injustice, so that the law made by this other person would require a further law to limit his legislation. Thus an individual will cannot legislate for a commonwealth. For this requires freedom, equality and unity of the will of all the members. And the prerequisite for unity, since it necessitates a general vote (if freedom and equality are both present), is independence. The basic law, which can come only from the general, united will of the people, is called the original contract. (TP Reiss ed 1996). 

There are clear parallels between these principles and the moral republic of ends which Kant derived from the categorical imperative. Nevertheless Kant makes no attempt to refer to the ethical basis of these principles. The freedom, equality and autonomy of the individual as man, subject and citizen in the state is derived from the operation of an external legislative reason. Further, the coercive, diremptive and inegalitarian features of the existing political and social order show through in Kant’s constitution of the commonwealth. The uniform equality of human beings as subjects of a state is  perfectly consistent with the utmost inequality. Kant affirms the physical or mental superiority of some over others. True, Kant also affirms the meritocratic principle that every member of the commonwealth must be entitled to reach any degree of rank which a subject can earn through his talent, his industry and his good fortune, an idea derived from the idea of the equality of men as subjects in a commonwealth. Kant also violates the principle of self-assumed obligation when arguing that whilst all who are free and equal under existing public laws may be considered equal, they are not so with respect to the right to make these laws. Those not entitled to this right are nonetheless obliged to comply with these laws. Kant’s reasoning is that, as members of the commonwealth, those not entitled to the right to make laws nevertheless enjoy their protection. This violates the principle of citizenship and Kant knows it, referring to such members ‘not as citizens but as co-beneficiaries of this protection’. The laws tend to most protect those who have made them. Kant’s reasoning here is plainly anti-democratic and runs contrary to the democratic thrust of his ethical position. There would appear to be a flagrant contradiction here in Kant’s position concerning morality and politics. Indeed, Kant would appear to have abandoned the ‘rational’ tradition of Plato and Aristotle for the plainly protective tradition of individualist liberalism, politics as a necessary evil for maintaining the ring between individuals competing for resources. Such a politics violates Kant’s ethics.

The character of Kant's conception influences the way that he treats the freedom of the individual in society. The principles of freedom are normative for the political world but do not enter into it. In the first place, in the original contract of civil society, these principles were nevertheless defined in terms of and necessarily limited by experience. Freedom is thus defined as the right of the individual to pursue happiness without the interference of the state. (Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:74). Kant argues against paternal government as 'the greatest conceivable despotism' (Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:74). Equality becomes the equal 'rights of coercion' each member of the commonwealth possesses in relation to all the other members (Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:74/5). This original contract is to be conceived not as an actual historical fact, as regards an existing constitution, but as 'merely an idea of reason' in which the judgement of existing laws according to the criterion of whether 'they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation’ and according to these very principles (Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:79). Hence the inalienable rights which people possess against the head of state cannot be 'coercive. The limitations that the principles place upon the head of the state 'obviously applies only to the judgement of the legislator, not to that of the subject' (Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:79/80). Thus, with the establishment of the civil constitution, the autonomous right of citizens to legislate the laws to themselves is actually transformed into a hypothetical 'as if and is thus turned into the rational norm of freedom and equality, existing as a criterion according to which the head of the state adjusts the laws. Indeed, far from pursuing the principle of, the right of citizens to legislate the laws to which they are subjected to its radical conclusion, Kant actually comes to argue that even if a law existed to which the people, at that moment, could not be conceived as consenting too if asked the law should nevertheless still be considered as just insofar as 'it is at least possible that a people could agree to it' (Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:79). The full passage here is worth quoting in full, since it places Kant within the theoretico-elitist model, a tradition which leads from the ancient device of the Lawgiver as well as Plato’s Philosopher King, and carries on through the Buonarotti-Weitling tradition of revolutionary Jacobinism, all the way up to the revolutionary party bringing socialism to the proletariat ‘from the outside’.





This amounts to a justification of an elite rule and an educative politics on the basis of the objective interests of the citizens, even though these citizens in their empirical reality do not recognise those interests as their own. It is the age old recourse to the philosopher ruler as educator in an attempt to overcome a recalcitrant reality. Surely, if it is indeed possible that a people could agree to a law, the point is to relate theory and practice in such a way as to realise that possibility in the process of making the law. Instead, Kant applies the law before the fact, opening up a massive democratic deficit in his politics.

Time and again in his political writings, Kant shies away from the radical implications of his ethical theory. Kant seems unable to apply his ethics to politics. 

And it would then be seen that, until the general will is there, the people has no coercive right against its ruler, since it can apply coercion legally only through him. But if the will is there, no force can be applied to the ruler by the people, otherwise the people would be the supreme ruler. Thus the people can never possess a right of coercion against the head of state, or be entitled to oppose him in word or deed. 

Theory and Practice in Reiss ed. 1991:83.

Kant’s argument is categorical, concluding that the people ‘can never’ possess a right of coercion against the head of state. Yet he begins the passage by arguing that if the general will is there, the people does have a coercive right against its ruler. The presence of the general will as an active principle in politics effectively means that the people has constituted itself as the supreme ruler. Kant’s realm of ends implies some such thing, yet Kant fails to apply his ethic within the realm of politics.

Kant, then, has two states confronting each other from different perspectives. On the one side, there is the ethical state in which the sovereign law of reason raised the individual to the universal moral level, the individual attaining what was truly human in himself or herself. On the other side, there is the juridical state in which the sovereign law of reason integrated the individual at the level of civil society. 

The way beyond the impasse lies in affirming Kant’s developmental conception of human potentiality. Against the conservative thesis which makes corrupt human nature responsible for imperfect political institutions, Kant affirms the potentiality of human beings to achieve the flourishing society. Identifying the cause of imperfection with 'the neglect of the pure ideas in the making of the laws' (Pure 1965:312), Kant explains corrupt human nature by reference to imperfect institutions. In corrupting human nature, these imperfect institutions ought to be transformed and established on a moral basis. Happiness deriving from the moral perfection of humanity does not imply an unmediated existence proceeding through 'inner' conviction but is set within the collective framework of a perfect civil constitution and its laws. Kant's 'concept of freedom' is the essential core of Kant's ethics concerning the possibility of the categorical imperative, the 'keystone of the whole edifice of pure reason' (1965 B.7 394n; 1956:3). 

This means realising the perfect constitution as part of the duty to realise the highest good. Kant describes this ideal constitution as 'a necessary idea which must be taken as fundamental not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws'. This perfect constitution is a 'state’ that has lost its coercive character. This ideal, Kant goes on to argue, cannot be criticised for its alleged impracticality: 'For the issue depends on freedom; and it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any and every specific limit' (1965 B.374). Kant raises the possibility that the 'more legislation and government are brought into harmony with the above idea, the rarer would punishment become', making it 'quite rational to maintain .. that in a perfect state no punishments whatsoever would be required'. The fact that this perfect state may never be achieved does not alter 'the rightfulness of the idea, which, in order to bring the legal organisation of mankind ever nearer to its greatest possible perfection, advances this maximum as an archetype' (1965 B.373-374).

The implications are radical. Political and social institutions which deny the lawmaking autonomy of individuals may be criticised and transformed from the perspective of the ideal. Since heteronomy - determination by external laws (one’s natural inclinations or the arbitrary will of others) - is the norm in existing society, autonomy - being governed rationally by self-legislated laws - remains a goal to be achieved (Van Der Linden 1988:32). 

Existing political and social institutions may be criticised from the perspective of the ideal since they deny the lawmaking autonomy of individuals. However, whilst the concept of the republic of ends can critically expose the failings of actual society, it is not able to show how this society can be brought into accordance with the ideal. Marx's critique exposes the heteronomous character of capitalist society in order to realise the autonomous moral community. Within capitalism, the ends of some are preferred or downgraded to those of others. Marx's conception of communism as 'an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all' (CM 1973:87) is in a direct line of descent from the ideal constitution as promising a self-regulating society.

Undermining Kant's ideal is the contradiction between the realm of ends and the empirical world, the way reason is raised over nature. Kant formulates his ideal constitution in abstraction from certain 'hindrances' (1965 B.374). 
What Kant is referring to here becomes clear in the second Critique. Firstly, there is sensory nature as external to the individual and which cannot be altered by even the legislation of reason, the determination of human will by the moral law (Kant 1956:15 21). Knowledge of the course of nature is crucial in overcoming this hindrance. 
Secondly, there is internal nature, the inclinations individuals possess through natural causality (1956:20ff). Being morally free, rational beings, the individual has the capacity to act independently of natural inclinations. Individuals need to be taught how to act against the inclinations aroused by external objects through the 'respect' aroused by the moral law (1956:84f 117 160f).
This educational process gives Kant's philosophy an intersubjective dimension, one that avoids authoritarian implications since it is based on the moral law within each and all. The attainment of autonomy through the 'culture of reason' (1956:162f) is not the result of legislative reason on the part of an isolated individual but requires the development by society as a whole of individual reason (1965 B.845 1956:64f). The role Kant assigns the 'culture of reason' makes apparent, however, the extent to which the realm of ends is divorced from the empirical world. Human society has a history whereas the realm of ends, as the rational idea of a nonempirical, perfect community rather than an appearance, does not (cf CJ 444).

The problem lies in the way that Kant sets reason over nature. Kant requires a more material account of the ideal and this is available. The fact that the actual purposiveness and inclinations of individuals within the empirical world are present within any meaningful interaction makes it possible to conceive reason as truly interactive, situated and social.
The only problem then is to discern how the ideal can be realised through human action on Kant's own premises. The capacity for moral action, noumenally part of the a priori capacities of the rational human mind, is a different notion from Aristotelian empirical self-actualisation. As Hegel came to argue, although moral action always occurs in a context, Kant's morality is unsituated in that freedom as the a priori causality of reason pays no regard to empirical givens and thus offers no guidance with respect to material moral action. If freedom remains this unsituated concept, it cannot even be pursued let alone realised in the empirical or sensible realm. Freedom is confined in an impotent noumenal sphere.

Though the realm of ends can reveal how existing society is deficient in comparison with the ideal it is unable to show how society can be improved so as to increase the accordance. This requires the use of 'hypothetical' maxims relating empirical givens to ends. 

All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may will). A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end.
Every practical law represents a possible action as good and therefore as necessary for a subject whose actions are determined by reason. Hence all imperatives are formulae for determining an action which is necessary in accordance with the principle of a will in some sense good. If the action would be good solely as a means to something else, the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as good in itself and therefore as necessary, in virtue of its principle, for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is categorical.
An imperative therefore tells me which of my possible actions would be good; and it formulates a practical rule for a will that does not perform an action straight away because the action is good — whether because the subject does not always know that it is good or because, even if he did know this, he might still act on maxims contrary to the objective principles of practical reason.




Though they are empirical and not moral maxims (GMM 1991:78/9 1956:20), hypothetical imperatives are not lacking in moral significance when it comes to realising desired ends. There is a need to go beyond the purely moral realm of ends to explain materially what this significance is and such imperatives play a role in this project.

This requires a more material conception of interaction than Kant makes available. In the realm of ends, each member treats all others as ends so that all respect the moral legislation of the other. However, in abstracting from the 'empirically conditioned' purposes which agents set for themselves so that only purposes 'posited through freedom' remain, there is nothing to interact about. Since all maxims present in the realm of ends are derived from the moral law that inheres in every member of the realm, so that each, as legislator, is able to prescribe maxims for her/himself on its basis, interaction takes the form of mutual noninterference. The fact that the actual purposiveness and inclinations of individuals within the empirical world are present within any meaningful interaction shows the extent to which the realm of ends diverges from the empirical world. Only with a material account of the ideal can reason become truly interactive, situated and social.

The question is whether Kant's nonempirical ideal could be realised as an empirical world of free personalities freely accepting the law. This is a realm of self-sufficient subjects in rational union. Marx wasn’t so much sceptical as downright hostile. Marx saw Kant's highest good as the province of religious hope rather than practical politics: 'Kant was satisfied with "good will" alone, even if it remained entirely without result, and he transferred the realisation of this good will, the harmony between it and the needs and impulses of individuals, to the world beyond' (GI 1999:97). This implies that Kant's highest good exists only in abstraction, like Plato’s World of Being. However, Kant's moral law projects an abstract and 'empty' ideal only if this end is detached from the moral community of co-legislators who seek to enhance one another's ends. Kant's highest good is an empty ideal or religious only to the extent that it is not grounded in the categorical imperative as a social ethics and moral praxis (Van Der Linden 1985:78/9). Kant's highest good rests upon 'a moral kingdom of purposes., viz., the existence of rational beings under moral laws' (CJ 1951:295). This is grounded in the categorical imperative, which demands that individuals seek the moral kingdom in which each enhances the ends of all. All obey the moral law and cooperate in the promotion of universal happiness. 

Marx himself is vulnerable to the criticism that he has underestimated the power of morality and culture in realising the highest good, achieved through the participation of all human beings as rational beings, not just those with material futurity and the structural power to act. Marx can also be accused of denigrating the transcendental perspective which has inspired human beings throughout history to constantly raise their sights above the temporal or empirical realm to seek a world that is better than the one that is immediately given. The creative power that is assigned to ideals, morality and culture is a strength that Kantian transcendental idealism has over perspectives which narrow praxis down to things, tools, instruments, interests.

That said, Marx identifies the crucial question as being how to relate the ‘good will’ in the ideal noumenal realm to the needs and impulses of individuals in the empirical world. The task that the ideal of the realm of ends sets for each individual, as a member of a group of rational beings, is to establish society according to the moral law. The final end of humanity will be realised when 'the authority, not of governments but of conscience within us, will .. rule the world' (LE 1980). This is the idea of the 'moral world', the world as it 'ought to be', as revealed by the 'necessary laws of morality' (B.836). This is 'so .. far thought .. as a mere idea' since an account of its conditions in the sensible world of experience is lacking. Nevertheless, it is at the same time 'a practical idea, which really can have, as it also ought to have, an influence upon the sensible world, to bring that world, so far as may be possible, into conformity with the idea' (1965 B.836). The idea of a moral world, therefore, has 'objective reality', not as referring to an object of an intelligible intuition 'but as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment' (B.836). This achieves the idea of a 'corpus mysticum of rational beings' 'so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every other' (B.836). The ethical state is thus based on the moral law and the moral purpose that that law engenders. This association uniting rational individuals would be possible if pure morality was expanded so that it were freely accepted by all. 

Kant identifies the perfect constitution as the republican state, realising the social as against unsocial character of human beings through the rule of law, and guaranteeing the greatest possible freedom for each consistent with all. Government facilitates the development of the moral disposition to a direct respect for the law by placing a barrier against the outbreak of unlawful inclinations (PP Reiss 1991:121n).

In assuring each that all will follow the concept of law, government facilitates the development of the moral disposition to a direct respect for the law, representing a 'great step' 'towards morality .. towards a state where the concept of duty is recognised for its own sake, irrespective of any possible gain in return' (PP Reiss 1991:121n). Here, Kant emphasises again that true morality is built on a duty that is emphatically distinguished from interest, gain, from class or sectional implication. The rule of law fosters a climate favourable to moral autonomy and is thus preparatory for the final end of creation, the moral community in which the command of law is internalised as the product of moral motives rather than of self-interest and coercion. With internal discipline replacing external discipline, political peace is spontaneously affirmed by human agents as morally autonomous beings.

This end of political peace beyond coercion is expressed in Kant's argument that the visible church prepares the ground for the invisible church. Ultimately, religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds and 'all statutes which provisionally unite men for the requirements of the good'. In the end, 'pure religion of reason will rule over all'. Statutes become a fetter and 'become bit by bit dispensable'. With 'true freedom' 'each obeys the (non-statutory) law which he prescribes to himself, obeying a rational will, 'a will which by invisible means unites all under one common government into one state' (R 1960:112). This future 'state' is the moral community resting upon an 'inner' unification of good wills through the moral law.

6 POLITICAL PEACE - Peace And Freedom Under Law

Kant is not silent on the institutional, political and practical requirements of realising the good in the real world. In Perpetual Peace, Kant attempted the synthesis of the ‘ought-to-be’ and the ‘is’ in a definite political system. Though he frequently denied it, Kant did not regard the free will of the moral agent as being irrelevant to politics. 'A true system of politics cannot therefore take a single step without first paying tribute to morality. And although politics in itself is a difficult art, no art is required to combine it with morality. For as soon as the two come into conflict, morality can cut through the knot which politics cannot untie.' (Perpetual Peace in Reiss ed 1991:123). Kant writes of the ‘the desperate conclusions to which we are inevitably driven if we do not assume that the pure principles of right have an objective reality, i.e. that they can be applied in practice. And whatever empirical politics may say to the contrary, the people within the state, as well as the states in their relations with one another, must act accordingly’ (PP in Reiss ed 1991:123). Kant never denied the distinction between the moral and the political realms, something to be seen in the way he distinguishes between the phenomenal and the noumenal, between human beings as 'angels' and 'devils'. But he did argue that the problem of setting up a state could be solved even by a nation of 'devils', providing they act rationally and submit to coercive laws (Reiss ed 1991:112/3). There is a clear tendency for his thought to press against the boundary separating the political from the moral, overcoming the distinction between the politically possible and the morally right (Riley 1982). Kant can thus make moral demands which possess quite revolutionary implications. Kant argues that there can be no conflict of politics, as a practical doctrine of right, with ethics, as a theoretical doctrine of right.





By guaranteeing equal external freedom for each individual, the rule of law fosters a climate favourable to moral autonomy and is preparatory for the final end of creation, the moral community in which the command of law is internalised as the product of moral motives rather than of self-interest and coercion, gain and power. Internal discipline replaces external discipline. 

Rightful (i.e. external) freedom cannot, as is usually thought, be defined as a warrant to do whatever one wishes unless it means doing injustice to others. For what is meant by a warrant ? It means a possibility of acting in a certain way so long as this action does not do any injustice to others. Thus the definition would run as follows: freedom is the possibility of acting in ways which do no injustice to others. That is, we do no injustice to others (no matter what we may actually do) if we do no injustice to others. Thus the definition is an empty tautology. In fact, my external and rightful freedom should be defined as a warrant to obey no external laws except those to which I have been able to give my own consent. Similarly, external and rightful equality within a state is that rela​tionship among the citizens whereby no-one can put anyone else under a legal obligation without submitting simultaneously to a law which requires that he can himself be put under the same kind of obligation by the other person. (And we do not need to define the principle of legal dependence, since it is always implied in the concept of a political constitution.) The validity of these innate and inalienable rights, the necessary property of mankind, is confirmed and enhanced by the principle that man may have lawful rela​tions even with higher beings (if he believes in the latter). For he may consider himself as a citizen of a transcendental world, to which the same principles apply. And as regards my freedom, I am not under any obligation even to divine laws (which I can recognise by reason alone), except in so far as I have been able to give my own consent to them; for I can form a conception of the divine will only in terms of the law of freedom of my own reason. (PP Reiss ed 1991:99). 

At this stage, political peace is freely and spontaneously affirmed by human agents as morally autonomous beings. In this community, agents do not merely leave each other free to pursue private ends but come actively to promote each other's ends (Van Der Linden 1985:188).

The principal aim of Kant's political philosophy is to establish 'the way to peace', converting chaos, difference and diversity into order, identity and unity (Saner 1973:3 4). Kant's political philosophy identifies the goal of human history as the empirical political fulfilment of the idea of 'rational freedom' (Cassirer 1981:407). This affirms that the 'sovereignty of the good principle is attainable, as far as men can work toward it, only through the establishment and spread of a society in accordance with and for the sake of the laws of virtue, a society whose task and duty it is rationally to impress these laws in all their scope upon the entire human race' (R 1949:404). It follows from this that ‘the species of rational beings is objectively, through the idea of reason, destined for a social goal, namely, the promotion of the highest good as a social good’ (R 1949:407).
The 'rational' ideal of the state, as the republican constitution in accord with natural rights, with the very nature of individuals, makes the dream of 'perpetual peace’ a realistic possibility (PP 1991:99/100 114).

Kant's conception is based upon the capacity of individuals to universalise and hence give their moral principles the force of law. Freedom is not the absence of constraint but the moral recognition of constraint in the shape of relationships of obligation with others. Constraint is put on a moral basis since human beings do not just obey law but make it. Kant thus establishes the principles ensuring the greatest possible freedom of each and all under a collectively universal will (Saner 1973:215). A legal order ensures an eternal peace by limiting individual freedom so that it is consistent with the freedom of all and hence with the common good (1965 B.779/80). The rules of the lawful state are reciprocal in being equally and mutually obligatory for all (Saner 1973:30/1). The law transforms the license in which the freedom of all individuals cancels itself out in mutual conflict into a freedom of each coexisting with the freedom of all. This image of freedom achieved through the reciprocity of legal obligations pervades the Critique of Pure Reason and is central to Kant's 'architectonic’ (1965 B.860).

In the Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784), Kant seeks to ground hope for moral progress in the historical process, seeking to inspire moral action to bring about the realisation of progressive political ends, the perfect state and peace. 
In the Idea, human culture evolves out of the chaotic state of nature. From within the chaotic appearance of the human world, Kant discerns a slow but steady evolution of culture (KGS 8:17).

Kant rests his argument on a number of propositions:

First Proposition
‘All the natural capacities of a creature are destined sooner or later to be developed completely and in conformity with their end.’

Second Proposition
In man (as the only rational creature on earth), those natural capacities which are directed towards the use of his reason are such that they could be fully developed only in the species, but not in the individual.’

Third Proposition
‘Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct and by his own reason. For nature does nothing unnecessarily and is not extravagant in the means employed to reach its ends. Nature gave man reason, and freedom of will based upon reason, and this in itself was a clear indication of nature's intention as regards his endowments. For it showed that man was not meant to be guided by instinct or equipped and instructed by innate knowledge; on the contrary, he was meant to produce everything out of himself.’

In the fourth proposition, Kant comes to the ‘unsocial sociability' which drives individuals towards associationalism - the inclination to 'live in society' - and individualisation - the tendency to 'live as an individual' - conflict (UH 1991:44). 

Fourth Proposition
‘The means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism within society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of a law-governed social order. By antagonism, I mean in this context the unsocial sociability of men, that is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up. This propensity is obviously rooted in human nature. Man has an inclination to live in society, since he feels in this state more like a man, that is, he feels able to develop his natural capacities. But he also has a great tendency to live as an individual, to isolate himself, since he also encounters in himself the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with his own ideas. He therefore expects resistance all around, just as he knows of himself that he is in turn inclined to offer resistance to others. It is this very resistance which awakens all man's powers and induces him to overcome his tendency to laziness. Through the desire for honour, power or property, it drives him to seek status among his fellows, whom he cannot bear yet cannot bear to leave. Then the first true steps are taken from barbarism to culture, which in fact consists in the social worthiness of man. All man's talents are now gradually developed, his taste cultivated, and by a continued process of enlightenment, a beginning is made towards establishing a way of thinking which can with time transform the primitive natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles; and thus a pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole. Without these asocial qualities (far from admirable in themselves) which cause the resistance inevitably encountered by each individual as he furthers his self-seeking pretensions, man would live an Arcadian, pastoral existence of perfect concord, self-sufficiency and mutual love. But all human talents would remain hidden for ever in a dormant state, and men, as good-natured as the sheep they tended, would scarcely render their existence more valuable than that of their animals. The end for which they were created, their rational nature, would be an unfilled void. Nature should thus be thanked for fostering social incompatibility, enviously competitive vanity, and insatiable desires for possession or even power. Without these desires, all man's excellent natural capacities would never be roused to develop. Man wishes concord, but nature, knowing better what is good for his species, wishes discord. Man wishes to live comfortably and pleasantly, but nature intends that he should abandon idleness and inactive self-sufficiency and plunge instead into labour and hardships, so that he may by his own adroitness find means of liberating himself from them in turn. The natural impulses which make this possible, the sources of the very unsociableness and continual resistance which cause so many evils, at the same time encourage man towards new exertions of his powers and thus towards further development of his natural capacities.’ (UH Reiss ed 1991:44). 

It is the purpose of Nature that human natural capacities be fully developed, not in any individual alone but in the human race as a whole. It is Nature’s intention that human beings use their natural capacities to work out their independent way of securing human well-being. The cunning of nature suffices for this task, operating through mechanisms of self-interest to compel human beings to institute 'a law-governed social order' (UH 1991:44). This is the fifth proposition.

Fifth Proposition
‘The greatest problem for the human species, the solution of which nature compels him to seek, is that of attaining a civil society which can administer justice universally. 
The highest purpose of nature—i.e. the development of all natural capacities—can be fulfilled for mankind only in society, and nature intends that man should accomplish this, and indeed all his appointed ends, by his own efforts. This purpose can be fulfilled only in a society which has not only the greatest freedom, and therefore a continual antagonism among its members, but also the most precise specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom in order that it can co-exist with the freedom of others. The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that of establishing a society in which freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly just civil constitution.’ (UH 1991:45).

The political problem is to recognise and reconcile the legitimate claims of both facts of sociability and asociability. The political problem is to accommodate both factors rather than suppress either. Arguing that 'the development of all natural capacities' is the 'highest purpose of nature', Kant predicates human growth and development upon the interplay between natural inclinations of asociability and moral inclinations of sociability (UH 1991:45). Unity can, therefore, be achieved out of antagonistic forces, these forces cancelling each other out in a republican arrangement achieved by nature, by prudence or by reason (Saner 1973:38 46 41/2 41/53 109/114). This is a step in the direction of the moral order. 'Unsocial sociability’ compels human beings to prepare for the replacement of a natural order of conflicting particular wills by the universal will of a legal order: 'a beginning is made towards establishing a way of thinking which can with time transform the primitive natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles' (UH 1991:44/5).

Out of this clash of antagonistic forces, the individual seeks a form of association which has 'the greatest freedom' which has specific limits so that 'it can coexist with the freedom of others' (UH 1991:45).
The cunning of nature, operating through mechanisms of self-interest, compels human beings to institute 'a law-governed social order' (UH 1991:44), a 'civil society which can administer justice universally’ (UH 1991:45).
The development of human capacities to the full requires the creation of a social order with the greatest possible freedom. The social order which enables the greatest possible freedom is a perfectly just constitution in which mutual opposition between its members is made consistent with freedom and justice. The highest problem that nature assigns to the human race is to design a just civic constitution. This civic constitution establishes a commonwealth in which the destructive passions of natural freedom are tamed for the good by civic union. 

Kant proceeded to delineate civil freedom whilst still adhering to a moderate monarchical absolutism. The rationale was that 'man is an animal who needs a master.' 

The development of the pragmatic capacity for social control involves a high human cost but nevertheless makes it possible to replace discord with concord, leading to a 'civil society which can administer justice universally' (UH 1991:45). To guarantee 'freedom under external laws' requires an 'irresistible force' since members of this 'perfectly just civil constitution' are related to each other in antagonistic fashion (UH 1991:46). Kant proceeds from the 'rational' argument both Aristotle and Rousseau made in differentiating liberty from license. Though the individual, as a rational being, 'desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all', 'he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law' and 'abuses his freedom in relation to others' and therefore 'requires a master to break his self will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free'. But since this 'master' can be found only the human species, and hence 'will also be an animal who needs a master' (UH 1991:46), the realisation of the perfect constitution in a society composed of particular citizen wills 'is both the most difficult and the last to be solved' (UH 1991:46).

Sixth Proposition
‘This problem is both the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human race. The difficulty (which the very idea of this problem clearly presents) is this: if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master. For he certainly abuses his freedom in relation to others of his own kind. And even although, as a rational creature, he desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all, he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law where he can. He thus requires a master to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free. But where is he to find such a master ? Nowhere else but in the human species. But this master will also be an animal who needs a master. Thus while man may try as he will, it is hard to see how he can obtain for public justice a supreme authority which would itself be just, whether he seeks this authority in a single person or in a group of many persons selected for this purpose. For each one of them will always misuse his freedom if he does not have anyone above him to apply force to him as the laws should require it. Yet the highest authority has to be just in itself and yet also a man. This is therefore the most difficult of all tasks, and a perfect solution is impossible. Nothing straight can be constructed from such warped wood as that which man is made of. Nature only requires of us that we should approximate to this idea.’ (Kant Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose in Hans Reiss ed. 1991:46).

This republican or civil constitution acknowledges freedom as a collective project which connects the individual with essential universal powers and potentialities beyond an immediate, individual, direct response to circumstances. Kant proceeds from Rousseau’s distinction between liberty and license. For Kant, although the individual, as a rational being, 'desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all', 'he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law where he can' and 'abuses his freedom in relation to others' and therefore 'requires a master to break his self will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free'. But since this 'master' can be found only the human species, and hence 'will also be an animal who needs a master' (UH 1991:46), the realisation of the perfect constitution will be the last problem to be solved. Its solution requires 'a correct conception of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience tested in many affairs of the world, and above all else a good will prepared to accept the findings of this experience’ (UH Reiss 1991:47). This makes it clear that Kant's 'master' is not an external agency but the rational nature within human beings themselves. Mastery is a self-mastery achieved through the moral law, through the autonomous citizen living under the perfect constitution obeying a law that is self-made and self-imposed.

The greater liberty of 'rational freedom' achieved through an inner mastery and not just an institutional constraint is suggested by Kant's reference to the realisation in the historical process of a 'hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally - and for this purpose also externally - perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely' (UH 1991:50). To this end, nature guides human inclinations over time to the rational end of a 'just civil constitution' as the final condition for the self-development of the natural faculties of human beings (UH 1991:45). Kant, having separated the individual and the species, with reason capable of being fully realised only in the latter (Kant UH 1991:42), comes to recognise that nature is moral after all. Kant’s target is not nature as such but natural inclinations and impulses which chain rational human beings to the empirical world of necessity and immediacy. But reason too is a natural endowment which human beings can use to realise moral freedom as a rational natural end. In achieving this end, the 'pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole' (UH 1991:44/5). The pathologically enforced coordination of society is superseded by an internal moral coordination through the process of culture.

Then the first true steps are taken from barbarism to culture, which in fact consists in the social worthiness of man. All man's talents are now gradually developed, his taste cultivated, and by a continued process of enlightenment, a beginning is made towards establishing a way of thinking which can with time transform the primitive natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles; and thus a pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole.
(UH 1991:44/5)

This collectively universal will is a collective force for the regulation of supra-individual forces, public law under a sovereign authority (Reiss 1991:26). This is an expansion rather than an infringement of individual liberty since individuals obey only that law to which they have agreed (Reiss 1991:11). Kant's conception of the moral life is based upon the capacity of individuals to universalise and hence give their moral principles the force of law. Freedom and lawfulness, far from being antithetical as in an individualist liberal conception of liberty, are integral to each other. Freedom is not the absence of necessity but the moral recognition of necessity in the shape of relationships of obligation with others. Since human beings do not just obey law but make it, necessity is put on a moral basis.

In the absence of this legal process, reason is in the state of nature and asserts its claims only through war, disputes ending only in a temporary armistice. In contrast, a legal order ensures an eternal peace through the recognised methods of legal action. This limits individual freedom so that it may be consistent with the freedom of all and hence with the common good of all (1965 B.779/80). Kant unites the freedom of each individual and all individuals through the reciprocity of legal obligations. All individuals are equal before and subject to the one universal law. The rules of the lawful state are reciprocal in being equally and mutually obligatory for all individuals (Saner 1973:30/1).

However, this commonwealth of individuals can only be achieved by securing peace and harmony among all the nations. For the same antagonism that sets individuals against each other in society also establishes hostile relations between the nations. The ultimate purpose of Nature is to lead humankind from the state of individual rivalry to the state of social harmony, and from the state of national rivalry to the state of international harmony. Peace and harmony reigns between individuals in society and between sovereign states in the international domain. 

Seventh Proposition
‘The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved. What is the use of working for a law-governed civil constitution among individual men, i.e. of planning a commonwealth ? The same unsociability which forced men to do so gives rise in turn to a situation whereby each commonwealth, in its external relations (i.e. as a state in relation to other states), is in a position of unrestricted freedom. Each must accordingly expect from any other precisely the same evils which formerly oppressed individual men and forced them into a law-governed civil state. Nature has thus again employed the unsociableness of men, and even of the large societies and states which human beings construct, as a means of arriving at a condition of calm and security through their inevitable antagonism. Wars, tense and unremitting military preparations, and the resultant distress which every state must eventually feel within itself, even in the midst of peace—these are the means by which nature drives nations to make initially imperfect attempts, but finally, after many devastations, upheavals and even complete inner exhaustion of their powers, to take the step which reason could have suggested to them even without so many sad experiences—that of abandoning a lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own legal judgement, but solely from this great federation from a united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will. (UH Reiss ed 1991:47).

Eighth Proposition
‘The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally—and for this purpose also externally—perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely. This proposition follows from the previous one. We can see that philosophy too may have its chiliastic expectations; but they are of such a kind that their fulfilment can be hastened, if only indirectly, by a knowledge of the idea they are based on, so that they are anything but over-fanciful. The real test is whether experience can discover anything to indicate a purposeful natural process of this kind. (UH Reiss ed 1991:47).

Ninth Proposition
‘A philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civil union of mankind, must be regarded as possible and even as capable of furthering the purpose of nature itself. It is admittedly a strange and at first sight absurd proposition to write a history according to an idea of how world events must develop if they are to conform to certain rational ends; it would seem that only a novel could result from such premises. Yet if it may be assumed that nature does not work without a plan and purposeful end, even amidst the arbitrary play of human freedom, this idea might nevertheless prove useful. And although we are too short-sighted to perceive the hidden mechanism of nature's scheme, this idea may yet serve as a guide to us in representing an otherwise planless aggregate of human actions as conforming, at least when considered as a whole, to a system…..
‘All this, I believe, should give us some guidance in explaining the thoroughly confused interplay of human affairs and in prophesying future political changes. Yet the same use has already been made of human history even when it was regarded as the disjointed product of unregulated freedom. But if we assume a plan of nature, we have grounds for greater hopes. For such a plan opens up the comforting prospect of a future in which we are shown from afar how the human race eventually works its way upward to a situation in which all the germs implanted by nature can be developed fully, and in which man's destiny can be fulfilled here on earth. Such a justification of nature—or rather perhaps of providence—is no mean motive for adopting a particular point of view in considering the world. For what is the use of lauding and holding up for contemplation the glory and wisdom of creation in the non-rational sphere of nature, if the history of mankind, the very part of this great display of supreme wisdom which contains the purpose of all the rest, is to remain a constant reproach to everything else ? Such a spectacle would force us to turn away in revulsion, and, by making us despair of ever finding any completed rational aim behind it, would reduce us to hoping for it only in some other world. (UH Reiss ed 1991:53). 

In bringing the hidden plan of nature to light, the philosopher grounds the hope of progress in the perfect  state  and  peace, thus stimulating the moral  action concerned  to  realise these ends. The role of the philosopher is to 'formulate in terms of a definite plan of nature a history of creatures who act without a plan of their own'  (UH 1991:42). In other words, reason inspires the moral impulse and informs practice leading to the perfect constitution and perpetual peace. This hope is not Utopian since nature pushes humanity towards the good; through the plan of nature, philosophy can have its belief in a millennium (UH 1991:50). The intelligent action of human beings thus hastens the fulfilment of human destiny on earth (UH 1991:52/3). Thus a philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civic union of mankind, must be regarded as possible and even as capable of furthering the purpose of nature itself (UH 1991:51).

Having separated the individual and the species, Kant proceeds to unite them through reconciling moral freedom and nature.
Thus individuals must raise themselves above nature whilst acknowledging that their moral destiny is to conform to nature. Human beings, in their works, become natural in achieving perfection. Kant's assumption is that nature is moral.
Kant's plan of nature subverts the need for an external master by guiding human inclinations over time to the rational end of a 'just civil constitution', the final condition for the self-development of the natural faculties of human beings (UH 1991:45). 'The history of the human race as a whole', Kant wrote, 'can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally - and for this purpose also externally - perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely" (Universal History in Reiss ed. 1991:50). 

To this end, nature guides human inclinations over time to the rational end of a just civil constitution. This constitution is the final condition for the self-development of the natural faculties of human beings.
In achieving this rational natural end there is also achieved the transformation of the 'the primitive natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles', and thus the 'pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole' (Universal History in Reiss ed. 1991:44/5). The pathologically enforced coordination of society would thus be superseded by internal moral coordination. This transformation would be achieved through the process of enlightenment and culture; Kant thus postulates development through the interplay between natural inclinations of associability and moral inclinations of sociability (Universal History 1991).
Kant, having separated the individual and the species, with reason as capable of being fully realised only in the latter (UH 1991:42), proceeds to re-unite them by reconciling moral freedom and nature. In achieving this rational natural end, the 'pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole' (UH 1991:44/5). The external coordination of society is superseded by an internal moral coordination through the process of culture.

But Kant did not establish what this moral freedom was and the role it played in the empirical world. He was concerned with knowledge rather than morality at this stage, hence his opening statement is one of indifference towards the conception of the freedom of the will formed in terms of metaphysics (Universal History in Reiss ed. 1991:41). By the mid 1780's Kant had completed to his satisfaction his analysis of the world of nature. Kant's next task was to do the same for the autonomous moral world.

Though Kant argues that the union of states is the 'halfway mark’ in human development (UH 1991:49), it is only in the Critique of Judgment that he argues that culture, comprising the legal order and peace between states (highest political good), is the ultimate end of nature and prepares the ground for the moral community of co-legislators (highest moral good) as the final and of creation. Whilst the mechanisms of self-interest are sufficient to achieve the highest political good as a preparatory step toward the highest moral good, the latter can only be achieved by moral praxis under the good will (Van Der Linden 1985:134). 

Kant's argument that the union of states is the 'halfway mark' in human development (UH 1991:49) makes the point that the political commonwealth is a precondition for the emergence of the ethical commonwealth. Since citizens cannot be forced into the ethical commonwealth without violating the premise of freedom, the hope is that the citizens, united under moral laws, freely enter the ethical commonwealth: 'for then, when its methods of compulsion do not avail (for the human judge cannot penetrate into the depths of other men) their dispositions to virtue would bring about what was required' (R 1960:87).
Although this suggests a noumenological civil society beyond the state (Krieger 1972:102), Kant's formulation is lacking in transformatory and social content. Kant's purposes are theoretic. The natural plan is prescribed as a regulative ideal of reason applicable to the sphere of knowledge rather than to political action resting upon morality (UH 1991:41).
That said, Kant's argument that the role of the philosopher is to 'formulate in terms of a definite plan of nature a history of creatures who act without a plan of their own' (UH 1991:42), aims to stimulate moral action to realise the perfect state. Philosophy can thus have its belief in a millennium, revealing how nature pushes humanity towards the good (UH 1991:50). The philosophical formulation of a universal history 'in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civic union' is capable of 'furthering the purpose of nature itself (UH 1991:51). The intelligent action of human beings may hasten the fulfilment of human destiny (UH 1991:52/3).
Kant's philosophy is therefore praxis and future oriented, his primacy of pure practical reason asserting that the world is created by human praxis (Goldmann 1971:57). Thus '(empirical) humanity, in order to express its humanity (rational/moral nature), must produce humanity (the moral order)' (Van Der Linden 1988:13). This aspect of Kant, indicating how the ideal may be realised, requires further comment.
Kant's praxis, grounding a rational hope for progress, affirms that the future is something to be created: 'Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct and by his own reason' (UH 1991:43). The things which define human beings as rational beings - knowledge, insight, happiness, virtue - are not given by nature but exist as potentialities for human beings to actualise, transforming their environment and themselves (Van Der Linden 1988:102/3). Kant, therefore, affirms history as a process of human self-creation. Culture, as 'what nature can supply to prepare [the human agent] for what he must do himself in order to be a final purpose' (CJ 1951:281), prepares the way for the moral society. Kant's view that the moral society is something that humanity ought to realise makes his praxis moral as well as technical.
The end of moral community is rooted in the development of the rational predispositions of the species. The ‘technological predisposition' for manipulating things entails the increasing mastery of nature to satisfy human needs. The 'pragmatic predisposition' involves the increasing social, political and cultural power to organize and employ human beings to realize specific purposes and accustom human beings to rule-governed behaviour. The 'moral predisposition’ to treat oneself and others according to 'the principle of freedom under laws' affirms that human beings come to obey juridical laws on account of autonomous motives and a concern to promote the ends of others, so long as these ends are consistent with the universal law. Progress in the moral disposition implies that human agents fulfil the duty to promote the highest good, coming to pursue just institutions in greater numbers (A 1974:183).

Kant expands on this theme in Perpetual Peace (1795). Here he argues Nature has used the device of war for the evolution of humankind. The state of nature is a state of war. Humankind begins in this condition and scatters itself to the ends of the Earth by ceaseless war. In turn, this war produces the legal order on three levels: civil law, the law of nations, and the law of world citizenship (KGS 8:365). Kant claims that these legal orders are the work of Nature. By placing different groups of people close to each other in antagonistic relations, Nature compels them to form states for their defence, to submit to public laws, to create political order. The political order which is most fitting for the rights of individuals is the republican constitution. As already noted, for Kant, the creation of this republican constitution as a universal power overcoming selfish inclinations 'is both the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human race' (UH 1991:46). However, the end is not unrealistic since, rather than base peace upon the assumption of 'the moral improvement of man', Kant accommodates the 'selfish inclinations' of individuals politically (PP 1991:113). Kant thus proceeds from the worst case, individuals as a 'nation of devils' who, in possessing understanding, may solve the political problem (PP 1991:112). 

Whilst many claim that a republic would have to be a race of angels, Kant comments, Nature makes it possible for humankind to organize the state in such a way that the selfish inclinations of a ‘race of devils’ is contained by their mutual opposition (KGS 8:366). 

With the realisation of the republican constitution within each nation, the dream of 'perpetual peace' becomes a realistic possibility (PP 1991:99/100 114).

i. Even if people were not compelled by internal dissent to submit to the coercion of public laws, war would produce the same effect from outside. For in accordance with the natural arrangement described above, each people would find itself confronted by another neighbouring people pressing in upon it, thus forcing it to form itself internally into a state in order to encounter the other as an armed power. Now the republican constitution is the only one which does complete justice to the rights of man. But it is also the most difficult to establish, and even more so to preserve, so that many maintain that it would only be possible within a state of angels, since men, with their self-seeking inclinations, would be incapable of adhering to a constitution of so sublime a nature. But in fact, nature comes to the aid of the universal and rational human will, so admirable in itself but so impotent in practice, and makes use of precisely those self-seeking inclinations in order to do so. It only remains for men to create a good organisation for the state, a task which is well within their capability, and to arrange it in such a way that their self-seeking energies are opposed to one another, each thereby neutralising or eliminating the destructive effects of the rest. And as far as reason is concerned, the result is the same as if man's selfish tendencies were non-existent, so that man, even if he is not morally good in himself, is nevertheless compelled to be a good citizen. As hard as it may sound, the problem of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation of devils (so long as they possess understanding). It may be stated as follows: 'In order to organise a group of rational beings who together require universal laws for their survival, but of whom each separate individual is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, the constitution must be so designed that, although the citizens are opposed to one another in their private attitudes, these opposing views may inhibit one another in such a way that the public conduct of the citizens will be the same as if they did not have such evil attitudes.' A problem of this kind must be soluble. For such a task does not involve the moral improvement of man; it only means finding out how the mechanism of nature can be applied to men in such a manner that the antagonism of their hostile attitudes will make them compel one another to submit to coercive laws, thereby producing a condition of peace within which the laws can be enforced. We can even see this principle at work among the actually existing (although as yet very imperfectly organised) states. For in their external relations, they have already approached what the idea of right prescribes, although the reason for this is certainly not their internal moral attitudes. In the same way, we cannot expect their moral attitudes to produce a good political constitution; on the contrary, it is only through the latter that the people can be expected to attain a good level of moral culture. Thus that mechanism of nature by which selfish inclinations are naturally opposed to one another in their external relations can be used by reason to facilitate the attainment of its own end, the reign of established right. Internal and external peace are thereby furthered and assured, so far as it lies within the power of the state itself to do so. We may therefore say that nature irresistibly wills that right should eventually gain the upper hand. What men have neglected to do will ultimately happen of its own accord, albeit with much inconvenience. 
2. The idea of international right presupposes the separate existence of many independent adjoining states. And such a state of affairs is essentially a state of war, unless there is a federal union to prevent hostilities breaking out. But in the light of the idea of reason, this state is still to be preferred to an amalgamation of the separate nations under a single power which has overruled the rest and created a universal monarchy. For the laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range, and a soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy. It is nonetheless the desire of every state (or its ruler) to achieve lasting peace by thus dominating the whole world, if at all possible. But nature wills it otherwise, and uses two means to separate the nations and prevent them from intermingling—linguistic and religious differences. These may certainly occasion mutual hatred and provide pretexts for wars, but as culture grows and men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace. And unlike that universal despotism which saps all man's energies and ends in the graveyard of freedom, this peace is created and guaranteed by an equilibrium of forces and a most vigorous rivalry. 
3. Thus nature wisely separates the nations, although the will of each individual state, even basing its arguments on international right, would gladly unite them under its own sway by force or by cunning. On the other hand, nature also unites nations which the concept of cosmopolitan right would not have protected from violence and war, and does so by means of their mutual self-interest. For the spirit of commerce sooner or later takes hold of every people, and it cannot exist side by side with war. And of all the powers (or means) at the disposal of the power of the state, financial power can probably be relied on most. Thus states find themselves compelled to promote the noble cause of peace, though not exactly from motives of morality. And wherever in the world there is a threat of war breaking out, they will try to prevent it by mediation, just as if they had entered into a permanent league for this purpose; for by the very nature of things, large military alliances can only rarely be formed, and will even more rarely be successful. (PP Reiss ed 1996: 100). 
‘In this way, nature guarantees perpetual peace by the actual mechanism of human inclinations. And while the likelihood of its being attained is not sufficient to enable us to prophesy the future theoretically, it is enough for practical purposes. It makes it our duty to work our way towards this goal, which is more than an empty chimera. (PP Reiss ed 1996:100).

What Kant does not provide, however, is an account of how the perfect community can be realised. The way that Kant leaves it, the republic of ends exists simply as a future goal motivating human behaviour in the present, the 'real object of our willing'.
Kant's political antinomies need to be addressed. Kant postulates a separation between the republic of ends as the 'respublica noumenon' and civil society as the 'respublica phenomenon'; the one community is appropriate to a 'race of angels', the other to human beings as a 'race of devils'. In so far as individuals live in two spheres (the natural and the intelligible), they are torn between freedom under the moral law and the ethical arbitrariness of natural inclinations. The problem with putting the point this way is that the principle of society and its laws cannot be freedom, which can never be empirically realised, but coercion. Thus Kant concludes that the purpose of legality is to force people to do on prudential grounds what they ought to do on moral grounds.
This social contract binds and creates a united general will which makes possible the use of legal coercion. As limited and fallible creatures, individuals may fail to behave in a way which accords with the liberty of others and so can be legitimately punished by a publicly created authority.
Natural freedom may be freedom as it is popularly conceived, as freedom from constraint, but a civil freedom recognising constraints is the only possible freedom in a civilised society requiring peaceful social cooperation. Politics is thus the realm between nature and freedom, and thus has to refer to the human being as both 'homo phenomenon' and 'homo noumenal'. Here the ideal of human beings as co-legislators in government 'which can be fulfilled only on condition that the means employed to do so are compatible with morality' (Contest of Faculties in Reiss ed. 1991:184).

Kant now came to assign central significance to the active principle of freedom in the political world. The activation of freedom in the world of politics induced Kant to develop liberty in a new way. Kant alters his former emphasis upon 'civil equality' and 'civil liberty', his liberal argument for the protection of the rights of individuals to life and happiness in civil society as against interference by other individuals and by government. This 'protective'/liberal definition of freedom is now subordinated to what Kant calls 'lawful freedom', something which opens a route to the conception of an 'active' as opposed to a 'passive' sovereignty (Metaphysics of Morals in Reiss ed. 1991:139). Kant affirms the right of the individual 'to obey no law other than that to which he has given his consent’ (Metaphysics of Morals in Reiss ed. 1991:139). And it is this that now becomes the definitive form of liberty in the state. Thus Kant now argues civil equality and civil liberty are rooted in 'natural freedom and equality' and thus have the effect of making individuals 'passive members of the state' (Metaphysics of Morals in Reiss ed. 1991:140). 'The citizen' is created only through political liberty, as defined by legislative freedom. This equips the individual to influence and organise the state as an active member.

Kant was thus in a position to argue that sovereignty, the legislative power, 'can only belong to the united will of the people'. The ruler exercises executive power and, as with the judiciary, is simply the agent or the representative of the people (Metaphysik). Legitimate government, therefore, must be 'a representative system of the people' (Metaphysik).

An unconscious natural teleology is at work in this. Human beings, as children of Nature, are born with the natural instinct for selfishness, and this leads them into the state of war. However, this war drives human beings to develop the intelligence that Nature has also endowed them with. Eventually, human beings become sufficiently intelligent to leave the state of war by building a civil society to enable the orderly exercise of their freedom, thus creating the foundation for the flowering of culture. However, a civil peace and freedom that is established within  the confines of a single state is vulnerable to the predation of competing states in a condition of international war. Therefore, according to Kant’s natural teleology, humankind will extend the peaceful union of warring individuals in the social sphere to a peaceful union of warring states in the international sphere. This development is initiated by Nature and Nature’s endowment. Human history is therefore the work of Nature. Humankind is a product of nature, and is endowed with the power to realize the highest good. This points to the active role of reason in realising Nature’s end.

7 NATURAL TELEOLOGY AND HUMAN PRAXIS

In the second Critique, Kant argued that the highest good could be fully realized only in the eternal world of noumena. In the Appendix, he is now arguing that the realisation of the highest good is the ultimate purpose of nature. Kant thus conceives humankind as Nature’s children developing under the guidance and protection of nature’s providence.

Kant's view that the moral society is something that humanity ought to realise makes his philosophy both praxis- and future-oriented. Kant's primacy of pure practical reason affirms the view that the world is created by human praxis (Goldmann 1971:57). Van Der Linden thus states that Kant's social ethics affirms that '(empirical) humanity, in order to express its humanity (rational/moral nature), must produce humanity (the moral order)' (Van Der Linden 1985:13).

Of particular importance is Kant's appraisal of moral enthusiasm and the capacity for social learning and control within humanity. The end of the perfect state and the union of all such states in perpetual peace is rooted in the full development of the rational predispositions of the human species. The 'technological predisposition' for manipulating things entails the increasing mastery of nature to satisfy human needs. The 'pragmatic predisposition' involves the increasing social, political and cultural power to organize and employ human beings to realize specific purposes and accustom human beings to rule-governed behaviour. The 'moral predisposition' to treat oneself and others according to 'the principle of freedom under laws' affirms that human beings come to obey juridical laws on account of autonomous motives and a concern to promote the ends of others, so long as these ends are consistent with the universal law. Progress is the moral disposition implies that human agents fulfil the duty to promote the highest good, earning to pursue just institutions in greater numbers (A 1974:183).

In the Appendix to the Critique of Teleological Judgement, Kant seeks to identify the ultimate purpose of nature as a whole. He finds this ultimate purpose in the realization of the highest good as presented in his moral theory. Human beings have a special role in realising this highest good by virtue of their rationality and morality. Kant begins his analysis of teleological judgement by noting how Socrates, as presented by Plato, was impressed with Anaxagoras' view that all things in nature were ordered not by dead matter but by the living mind. From this Socrates concluded that the mind could do this only by virtue of Ideas. Kant, therefore, builds his argument on Plato's Ideas of reason. But there is a subtle change and development in the way Kant argues the point.
Kant defines the ultimate purpose of nature as a whole as the realization of the highest good. Since this can be realized only by human beings on account of their rationality and morality, humankind is the ultimate purpose of nature as a whole (C3 427). So, whereas for Plato, the highest good could be fully realized only in the eternal world of Being - what Kant calls noumena (the world of things in themselves) - Kant makes the realisation of the highest good the ultimate purpose of nature.
Human beings are special only for their ability and will to set their own goals. It follows that human beings must pursue their own purpose independently of nature rather than be subject to nature's purposes. And this purpose leads human beings to develop culture beyond nature (C3 431). Beyond nature, that is, as resting at the lowest level of appetite and desire, in order to realise humanity’s rational-natural being.

Kant thus develops Rousseau's idea that human beings become truly human only by subjugating their natural instinct and appetite, transcending the domain of nature, and establishing the domain of culture. Rousseau, in turn, had adopted this idea of culture from Plato's teaching that human beings can become divine by transforming their animal passions into virtues.

Kant's 'culture of discipline' is really the culture of virtue as propounded by Plato for his ideal state in the Republic. The culture of discipline is for the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires and other natural chains, all of which make it impossible for human beings to pursue their own independent goals. For Kant, this culture will enable humanity to establish their sovereignty over natural impulses and institute a civil society for the liberty and equality of all citizens. In pursuing natural inclinations, individuals settle for a limited and incomplete freedom that falls far short of a full and genuine human freedom. Culture, on Kant’s terms, will take human beings out of the state of nature, where the unconstrained freedom of each individual destroys the freedom of all individuals. In the natural state of unrestrained desire and appetite, individual freedom degenerates into an egoistic licence that issues in a collective unfreedom constraining all individuals. 

According to Kant, humanity, like other animals, is a link in the chain of natural desires for happiness. What makes human beings unique is the ability and will to set their own goals. By virtue of this ability and will, human beings hold the title of lord of nature. As such, human beings must transcend subjection to nature's purposes, and pursue their own independent purpose. This purpose enjoins humanity to create and sustain culture above and beyond nature (C3 431).

Culture has two elements, through which the capacity to determine ends evolves in history. The ‘culture of discipline’ increases the tendency for human beings to submit to the demands of the moral law, coming to consult the voice of duty more and more. In the first Critique, Kant defined practical freedom as 'the will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses' (A534/B562). The culture of discipline realises this practical freedom. Kant is developing Rousseau's argument that only by subjugating natural instincts and appetites, thus transcending the domain of nature, do human beings become truly human. This process implies the 'ethicisation of human nature' in which duty comes to lose its compulsory character arid instead be guided by moral feelings like indignation, enthusiasm, solidarity, dignity (Van Der Linden 1985:173). 

Kant’s 'culture of discipline' is akin to Plato’s ‘culture of virtue’ as laid out in the Republic. For Plato, human beings become divine by transforming their beastly passions into virtues. The idea of establishing the domain of culture over the domain of nature therefore takes up Plato’s concern with the means of establishing the ideal city or state. The culture of discipline concerns the liberation of the will from the tyranny of desires and other natural chains, which shackle human beings to natural inclinations and prevent them from pursuing independent goals. For Kant, the ‘culture of discipline’ will enable humanity to establish their sovereignty over natural impulses and appetites and create a culture which makes it possible to institute a civil society for the liberty and equality of all citizens. This civil society takes human beings out of the state of nature, transcending the despotism of natural inclinations in which the unconstrained freedom of each individual to pursue natural appetites and impulses serves to destroy the freedom of all individuals. For Kant, the final purpose of creation is civil society, established by the force of reason, coming to extend throughout and rule the whole world (C3 435).

It follows that the ultimate purpose of nature for humanity is to develop the culture of discipline. The culture of discipline increases the tendency for human beings to submit to the demands of the moral law, coming increasingly to consult the voice of duty. Duty loses its compulsory character as it comes to be internalised (Van Der Linden 1988:173). 
However, this is not a case of asserting culture against nature, since the culture of discipline is the development of natural endowment enabling humanity to transcend Nature in the same manner as children reach maturity in becoming independent of their mothers. This is Kant’s natural teleology, humanity as the grown up children of Mother Nature.

The ‘culture of skill’ refers to the increasing capacity to manipulate the natural and social environment and involves conflict and inequality associated with material factors such as class, exploitation and division of labour (CJ 1951:282). 
Throughout history, the majority of human beings have had to submit to 'hard work' in order to produce 'the necessities of life .. for the convenience and leisure of others who work at the less necessary elements of culture, science and art' (CJ 1951:282). For Kant, the progress of culture overcomes class conflict through a 'civil community' guaranteeing freedom and equality for all as citizens. Only in this, the perfect state, 'can the greatest development of natural capacities take place' (CJ 1951:282). Kant’s conception of praxis highlights the potential of the increasing rational capacity to control the natural and social environment in order to overcome conflict rooted in material scarcity and the autonomy of social mechanisms and institutions from human control.
Marx would explore the rational capacity to overcome conflict rooted in material scarcity and from the way that social mechanisms have achieved an autonomy from rational control. For Kant, the purpose of the mastery of nature is culture, and the purpose of culture, in turn, is to realise the highest political good as a preparatory stage leading to the moral community (Van Der Linden 1988:141). The external freedom guaranteed by political peace in and between perfect states creates conditions for autonomous action and diminishes the forces which encourage immoral acts. 

Kant's moral praxis rests not on a religious hope but on the rational hope for progress, affirming that the future is something open, something to be created by rational human agents. 





The very things which define human beings as rational beings - knowledge, insight, happiness, virtue - are given by nature as endowments and potentialities for human beings to live up to (Van Der Linden 1985:102/3). Kant, therefore, conceives history as a process of human self-creation. Culture, as 'what nature can supply to prepare [the human agent] for what he must do himself in order to be a final purpose' (CJ 1951:281), prepares the way for the moral society.
Kant's highest good as projecting an ideal community of colegislators shows the extent to which Kant's philosophy is future oriented and affirms a moral praxis. Human beings have a duty to change the world to realise a moral ideal. Kant advocated caution in politics, believing it  'foolhardy'  and  even 'punishable'  to  oppose  an existing  constitution with 'political constitutions which meet the requirements of reason’ (CF Reiss ed. 1991:188). The perfect constitution and perpetual peace will be attained and maintained by rational moral action, not physical and material force. Kant nevertheless praised the French Revolution for arousing moral enthusiasm within 'all spectators' deriving from 'a moral disposition within the human race' (CF Reiss ed 1991:182). 

The revolution which we have seen taking place in our own times in a nation of gifted people may succeed, or it may fail. It may be so filled with misery and atrocities that no right-thinking man would ever decide to make the same experiment again at such a price, even if he could hope to carry it out successfully at the second attempt. But I maintain that this revolution has aroused in the hearts and desires of all spectators who are not themselves caught up in it a sympathy which borders almost on enthusiasm, although the very utterance of this sympathy was fraught with danger. It cannot therefore have been caused by anything other than a moral disposition within the human race. (CF Reiss ed 1991:182). 

Kant affirms the human 'disposition and capacity’ to effect social change autonomously, 'to be the cause of its own advance toward the better' (1963:142). The prospect of the evolution of a condition  of  natural  right  in  the  relation  of  the individual to the state and of individual states to each other is founded upon this moral disposition, 'the right of every people to give itself a civil constitution of the kind that it sees fit', the 'enthusiasm with which men embrace the cause of goodness'. The enthusiasm of the spectators shows that 'true enthusiasm is always directed exclusively towards the ideal, particularly towards that which is purely moral (such as the concept of right), and it cannot be coupled with selfish interests' (CF Reiss ad 1991:183). Advancing humanity toward the highest good embodied in political institutions shows that voluntary cooperation and reciprocity is more than a philosophical dream (Van Der Linden 1988:60 61 64). Indicating that a moral cause is operative in humanity, events like the French Revolution reveal a capacity for the better in human nature and society which no philosopher or politician could discern from the course of things, and which alone unites nature and freedom in accordance with the inner principles of right in humankind (Cassirer 1981:407). In precisely this same manner, the Paris Commune revealed to Marx a possible ideal future. Marx's moral enthusiasm as a spectator outweighed his practical reservations as regards the Commune.
As the enthusiasm of the spectators rather than of the Revolutionaries, it was an objective rather than a subjective concern with advancing humanity toward the highest good embodied in political institutions (Van Der Linden 1985:60).

The moral cause which is at work here is composed of two elements. Firstly, there is the right of every people to give itself a civil constitution of the kind that it sees fit, without interference from other powers. And secondly, once it is accepted that the only intrinsically rightful and morally good constitution which a people can have is by its very nature disposed to avoid wars of aggression (i.e. that the only possible constitution is a republican one, at least in its conception), there is the aim, which is also a duty, of submitting to those conditions by which war, the source of all evils and moral corruption, can be prevented. If this aim is recognised, the human race, for all its frailty, has a negative guarantee that it will progressively improve or at least that it will not be disturbed in its progress. (CF Reiss ed 1991:182). 

The moral enthusiasm of spectators show that voluntary cooperation and reciprocity is more than a philosophical dream (Van Der Linden 1985:61 64). Kant affirms here the power of example and association in motivating and sustaining moral action. The 'moral disposition’ within the people possesses a tendency towards the moral society and for humanity as it ought to be, stimulating action toward the realisation of this ideal. Indicating that a moral cause is operative in humanity, events like the French Revolution reveal a capacity far the better in human nature and society which no philosopher or politician could discern from the course of things and which alone unites nature and freedom in accordance with the inner principles of right in humankind (Cassirer 1981:407). In the same manner, political events, campaigns, grassroots movements and organisations reveal the contours of a possible ideal future, give hope and inspire efforts leading to its attainment. Prefiguration in this sense is a Kantian view of the innate moral disposition of human beings.

This begs the question of how reflective judgement mediates between the worlds of phenomena and noumena. The question involves the two-way transition, the upward transition from phenomena to noumena, which concerns the recognition of moral law; and the downward transition from noumena to phenomena, which concerns the realization of moral law. In answering the question of how aesthetic judgement makes these two transitions one has to recognise that Kant had two aesthetic theories, aesthetic formalism and aesthetic Platonism. In aesthetic formalism, reflective judgements are made by the subjective feeling that the free interplay of imagination and understanding provoke. Since this free interplay involves no supersensible world, there is no need for mediation. In Kant’s aesthetic Platonism, there is a need for mediation since the ultimate foundation of all aesthetic judgements is the Idea of Beauty, and this belongs to the noumenal world. The Idea of Beauty is transcendent and abstract and is not therefore readily applicable to the phenomenal world, leaving a gap between phenomena and noumena. Bridging this gap requires aesthetic Ideas constructed by imagination and understanding, thus articulating the transcendent Idea of Beauty in terms of sensible imagery. This is what artistic genius and its inspiration does. In Platonic terms, this is the descent of Ideas from Heaven to the natural world. In Kantian terms, immanent aesthetic Ideas perform the mediation between phenomena and noumena. With natural beauty as the expression of aesthetic Ideas, this mediatory transition is made by both human beings and nature.

 The two-way mediation in teleological judgements works thus. For Kant, natural purpose is a supersensible Idea that cannot be found in the blind mechanism of nature (C3 377). Human beings make the upward transition for recognizing the Idea and the downward transition for realizing the Idea in the natural world. But this mediation is made by both human beings and natural teleology. On the highest level, there may be only one Idea of natural purpose. For Plato, there is only one Idea of Life (Timaeus (39e). However, every species has its own Idea of natural purpose and is governed in accordance with it. On this level, the multiplicity of teleological Ideas corresponds to the multiplicity of aesthetic Ideas. The various particular Ideas of natural purpose are generated by the articulation and specification of the one transcendent Idea of Life. In naming the objects of natural beauty, Kant often refers to living beings such as flowers, birds, and crustaceans. This implies the conclusion that the power of life includes the power of beauty. Thus Nature conjoins the Ideas of Life and Beauty and brings them from the supersensible to the sensible world. This descent of Ideas is engineered by the technique of Nature. Nature working like an artist (C3 390). Nature’s two-way mediation between phenomena and noumema proceeds thus: Nature creates living beings in the phenomenal world by bringing down the supersensible Ideas, and one species amongst those living beings have the intelligence to apprehend the noumenal world. The moral and aesthetic life of human beings is a link in the creative cycle of natural teleology which Kant calls the Providence of Mother Nature in his Idea of a Universal History.

For Kant, Newton was the master of natural world (the starry skies above) and Rousseau was the master of the moral world (the moral law within). But neither could bridge the vast chasm between phenomena and noumena. This, for Kant, is the key problem. Kant locates the solution to this problem in Nature. Nature is the original matrix for realizing the supersensible Ideas in the sensible world, even before the birth of humanity; the moral and political development of humanity is shaped under the auspices of Nature’s eternal providence. His acceptance of the mechanistic conception of nature had prevented Kant from grasping this cosmic truth. By acknowledging Nature as the living force, resolves his ultimate philosophical problem and bridges the chasm between noumena and phenomena. Kant’s solution savours a great deal of Plato's conception of the natural world in the Timaeus, where the Demiurge, the spirit of the natural world (the World-Soul), creates all things in accordance with the eternal Ideas.

Moral and political philosophy began with Socrates and the stand he took against the overweening claims to knowledge on the part of natural philosophers. The natural philosophers, the scientists, studied nature but paid no regard to human beings. Plato continued Socrates’ spiritual quest, connecting the fight against the amoral forces of nature with the fight against the immoral forces of human beings. In the Gorgias, Callicles, the avowed champion of amoral naturalism and immoral humanism, is confronted by Socrates’ argument that that one could be virtuous even in a totally immoral world and that one's soul could never be harmed by the immoral acts of others. In the Phaedo and the Symposium Plato finds a safe haven for the virtuous soul in the intelligible world of Ideas. In this world, the soul was safe from the immorality of the phenomenal world. However, the safe haven of the intelligible world could never provide a living community for moral individuals. In the Republic, Plato set out the principles of the ideal state as a moral community which provides for the moral life of individuals. Recognising the difficulty of realising a just society in an amoral and irrational world, Plato laid out his conception of a rational and orderly universe in the Timaeus – which Plato presents as the cosmological foundation for his ideal state of the Republic and for the city of Magnesia proposed in the Laws.

Kant reaffirms the Platonic conception of the rational order of Nature in his Ideological conception of natural order. Kant is continuing Plato's quest for a suitable natural order for the realization of eternal ideals. In this quest, Kant revitalises the Platonic conception of Nature as the Mother of all creation. If Kant’s conception of the noumena and the categorical imperative retained the Christian legacy, then this conception of Mother Nature taps into ancient nature religion whilst looking forward to the attempts to locate the place of human beings within Nature. Certainly, the conception was a key figure in Goethe’s Faust, where Nature manifests her inexhaustible creative power as the Earth Spirit, the Eternal Mothers, and the Eternal Feminine. The idea also inspired the supernatural naturalism of Romantic philosophers and poets. Along with the conception of immanent Ideas, this natural teleology is one of Kant's most enduring achievements and is likely to become even more relevant in the coming years as human beings deal with the task of resolving the ecological crisis and making their peace with Nature.

In the middle of the third Critique, Kant abandons the formalist programme and propounds his revolutionary notion of immanent Ideas. The descent of transcendent Ideas from Platonic Heaven to the natural world fundamentally alters Kant's conception of Nature. In the first Critique, in Religion and in the Groundwork, Kant conceived Nature as a chaotic world of subjective impressions and natural inclinations, a world so unruly that Kant claimed that it was the ultimate source of all radical evil in human nature (R 19). This chaotic natural world could assume a rational order only through the a priori natural laws that human understanding comes to impose on empirical impressions; the world of natural inclinations could only be controlled by imposing moral laws. However, the descent of transcendent Ideas from the Platonic world of Being releases Nature from the shackles of humanly imposed moral and natural laws, since Nature is able to operate with the power of its own immanent Ideas. This opens up a conception of Mother Nature as the Eternal Feminine who has the inexhaustible power to procreate and sustain her countless children. Kant’s vision is larger than this in arguing that human beings, Nature’s children, are equipped with natural endowments that enable them to transcend their natural state and create their cultural world. thus realizing Nature’s immanent Ideas. This is Kant's transcendent naturalism.

The development of human capacities requires a social order with the greatest possible freedom. Such a social order is a perfectly just constitution in which mutual opposition between its members becomes consistent with freedom and justice. 

For Kant, the moral laws are a priori laws based on the Ideas of pure reason (A806/B834). Kant conceives of moral law in a political framework. The function of moral law is to harmonize the freedom of each individual with the freedom of all other individuals. Kant offers the Idea of a republican constitution, which allows 'the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others' (A316/B373, tr. Kemp Smith).

These laws are initially proposed as maxims, the subjective rules of behaviour. When these subjective rules are in accord with the Ideas of pure reason, they can be accepted as the objective laws of a community. Thus, Kant's conception of morality implies a realm of ends which reconciles the life of each individual with that of the community of all individuals.

Such a civic constitution establishes a commonwealth. Thus, the ultimate purpose of Nature for Kant is to lead humankind from the state of individual rivalry which inhibits the freedom of each and all to the state of universal harmony which enhances the freedom of each and all. Civil society established by the force of reason will eventually spread and rule the whole world. And this, for Kant, is the final purpose of creation (C3 435).

Kant's position could still not be described as radical. He repudiates democracy since, in it, 'everyone wishes to be master’. And if Kant traces all valid government to popular sovereignty, he also argues for a superior authority 'to rule autocratically' so as to control individual passions and improve the phenomena of the ethical disposition of humanity (Contest of Faculties in Reiss ed. 1991:184 187). Kant's attempt to reconcile popular sovereignty and political liberty with the existing political system, defending the principle of freedom in the one and endorsing the authoritarian structure of the other, puts an ambiguity at the heart of Kant’s politics.
Kant opts for the mixed government of 'the republic' defined as 'that political principle whereby the executive power (the government) is separated from the legislative power' (Perpetual Peace in Reiss ed. 1991:101). This political framework institutionally embodies the rights of the people without thereby challenging 'irresistible' monarchical power (Perpetual Peace in Reiss ed. 1991:112).

It is certainly agreeable to think up political constitutions which meat the requirements of reason (particularly in matters of right). But it is foolhardy to put them forward seriously, and punishable to incite the people to do away with the existing constitution.

Contest of Faculties in Reiss ed. 1991:188

Kant's political system now came to include a political version of his moral principle of duty. The citizen is thus bound by 'duty', which becomes an 'eternal norm' (Contest of Faculties in Reiss ed. 1991:187). His 'republican constitution' is offered as the only means by which the ideal could be applied. The constitution is the portrayal of the respublica noumenon according to the laws of freedom through an example in experience (respublica phenomenon) (Contest of Faculties in Reiss ed. 1991:187).
Obedience to the ruler is now justified not simply as a fact but as an a priori concept of practical reason. The 'rightful (i.e. external) freedom' associated with practical reason is transformed here into the subjunctive 'warrant to obey no external laws except those to which I have been able to give my own consent' (Perpetual Peace in Reiss ed. 1991:99).
Kant's 'republican constitution' is an attempt to combine the ideal of the self-legislating sovereign people with its identification with the existent sovereign ruler, with the former justifying the latter. Ultimately, then, Kant is led to resolve the problem of freedom in a plainly authoritarian manner, suppressing the radical implications of his moral principles by subordinating them to the empirical world of politics. Monarchs must 'rule autocratically and at the same time govern in a republican manner, i.e. to govern in the spirit of republicanism and by analogy with it' (Contest of Faculties in Reiss ed. 1991:184).
Kant nevertheless had come to recognise that absolute monarchy, administering political freedom, is 'provisional' and he projected a possible future in which the sovereign people would actually be the co-legislators of their freedom. Thus, the sovereign ruler representing the sovereign people, the separation of powers and the republican constitution exists in Kant as the final form of earthly human freedom. The exploration of human freedom beyond politics, the attainment of the moral republic of ends, was Marx's task.
Kant treats the complex relation between freedom and authority in depth and is certainly suggestive when it comes to the problem of coercion and the possibility for a social order without it. There is a sense, however, in which Kant's state, ultimately, is in its basics the liberal and the protective state. Thus Hoffman is forced to conclude that Kant's liberalism 'leaves people bound to their governors hand and foot’ (Hoffman 1995:108), the whole paradox of a defence of liberty combined with a submission to tyranny being contained within liberalism itself (Bellamy 1992:161).
Kant was left paralysed on the typically liberal association of social atomism and political centralisation. The question is whether the normative content of Kant's philosophy can be radicalised to overcome the political limitations of Kant's position. This radical potential, moreover, is realised against the way that liberalism has consistently interpreted Kant in terms of a disembodied morality abstracted from real social content. Another Kant is available, one that grounds politics in the categorical imperative, as presented in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.

8 THE IDEAL CIVIC CONSTITUTION

In determining purposes through the moral law, each member of the republic of ends legislates the law to him/herself and achieves autonomy and equality. In contradistinction to legislation in the actual world, individual members always heed the legislation in the republic of ends. Thus, each member not only gives her/himself the moral law but also obeys it. Each member of the republic of ends obeys only self-legislated laws. Since each member is both legislator and the subject of the laws, all are equal. The republic of ends is thus an ideal human community composed of free and equal members (Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith trans 1965: B.372).

As such an ideal, the republic of ends exists as a criterion by which to evaluate the existing political order. And Kant does indeed use the ideal in this way.

A constitution of the greatest human freedom in accordance with laws .. is at least a necessary Idea, which one must place at the foundation, not only in the first project of a state constitution, but also with regard to all laws... Though a [perfectly constituted society] may never come to pass, the Idea itself remains completely correct, which posits this maximum as an archetype, in order to bring the legal constitution of man ever closer to the greatest possible perfection, in accordance with the archetype. What the highest level may be at which man must stop, and how great therefore is the gap which necessarily remains open between the Idea and its realisation - that is a matter which no-one can or should determine [in advance] precisely because it is Freedom which can transgress any assigned limit.
Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith trans 1965: B 372-74

This ideal community has been formulated in abstraction from two 'hindrances' which block its achievement. The first hindrance is the fact that sensory nature is external to the individual so that even the legislation of reason, the determination of human will by the moral law, may not alter its course (Critique of Practical Reason Lewis White Beck trans 1956: 15 21). Knowledge of the course of nature is crucial in overcoming this hindrance.
The second hindrance is internal nature, the inclinations individuals possess through natural causality (Critique of Practical Reason Lewis White Beck trans 1956 20ff, 83f). This hindrance is overcome through the 'culture of reason' which teaches the individual how to act against all the inclinations aroused by external objects with the feeling aroused by the moral law (Critique of Practical Reason Lewis White Beck trans 1956 84f 117 160f). The autonomy achieved is not merely the result of the legislative activity of the monadic self but requires the development, by society, of each individual's reason. Human beings are morally free beings and are thus capable of rising above inclinations and acting with the 'respect' created by the moral law. Thus individuals become moral only to the extent that they subordinate their natural inclinations to the authority of the moral law (Seidler 1994:52).

Kant bequeathed a dualism between ethics and politics which could put the emphasis upon political obligation on the one hand or upon political freedom on the other hand. Politically, Kant is a moderate. Indeed, the political obligation to which Kant gave moral and rational foundation could take the conservative form of obedience and duty, invested in institutions and divested of popular input. Kant’s ethics, however, possess implications which are radical when translated into politics. To rearrange the relationship between ethics and politics in Kant, so as to explore Kant on his radical side, is to come up with a much more democratic formulation than Kant himself sought to provide, let alone achieved.

Kant's thought reproduces the old dualism between the world of flesh and the world of spirit (Krieger 1972:61). He postulates a (phenomenal) world of nature, which is the sensible world, and a (noumenal) world of freedom, which is the intelligible world. The basis of morality cannot be located in nature since, for Kant, this would imply collapsing individuals back into the determined order of natural necessity. Kant, then, has to avoid conflating the empirical existence of individuals and their moral selves by deducing a purely a priori morality, a morality within the limits of reason alone. What characterises Kant's morality is its autonomy, the view that moral duty is derived from no source outside of itself (Smith 1991:29/30).
What is radical about Kant's dualism is the dialectical relationship between the two worlds. The world of nature is actually organised by categories supplied by the human mind in accordance with the principles of knowledge. Of course Kant did argue that 'things in themselves' were unknowable. Nevertheless, 'things in themselves', to the extent that they are unknowable would remain unknown; human beings either grasped things through their conceptual apparatus or they were simply not conscious of them. The world of freedom is the intelligible world, the noumenal, organised by the human will and created by human action.
The dialectical relationship that Kant establishes between the two worlds via the common theme of human agency, comes with the revolutionary implication that the political and the social organisation of the necessitous natural world is actually open to the achievement of some degree of human freedom within its sphere. Moreover Kant's absolute moral law of freedom assumes a noumenological society of individuals who adhere to the prescription - 'I should never act in such a way that I could not will that my maxim should be a universal law (Kant Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals) and is formulated in such a way as to require a connection with the phenomenal world of political and social organisation. The extension of moral freedom to the civil and the political worlds was thus an imperative in Kant's own philosophy and did not need the French Revolution to suggest such a development.

9 THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION

For Kant, the philosophical problem of politics is how to convert lawless conflict into a moral ideal of peace (Saner 1973:310 313). This task is a struggle for the rule of law and persists until the realisation of the ideal of the republican state ensuring the greatest possible freedom for all. 
The chaos that conflict between the freedom of the individual and all others produces can be avoided only with the imposition of a lawful framework regulating individuals in a universally binding manner. This ensures that the free actions of one individual 'can be reconciled with the freedom of the other in accordance with a universal law', individuals remaining free to pursue private ends within the constraint of external freedom as defined by the 'Universal Principle of Right': 





This is an application of Kant's universal principle of morality, the categorical imperative, to politics. In Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that political philosophy must begin from the a priori awareness of the moral law as opposed to principles of (empirical) advantage, which would  issue  in  the rationalisation of unjust acts (PP 1991:93ff).
Kant’s First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace is that ‘The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican. The 'First Definitive Article'  restates  two  formulations  of  the Categorical Imperative to produce an a priori starting point. The 'objective' formulation, that human beings act in accordance with practical laws valid for all, is given political form in the principle that all members of society are equally subject to a 'common legislation' (PP 1991:99). The 'subjective' formulation, that human beings treat each other as ends and never as means, respecting everyone's capacity to legislate for themselves, takes political form in the principle of the 'freedom for all members of a society' (PP Reiss 1991:99).

A republican constitution is founded upon three principles: firstly, the principle of freedom for all members of a society (as men); secondly, the principle of the dependence of everyone upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and thirdly, the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens).
(PP 1996:99).

These principles lead to the idea of the moral agent as 'citizen of a transcendental world' (PP 1991:99), employing the moral law to establish a possible 'republican' constitution in the empirical world, structuring a 'civil society'. In this context, the realm of ends is a 'respublica noumenon' (CF 1991:187), appropriate to a 'race of angels' (PP 1991:112); civil society 'is a 'respublica phenomenon' which applies not to a moral idea of human beings but to a world of experience, to, in the worst possible case, a 'nation of devils' (PP 1991:112).

If reason is the slave of the passions, as Hume argues, then, for Kant, it ought not to be. The moral law can neither be derived from nor reduced to natural inclination, human beings acting on the level of empirical immediacy.
In so far as individuals live in two spheres (the intelligible and the natural), they are torn between freedom under the moral law and the ethical arbitrariness of natural inclinations. The problem is that Kant doesn’t actually bridge the gap between noumenon and phenomenon and this separation works to prevent the integration of morality and politics. In so far as individuals live in two spheres (the intelligible and the natural), they are torn between freedom under the moral law and the ethical arbitrariness of natural inclinations. The problem with this is that the principle of society and its laws cannot be freedom, which can never be empirically realised, but coercion, forcing individuals prudentially to do what they ought to do morally (PP 1991:112/3 117). And this means that Kant’s morality is brittle and fragile, wide open to the subversion of the passions. This is why coercion is required. Coercion is inherent in the constitutional framework of civil society, nature compelling individuals to enter into a social contract to satisfy their inclinations and protect their persons (PP 1991:97n 98n 99n). This coercive legality is necessary since individuals are inclined to pursue individual advantage at the expense of the moral law. However, this necessity of coercion to subordinate natural inclinations to legally instituted motives, voiding them (PP 1991:108/114 120/ln), diverges markedly from the ideal community promised by the realm of ends and the civil constitution. Freedom as the capacity to legislate for oneself remains a predicate of the individual as noumenon. Empirically, it can only appear as a form of natural causality which, applicable to the individual as phenomenon, is coercion. This necessity of coercion shows the extent to which Kant's politics diverge from the ideal community promised by the realm of ends and the perfect constitution.
Kant's morality of duty, institutionalised as a 'lawful freedom', does not provide a solution to the problem of order. In conceding the phenomenal world of natural inclination to self-interest (Hume’s ‘passions’), Kant's ethics degenerate into a formalistic morality designed not to overcome self-interest but constrain it within the capitalist structures of private property and the minimal state. The 'rational' project of substituting morality for coercion in human affairs ends in a lawful state administering a coercive civil society.
Kant's 'lawful state' thus assumes a restrictive character in which the freedom of each and all is harmonized through law as general coercive rule (TP 1991:73). Kant's principles of freedom do not enter into the political world. The original contract is not an actual fact but 'merely an idea of reason' by which to judge existing laws (TP 1991:79). Hence the inalienable rights which people possess against the head of state cannot be coercive (TP 1991:79/80). With the establishment of the civil constitution, the autonomous right of citizens to legislate the laws to themselves is transformed into a hypothetical ‘as if’ and turned into the rational norm according to which the head of the state adjusts the laws (TP 1991:79). The 'people can never possess a right of coercion against the head of state, or be entitled to oppose him in word or deed' (TP 1991:83).
In failing to synthesize politics and morality, Kant is left with two states confronting each other. Ideally, there is the ethical state in which the sovereign law of reason raises the individual to the universal moral level, the individual attaining what was truly human in himself or herself. Empirically, there is the juridical state in which the sovereign law of reason integrates the individual at the level of civil society.

Of all the 'rational’ thinkers, Kant expresses most clearly the dualistic character of law as rational and as positive (Norrie 1991:ch3; Wood 1990:70/1), of law as right in embodying the rational will of individuals and of law as regulation in controlling the egoistic will of individuals. Law involves both a concept of right and a concept of regulation, split between a possible freedom and an actual necessity. Hegel would come to attempt a synthesis by the rational elucidation of the universal within the particular. Law thus emerges in Hegel as a moment in the movement of the rational within the social (Norrie 1991:ch4).

As the application of principles of right to experience, Kant's principles of politics are normative. Indeed, he argues that politics should be normative. Right .. 'ought never to be adapted to politics, but politics ought always to be adapted to right' (Reiss ed 1991:21). Thus Kant affirms that there can be no conflict of politics, as a practical doctrine of right, with ethics, as a theoretical doctrine of right: 'all politics must bend the knee before right' (PP 1991:125).

Morality and legality must be related in such a way that morality shapes politics (PP 1991:93/130). The Categorical Imperative, universalising only those maxims of action which respect all individuals as ends in themselves, obtains political form. 

Thus the proposition that the human race has always been progres​sively improving and will continue to develop in the same way is not just a well-meant saying to be recommended for practical purposes. Whatever unbelievers may say, it is tenable within the most strictly theoretical context. And if one considers not only the events which may happen within a particular nation, but also their repercussions upon all the nations of the earth which might gradually begin to participate in them, a view opens up into the unbounded future. This would not be true, of course, if the first epoch of natural convulsions, which …  engulfed the animal and vegetable kingdoms before the era of man, were to be followed by a second in which the human race were given the same treatment so that other creatures might take the stage instead, etc. For man in turn is a mere trifle in relation to the omnipotence of nature, or rather to its inaccessible highest cause. But if the rulers of man's own species regard him as such and treat him accordingly, either by burdening him like a beast and using him as a mere instrument of their ends, or by setting him up to fight in their disputes and slaughter his fellows, it is not just a trifle but a reversal of the ultimate purpose of creation. (CF Reiss ed 1991:185). 

Kant’s point is important in pointing to the uniqueness of human beings in having a moral purpose as distinct from the amorality of physical causality. Though 'man' 'is a mere trifle' in relation to the 'inaccessible highest cause' of nature, 'it is not just a trifle but a reversal of the ultimate purpose of creation' 'if the rulers of man's own species regard him as such and treat him accordingly', 'using him as a mere instrument of their ends' (CF 1991:185). Further, if legality can be interpreted as ensuring that some moral ends (prohibition of theft, murder etc) are observed, then the political-legal realm can be conceived as the partial realisation of an ideal realm in which individuals respected each other as ends. Politics is thus the legal realisation of moral ends.

There is a strain in Kant's political thought which is sceptical of democracy, restricting the right to vote to individuals who qualify as active citizens, self-employed males i.e. the individual who is 'his own master' through owning 'same sort of property .. that supports him' (Saw 1974:63/4; CJ 1951:79). 
Kant's 'rational freedom' is a lawful freedom that restrains individual appetite and inclination in order to reach the higher good for all. In this conception, 'right is the restriction of each individual's freedom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else' and law is the general coercive rule which achieves this general union (TP 1991:73). Kant's thought compares and contrasts with Rousseau, particularly the principle of self-assumed obligation and the idea of law as an educative process that forces people to be free. Though what Kant calls 'lawful freedom' is based on the right of the individual 'to obey no law other than that to which he has given his consent' (MM 1991:139), this 'state of lawful dependence' created by the legislative will of its members does not imply democracy. Individuals must demonstrate a 'fitness to vote' by being a property owning member of the commonwealth (MM 1991:139; Saw 1974:63/4; CJ 1951:79). Whereas the original social contract establishes the legitimacy of the state and political obligation through a democratic act of consent, Kant sacrifices reason to the existing order. Since all 'are not equally qualified within this constitution to possess the right to vote', not all 'have a right to influence or organise the state itself as active members, or to co-operate in introducing particular laws' (MM 1991:140). In insisting that positive laws not be at variance with the natural laws of freedom, Kant does at least allow the equality of all 'to work their way up from their passive condition to an active one' (MM 1991:140) through 'talent, industry and luck' (Saw 1974:60). This would equip the individual to influence and organise the state as an active member. 

The notion of ‘fitness to vote’ is of a piece with Kant’s attempt to transcend natural inclinations for a higher good. Those who are unfitted are in a condition of material dependence and would tend to vote according to self-interest as given within the necessity of the empirical world. The votes of individuals pursuing their own interests and desires would reflect a passive condition of material dependency, not an active consideration of moral good in the commonwealth. The translation of the popular will into public policy would therefore reflect not a rational and moral will concerned with the common good of all but a congeries of individual inclinations, interests and desires.

Kant's equality of opportunity within a formal equality is, nevertheless, 'consistent with the greatest inequality’ in social life. Kant, moreover, accepts the corollary that whilst persons are 'equal subjects before the law', if 'the welfare of one person is greatly dependent on the will of another (the poor depending on the rich), one must obey .. when the other commands' (Saw 1974:59/60). 
The argument has radical implications. If the labourer, dependent on another's will through not owning the instruments and products of labour, is to acquire the attribute of citizenship, it follows that the economic structure of society must be transformed so that social dependence is abolished. This extends popular participation in equipping the individual to 'influence’ and 'organise' the state.

In being dependent on another's will through not owning the instruments and products of labour, the labourer cannot have the right to participate (CJ 1951:79). If the labourer is to acquire the attribute of citizenship fitting to a rational being, it follows that the economic structure of society must be transformed so as to abolish social dependence. Kant, however, himself limits his comments to the possibility that the passive citizen may rise to become an active citizen through 'talent, industry and luck’ (Saw 1974:60). Further, Kant repudiates the directly democratic implications of the social contract in favour of a republican state in which popular sovereignty is exercised through representatives chosen in free elections (Saw 1974:64). Yet, as Marx's critique of abstract political representation shows, representatives of the people are not independent of particular interests and do not necessarily legislate in the universal interest, even though legislative activity proceeds within a constitutional framework that embodies the universal principle. (Marx CHDS EW 1975). Kant's republican ideal could not serve the universal interest without an actively democratic input, an active as well as a passive suffrage, a commission or a recall system uniting electors and deputies. What Marx's critique would show most of all is the impossibility of a public realm under capitalism as a regime of private accumulation. Capitalism privatises and depoliticises the public realm by making common affairs the province of the private realm (Levine 1984:133/4). The realisation of the political ideal of Kant's republican state and Hegel's state as ethical agency requires the abolition of the state-civil society dualism so that the public sphere is invested with democratic and material content, ensuring that the universal interest legislated through the public sphere reflects the will of all.
The most that Kant will concede to this radical project is a formal or legal equality which 'is quite consistent with the greatest inequality' in social life. Kant accepts the corollary that whilst persons are 'equal subjects before the law', if 'the welfare of one person is greatly dependent on the will of another (the poor depending on the rich), one must obey .. when the other commands' (Saw 1974:59/60). Such dependence contradicts the principle of active citizenship and, hence, blocks the full realisation of the republican ideal. 

For Kant, justice as universal can only be realised through a legal coercion exercised according to universal principle. Kant's political order is, therefore, a 'coercive order’ (Ladd 1965:xviii) in which legality is 'the decisive principle' (Reiss in Reiss ed 1991:21/22). 

Kant's morality of duty, institutionalised as a 'lawful freedom', does not therefore provide a solution to the problem of order. Rather, in conceding the phenomenal world of natural inclination to self-interest, Kant's ethics degenerate into a formalistic morality designed not to overcome self-interest but constrain it within the capitalist structures of private property and the minimal state.

Kant argues for a superior authority 'to rule autocratically' so as to control individual passions and improve the ethical disposition of humanity (CF 1991:184 187). Kant refers to his ideal of a self-legislating sovereign people as a 'Platonic ideal', existing as an 'eternal norm but for which there is no object adequately existent in experience (CF 1991:187). He offers the 'republican constitution' as the only means by which the respublica noumenon could be applied, according to the laws of freedom through an example in experience (respublica phenomenon) (CF 1991:187). The 'republican constitution' represents Kant's attempt to combine the ideal of the self-legislating sovereign people with the existent sovereign ruler. 

In contrast to Kant, Marx was to demand the transformation of the mechanisms generating the socio-economic inequality which prevented civic independence, thus making political  participation available to all as active citizens. Kant's claims that the republican state guarantees the most extensive liberty for each and all, establishes the conditions of autonomy, and prepares the grounds for the moral community can only be made good with the abolition of capitalism (Van Der Linden 1985:201 202).

Kant, nevertheless, rejects democracy since, under it, everyone wants to be a ruler. Democracy is necessarily a despotism in that it creates an executive power through which all citizens may make decisions about and even against individuals without their consent, meaning that the general will is in contradiction with itself and with freedom (PP 1991:101). 

Kant favours republicanism over democracy. In a democracy, everyone wants to be a ruler or a master. This is precisely the criticism that Plato and Aristotle made of democracy. Democracy is necessarily a despotism in that it creates an executive power through which all citizens may make decisions about and even against individuals without their consent: 'decisions are made by all the people and yet not all the people; and this means that the general will is in contradiction with itself, and thus also with freedom' (Kant Hans Reiss ed Kant: Political Writings 1991:101).

Kant identifies a real problem here. The notion of the general interest becoming separated from the individuals constituting the citizen body would become a particular target for Marx in his concern to overcome the autonomy of the state and the alienation of community from individuals (Marx 1999:83/9). There is a need to oppose self-representation to the abstraction of representation and the autonomy of relations from the citizen body.

Lacking a solution, Kant falls back upon republicanism as entailing a representative system of government in which executive and legislative are divorced from each other. Kant thus argues for a superior authority 'to rule autocratically' to control individual passions and improve the ethical disposition of humanity (CF 1991:184 187). Unable to reconcile the real and the ideal, the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be’, Kant is compelled to state the idea of political peace and the constitution based on universal principles of natural right as something that human beings evolve towards. But in this evolution towards the end state, Kant justifies a form of political rule ‘by analogy with the laws which a people would give itself in conformity with universal principles of right.’

In these principles, there must be something moral which reason recognises not only as pure, but also (because of its great and epoch-making influence) as something to which the human soul manifestly acknowledges a duty. Moreover, it concerns the human race as a complete association of men (non singulorum, sed universorum), for they rejoice with universal and disinterested sympathy at its anticipated success and at all attempts to make it succeed. 
The occurrence in question is not, however, a phenomenon of revolution, but (as Erhard puts it) of the evolution of a constitution governed by natural right. Such a constitution cannot itself be achieved by furious struggles—for civil and foreign wars will destroy whatever statutory order has hitherto prevailed—but it does lead us to strive for a constitution which would be incapable of bellicosity, i.e. a republican one. The actual form of the desired state might be republican, or alternatively, it might only be republican in its mode of government, in that the state would be administered by a single ruler (the monarch) acting by analogy with the laws which a people would give itself in conformity with universal principles of right.

Rather than actively pursue the republican ideal through embodying universal principles in politics, Kant falls back upon a passive evolution in which a single ruler, even a monarch, acts ‘by analogy’ with those principles. Kant transfers the responsibility for the realisation of these universal principles of right from politics to ‘evolution’.

Even without the mind of a seer, I now maintain that I can predict from the aspects and signs of our times that the human race will achieve this end, and that it will henceforth progressively improve without any more total reversals. For a phenomenon of this kind which has taken place in human history can never be forgotten, since it has revealed in human nature an aptitude and power for improvement of a kind which no politician could have thought up by examining the course of events in the past. Only nature and freedom, combined within mankind in accordance of becoming a universal rule. A being endowed with freedom, aware of the advantage he possesses over non-rational animals, can and must therefore follow the formal principle of his will and demand for the people to which he belongs nothing short of a government in which the people are co-legislators. In other words, the rights of men who are expected to obey must necessarily come before all considerations of their actual wellbeing, for they are a sacred institution, exalted above all utilitarian values; and no matter how benevolent a government is, it may not tamper with them. These rights, however, always remain an idea which can be fulfilled only on condition that the means employed to do so are compatible with morality. This limiting condition must not be overstepped by the people, who may not therefore pursue their rights by revolution, which is at all times unjust. The best way of making a nation content with its constitution is to rule autocratically and at the same time to govern in a republican manner, i.e. to govern in the spirit of republicanism and by analogy with it. (CF Reiss ed 1991:184). 

Kant rules out revolution as a means incompatible with morality. But to argue for an autocratic rule through which a nation becomes content with its constitution by being governed in the spirit of republicanism is a flagrant contradiction of means and ends. Kant’s formulation savours a little of Rousseau’s argument that the law forces people to be free. The law for Rousseau was an educative purpose but also a self-education. Human beings as citizens obey the laws that they have themselves made and, in doing so, live up to their higher nature. To be defensible in a similar manner, Kant’s justification for autocratic rule governing in a republican manner must be given democratic content by reference to self-assumed obligation. Kant needs to emphasise the participation of citizens in this rule, so that in time the republican spirit is assimilated and becomes second nature. Without this democratic input, autocratic rule evolves only autocratic rule.

Kant's republic, defined as the separation of the executive from the legislative power (PP 1991:101) embodies the rights of the people without thereby challenging 'irresistible' monarchical power (PP 1991:112). Kant refers to ‘irresistible supreme power’ as something that ‘must be assumed in any civil consti​tution, for a ruler who does not have sufficient power to protect each individual among the people against the others cannot have the right to give the people orders either), he does not have to worry that his own aims might be frustrated if his maxim became generally known.’ (PP 1991:112).

The problem is one of preventing individuals encroaching upon each other, something for which the state exists in liberal theory. In the absence of the state another solution is required. Arendt recovers the old idea of Polybius that only power arrests power. This could also suggest the anarchist notion of individuals becoming so powerful in their social life that they can resist encroachment from others.

Kant, however, is very far from anarchism. 'Man' needs a master since 'those natural capacities which are directed towards the use of his reason are such that they could be fully developed in the species, but not in the individual’ (Kant UH 1991:42). 

Kant is concerned less with the form of the state than that the sovereign, even a monarch, represent the will of the people (Van Der Linden 1988:36). With his republic as a constitutional monarchy (Krieger 1972:121), Kant refers to his ideal of a self-legislating sovereign people as a 'Platonic ideal', existing as an 'eternal norm' for which there is no object adequately existent in experience (CF 1991:187). The ‘republican constitution' is the only means by which the respublica noumenon could be applied, according to the laws of freedom through an example in experience (respublica phenomenon) (CF 1991:187). The separation of powers at the heart of Kant's republicanism mediates between the ideal sovereignty of the people and the real sovereignty of the ruler. But Kant's morality is confined within empirical political possibility. Obedience to the ruler is justified not simply as a fact but as an a priori concept of practical reason (PP 1991:99).
But Kant's rationale for the absolutist state is deceptively formulated. Kant's political theory involves basic principles which could contradict his justification of the enlightened absolutist state. Kant argues that the plan of nature involves each individual developing his or her own capacities 'completely', happiness and perfection through the efforts of the individual human reason (Universal History in Reiss ed. 1991:44). But, if this is so, what becomes of the argument for a master breaking the will of the individual and compelling the individual to obey a general will that ensures the freedom of all? Kant is aware of the tension and, indeed, argues at length for a process of enlightenment which ensures the release of the individual reason from its 'self-incurred immaturity' (Enlightenment? in Reiss ed. 1991:54).

Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding!




So what becomes of Kant’s argument that human beings are animals who need a master in politics? Kant demands that human beings have the courage to use their own understanding, but time and again justifies the rule of a new guardian class in politics, autocratic rule ‘in a republican spirit.’

Kant argues that 'a perfect solution is impossible. Nothing straight can be constructed from such warped wood as that which man is made of. Nature only requires of us that we should approximate to this idea' (Universal History in Reiss ed. 1991:46/7). However, Kant's conflation of hereditary monarchy and elected assemblies in the concept of the 'master' is a plain evasion concealed behind the assertion that all human government is artificial (Universal History in Reiss ed. 1991:46/7). There is another way out. In What is Enlightenment?, Kant may be read as arguing for a situation in which individuals do not need a master to impose the general will upon them but can rule in a republican spirit themselves. Kant states the paradox of emancipation, the difficulty of those corrupted by circumstances to liberate themselves from those circumstances. 

Thus it is difficult for each separate individual to work his way out of the immaturity which has become almost second nature to him. He has even grown fond of it and is really incapable for the time being of using his own understanding, because he was never allowed to make the attempt. Dogmas and formulas, those mechanical instruments for rational use (or rather misuse) of his natural endowments, are the ball and chain of his permanent immaturity. And if anyone did throw them off, he would still be uncertain about jumping over even the narrowest of trenches, for he would be unaccustomed to free movement of this kind. Thus only a few, by cultivating their own minds, have succeeded in freeing themselves from immaturity and in continuing boldly on their way. (WE Reiss ed 1991:54). 

This is the justification for a theoretico-elitist model of authoritarian rule. Since ‘only a few’ have succeeded in cultivating there minds, only a few is entitled to rule. Kant sets up a dualism of active elite and passive mass, the familiar division upon which emancipatory politics flounders. Whilst Kant refers to ‘dogmas and formulas’ as the ball and chain of permanent immaturity, enlightened governments, bringing knowledge to the passive people ‘from the outside’, set up their own dogmas and formulas, reinforcing immaturity. It took Marx and his revolutionary-critical praxis to resolve this paradox of emancipation. Arguing that human beings are active agents, changing themselves in transforming their self-made circumstances, Marx had no need to divide society into two parts, a knowledgeable elite and a corrupted mass. Rather, human beings themselves are change agents.

Kant understands the paradox of emancipation as it applies to politics, and therefore rules out revolution in favour of a general and amorphous process of public education.

There is more chance of an entire public enlightening itself. This is indeed almost inevitable, if only the public concerned is left in freedom. For there will always be a few who think for themselves, even among those appointed as guardians of the common mass. Such guardians, once they have themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will disseminate the spirit of rational respect for personal value and for the duty of all men to think for themselves. The remarkable thing about this is that if the public, which was previously put under this yoke by the guardians, is suitably stirred up by some of the latter who are incapable of enlighten​ment, it may subsequently compel the guardians themselves to remain under the yoke. For it is very harmful to propagate prejudices, because they finally avenge themselves on the very people who first encouraged them (or whose predecessors did so). Thus a public can only achieve enlightenment slowly. A revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism and to rapacious or power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking. Instead, new prejudices, like the ones they replaced, will serve as a leash to control the great unthinking mass. 
For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom in question is the most innocuous form of all—freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters. But I hear on all sides the cry: Don't argue! The officer says: Don't argue, get on parade! The tax-official: Don't argue, pay! The clergyman: Don't argue, believe! (Only one ruler in the world says: Argue as much as you like and about whatever you like, but obey). All this means restrictions on freedom everywhere. But which sort of restriction prevents enlightenment, and which, instead of hindering it, can actually promote it? I reply: The public use of man's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men; the private use of reason may quite often be very narrowly restricted, however, without undue hindrance to the progress of enlighten​ment. But by the public use of one's own reason I mean that use which anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public. What I term the private use of reason is that which a person may make of it in a particular civil post or office with which he is entrusted. (WE Reiss ed 1991:55). 

Now in some affairs which affect the interests of the commonwealth, we require a certain mechanism whereby some members of the commonwealth must behave purely passively, so that they may, by an artificial common agreement, be employed by the government for public ends (or at least deterred from vitiating them). It is, of course, impermissible to argue in such cases; obedience is imperative. But in so far as this or that individual who acts as part of the machine also considers himself as a member of a complete commonwealth or even of cosmopolitan society, and thence as a man of learning who may through his writings address a public in the truest sense of the word, he may indeed argue without harming the affairs in which he is employed for some of the time in a passive capacity. Thus it would be very harmful if an officer receiving an order from his superiors were to quibble openly, while on duty, about the appropriateness or usefulness of the order in question. He must simply obey. But he cannot reasonably be banned from making observations as a man of learning on the errors in the military service, and from submitting these to his public for judgement. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed upon him; presumptuous criticisms of such taxes, where someone is called upon to pay them, may be punished as an outrage which could lead to general insubordination. Nonetheless, the same citizen does not contravene his civil obligations if, as a learned individual, he publicly voices his thoughts on the impropriety or even injustice of such fiscal measures.
WE 1991:56

'To test whether any particular measure can be agreed upon as a law for a people, we need only ask whether a people could well impose such a law upon itself (Enlightenment? in Reiss ad. 1991:57). And 'something which a people may not even impose upon itself can still less be imposed on it by a monarch' (Enlightenment? in Reiss ed. 1991:58).

But only a ruler who is himself enlightened and has no fear of phantoms, yet who likewise has at hand a well-disciplined and numerous army to guarantee public security, may say what no republic would dare to say: Argue as much as you like and about whatever you like, but obey! This reveals to us a strange and unexpected pattern in human affairs (such as we shall always find if we consider them in the widest sense, in which nearly everything is paradoxical). A high degree of civil freedom seems advan​tageous to a people's intellectual freedom, yet it also sets up insuperable barriers to it. Conversely, a lesser degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its fullest extent. Thus once the germ on which nature has lavished most care—man's inclination and vocation to think freely—has developed within this hard shell, it gradually reacts upon the mentality of the people, who thus gradually become increasingly able to act freely. Eventually, it even influences the principles of  governments, which find that they can themselves profit by treating man, who is more than a machine,'' in a manner appropriate to his dignity. (WE 1991:59).

Kant's constitutional monarchy is provisional, Kant projecting a possible future in which the sovereign people would actually be the co-legislators of their freedom. Thus monarchs must govern in a 'republican (not a democratic) manner', 'in the spirit of republicanism and by analogy with it' (CF 1991:184). The monarch should govern according to 'laws of freedom' that people of 'mature rational powers' would prescribe for itself (CF 1991:187). For Kant, it is less the form than the mode of government that it important, valuing the possibility that the state may 'come to be like the idea of the republican state' (Saner 1973:311).
But whereas Kant repudiates the directly democratic implications of the social contract in favour of a republican state in which popular sovereignty is exercised through representatives (Saw 1974:64), Marx affirmed the unity of democratic form and content. Marx's critique of abstract political representation showed that representatives do not necessarily legislate in the universal interest, even when legislative activity proceeds within a constitutional framework that embodies the universal principle. Only with an active as well as a passive suffrage, a commission or a recall system uniting electors and deputies, is the public sphere invested with democratic and material content to ensure that legislation genuinely reflects the universal will of all. Indeed, such a system is a form of political self-education and development, ensuring that the members composing the demos turn themselves into active and informed citizens.
Kant claims that the republican state guarantees the most extensive liberty for each and all, establishes the conditions of autonomy, and prepares the grounds for the moral community. However, in showing the impossibility of a public realm under capitalism, with the capital system privatising and depoliticising the public realm, making common affairs a private domain (Levine 1984:133/4), Marx renders these claims problematical. The abolition of capitalism is Marx’s categorical imperative applied to politics.

Kant himself offers a path beyond the contradiction between the ethical state of the moral world and an alienated juridical state of the real world. For Kant did not regard the free will of the moral agent as being irrelevant to politics. His argument that 'a true system of politics' must pay 'tribute to morality' (PP 1991:125) presses against the boundary separating the political from the moral, overcoming the distinction between the politically possible and the morally right (Riley 1982). Right .. 'ought never to be adapted to politics, but politics ought always to be adapted to right' (in Reiss ed 1991:21). Thus Kant affirms that there can be no conflict of politics, as a practical doctrine of right, with ethics, as a theoretical doctrine of right: 'all politics must bend the knee before right' (PP 1991:125).
True, Kant distinguished between moral and legal motives, maintaining that the one can never be merged with the other without requiring 'a kind of new creation or super-natural creation’ (CF 1991:188), a possibility which Kant denied. But Kant's ethic of ends bridges the moral to the political-legal realm as the two sides of freedom. A realm of ends as a regime of pure morality may be unrealisable but Kant does entertain possibilities for a legal order which corresponds to morality more closely than existing arrangements. Morality and legality must be related in such a way that morality shapes politics (PP 1991:93/130). The Categorical Imperative, universalising only those maxims of action which respect all individuals as ends in themselves, has political implications. Though 'man' 'is a mere trifle' in relation to the 'inaccessible highest cause' of nature, 'it is not just a trifle but a reversal of the ultimate purpose of creation' 'if the rulers of man's own species regard him as such and treat him accordingly', 'using him as a mere instrument of their ends' (CF 1991:185). Politics is thus the partial, legal, realisation of an ideal realm in which individuals respected each other as ends.




The success of Kant’s project depends upon the extent to which culture and nature can be integrated through reason. Without this integration it is not possible to establish the basis of freedom in the empirical world, a world of bondage subjecting individuals to alien forms. In so far as the ideal is locked up in a normative realm abstracted from the real world, the real state will be unable to proceed beyond Kant's minimal assumption of intelligent devils, an assumption which corresponds to a market society based upon antagonism and egoism in human relations (Lukacs 1991:72 73). The empirical facts of class division and the autonomy-denying universal antagonism of the ‘war of all against all’ means that the coercion that Kant wrote of in the 'respublica phenomenon’ is necessarily the basis of legality, against which the reconciling power of reason is impotent (Marx OJQ EW 1975:221). Marx showed that Kant's vision of the harmonious community of noumenal beings - the 'respublica noumenon' - is a material and historical possibility only through the abolition of class and the alienating division of labour which generate coercion in human relationships. 

Levine's claim that Marx would govern society through 'the internalized compulsion of reason' (Levine 1987:14) has a Rousseauan and Kantian flavour but is insufficiently alive to the repressive implications of replacing external obligations with internalised compulsion (Keane 1988:25; Walzer 1970:122-36). In Connolly's Foucaultian critique, the 'rational' project encloses the individual within an inclusive community (Connolly 1989:127/8 129/31). To be free in this sense requires that the particular will is 'domesticated' to will the universal law (Connolly 1989:57).

Both Marx and Hegel address this problem of internal and external constraint. The problem with this is the possibility that an external bondage has been replaced by an internal one, something which in no way grasps the nature of rational freedom being developed here. Hegel himself was aware of the repressive implications of reason. Hegel distinguished between the victim of positive religion and the Kantian self: it 'is not that the former makes himself into a servant while the latter is free; instead it is that the former carries his master outside himself, while the latter carries his master within himself and is in bondage to himself (Knox trans ETW 1971:211). In other words, Kantian morality overcomes the positivity of external bondage only by internalising it. The empirical self is still subject to the rational self, but the law it obeys is not its own law but that of the supernatural self. As a result, there is an 'indestructible positivity' inherent in Kantian morality of reason which, though presented as self-legislation, is actually the legislation of a will external to the empirical self, to which the empirical self must submit (Knox trans ETW 1971:211-12).
Marx made this point with respect to the way that Luther replaced servitude based on devotion with servitude based on conviction. This abolished 'external religiosity' 'only by making religiosity the inner man'. The layman no longer struggled with 'the priest outside himself but with 'his own inner priest' (CHPR:I 1975:251/2).

Max Weber referred to modern society as the iron cage. This steel hard cage is not so much a physical as a psychic prison, embracing not just the bodies but the very subjectivities of its members. The bars on the cage are not visible, they are internal rather than external – what William Blake called ‘mind forged manacles’. Weber here identifies the inner constraint that characterises capitalist modernity.

Foucault argues that madness was originally seen as a manifestation of animality rather than an illness. This shows the potentially repressive aspect of the attempt to tame and curtail natural inclinations. The imposition of culture over nature is not just a denaturalisation but also a dehumanisation. In Madness and Civilisation, Foucault comments that: 'the animality that rages in madness dispossesses man of what is specifically human in him; not in order to deliver him over to other powers, but simply to establish him at the zero degree of his own nature' (Foucault 1999: 74). Madness as the epitome of animality can be cured only by regulation. For Foucault power is not strict violence or pure coercion, but the interplay of techniques of discipline and less obvious technologies of the self. This amounts to the external and self-suppression of the body. Forming oneself as an ethical subject requires practices of the self (1987b: 26-8). It is 'the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, rapport a soi . .. which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions' (1984b: 352). 

The history of rationalization can be seen in terms of a growing regulation of nature, inclinations and the body through dietary management, scientific exercise, gastronomy and the technology of medicine, bringing human beings and human nature under the detailed control of the state and other institutions, curtailing possibilities of primitive experience, spontaneity and unrestrained pleasures. These developments are the culmination of the spirit of internal restraint in obedience to the moral law within. A parallel development is the increasing external regulation of the autonomous individual within the rationalizing process of the iron cage. Modern society thus emerges as a network of disciplines which police the individual from the cradle to the grave. 

Freud refers to civilisation as a social coercion which requires the sacrifice of instinctual satisfaction. As Erich Fromm puts it, there is a social character, a type, which is specific to every society. To put it simply, society needs men who want to do what they have to do’ (Fromm 1966:7/8). Human beings are trained to do and to want what the system has them do and want. Instead of freedom we have rationalisation as the growing regulation of the body and institutionalisation of the individual.

The existence of rationalisation as a 'religiosity' in both internal and external forms exposes Kant's freedom as problematical. Kant's dualism of duty and inclination contrasts with Aristotelian notions of self-fulfilment and possesses a strong relation to Christianity's dualism of flesh and spirit (Norman 1983:94/7; Krieger 1972:87). Kant's freedom affirms the human capacity to discern and submit to the dictates of the moral law, as existing independently of experience (Kant GMM 1991:62/6; 1956:81/4). The danger is that this succeeds in overcoming external bondage only by internalising it. The law that the empirical self obeys is not its own law but that of the supernatural self (Kant GMM 1991:62/6; 1956:81/4). There is, therefore, an ‘indestructible positivity’ in Kant's morality of reason which, though presented as self-legislation, is actually the legislation of a rational will external to the empirical self, to which the empirical self must submit as a second nature (Hegel ETW 1971:211/12; Seidler 1994:41).

True, Kant locates reason within the nature of human beings, the moral law which is planted within. The problem lies in Kant’s split between higher and lower nature, between reason as the higher part of humanity and empirical nature as the lower part. By placing all empirical phenomena outside the bounds of reason, Kant's framework is dualistic. As the product of pure reason, emancipating individuals from natural inclinations, Kant's freedom under law possesses an external character apart from individuals in their real lives in the world of experience. Kant separates moral society from the world of experience, treating individuals as rational beings as distinct from natural beings (Krieger 1972:101/2; Taylor 1975:368/9). This comes at a price. Kant is attempting to transcend natural inclinations, the appetites and desires that chain human beings to natural necessity and causality, and to that end reason does indeed possess an emancipatory purpose. The problem lies in the way that dualism can raise a higher rational realm over, above and even against empirical individuals. Kant requires a mediating term between reason and nature, an ethico-social-institutional matrix that channels human action towards the higher, rather than just restraining and suppressing the lower.

As Hegel argued, 'although practical reason postulates the identity of idea and reality, the latter remains strictly opposed and external to reason' (NL 1975:59/60 72). For Kant, the individual is moral only in being able to abstract from the contingent influences and determinations of the natural and social world, coming to act according to a moral law established by pure practical reason in a noumenal realm. The danger is that, far from orienting human beings away from their ‘lower’ empirical natures towards their higher rational natures, Kantian rationalism serves to denature human beings.





Since Kant identifies the 'true' moral nature of human beings with a self distinct from the empirical self, individuals have to value the rational aspect of identity whilst denying that the natural world of needs, wants, and desires could possess any rationality.

Kant, it should be emphasised, is not simply wrong on this. Kant is dealing with a very real problem that critics are prone to miss. Kant’s rational restraint is not repressive. There is nothing liberatory about removing natural inclinations – egoistic wants, desires, appetites from constraints – from restraint. On the contrary, egoistic liberty soon degenerates into a licence chained to natural necessity. So Kant is dealing with a real problem.

Kant delivers an impressive list of charges to prove that personal happiness is the 'most objectionable' principle, singling out the fact that it 'bases morality on sensuous motives' as the greatest vice (GMM 1991:103).
For Kant, the heteronomy of the will is ‘the source of all spurious principles of morality’.









Kant praises Plato for demonstrating that ideas originate in reason rather than in the empirical world: 'nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done, or to impose upon them the limits by which the latter is circumscribed' (Pure 1965:313). The human being as a 'creature' can never attain such a level of moral disposition as holiness since 'he can never be wholly free from desires and inclinations which, because they rest on physical causes, do not of themselves agree with the moral law, which has an entirely different source' (Prac 1956:86).

In the Groundwork, Kant turned morality and Nature against each other. The categorical imperative is conceived as a stern command for the triumph of morality over the forces of natural inclination. There is nothing absolutely good other than the morally good will. (GMM 394). Human beings, as moral agents, are the maltreated stepchildren of a heartless Nature. The absolute value of morality thus received protection by being enclosed in the innermost sanctuary of rational beings. In the Groundwork, the natural world is at best coldly indifferent and at worst cruelly hostile to the world of supersensible moral ideals. Material forces are governed by mechanical laws and are therefore blind and indifferent to moral values. In constituting human nature, they produce natural inclinations that have the perpetual propensity to flout moral laws. The natural world thus works to prevent human beings realizing their transcendent aspirations. The fact that human beings have such aspirations makes the human species a misfit pitted against nature. Kant contemplated this troubled condition of humanity in the natural world in terms of the gap between the sensible and the supersensible worlds. This was the gap that also filled Kant with awe and wonder, the starry skies above and the moral law within.

Since the possibility of morality depends upon abstraction from the empirical world, the noumenal realm beyond the phenomenal world 'is certainly only an ideal'. Individuals enter this noumenal realm only to the extent to which they abstract from their social situation. The categorical imperative can enjoin that individuals act as though they are legislating members of a 'kingdom of ends' only 'if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends' (GMM 1991:95). 

The problem is that Kant secures a basis for morality only by defining a realm that has little in common with real society. Individuals are required to detach themselves from everything that constitutes self-identity. 
It is difficult to understand how moral legislation produced in this noumenal realm could apply in the phenomenal realm. Kant himself realises that denying the situational character of the world of experience reduces the force of his argument. Though a kingdom of ends could exist if the maxims which the categorical imperative prescribes for all were universally followed, Kant acknowledges that 'even if a rational being were himself to follow such a maxim strictly, he cannot count on everybody else being faithful to it on this ground' (Kant GMM 1991:100).
Because a realm of ends, in which every individual acts as a rational being, cannot be guaranteed, legal force must intervene. The law, for Kant as for Rousseau, is an educative purpose, individuals learning to identify happiness with the subordination of their real nature to the necessity of law. Kant's view thus imposes a dualism between the independence of the individual as a rational subject and the subordination of the individual as an empirical being to an external authority (Norman 1983:96 98).

Kant's morality of self-denial, instituting the obedience of the 'lower', i.e. empirical, to the 'higher', i.e. rational self,  is  based  upon  the  categorical distinction  between  reason  and  nature. Individuals must learn to identify happiness with the subordination of their lower nature to the necessity of the moral law in order to realise their higher nature. For the workings of the Categorical Imperative enables individuals to discover 'right' and 'wrong' independently of their inclinations, impulses and desires. 
This division of the individual between the phenomenal natural world as a determined order of natural necessity and the noumenal world of moral freedom risks fragmenting human experience. Individuals are subjected to a ceaseless struggle between the command of duty and natural inclinations. The failure to bridge this gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal (Maclntyre 1967:197/8; Wolff 1973:ch2) results in the autonomy of law, morality and politics within liberal society (Murphy  1970; Arendt 1982), abstracting the forces which govern the world from the human ontology. 
This has implications which turn against both reason and nature. As Weber's rationalisation thesis  shows,  the  distinction between reason and nature fits a capitalist modernity in which individuals have been made instrumental to purposes and processes which are external to them. The  'rational' project of substituting morality for coercion in human affairs thus ends in a lawful state administering a coercive civil society which inhibits the human ontology and subjects external nature to an instrumental rationality detached from ends.

On Kant's premises the internal nature of human beings is in external relation to the moral law. Rather than seek to dissolve this externality through human beings transforming their nature, however, Kant insists that human beings free themselves from the sensuous desires which are an essential part of human nature. 
A libertarian critique convicts Kant here of a dehumanising dualism in which freedom is attained only at the expense of denaturing human beings. Before addressing this claim, it is crucial to recognise the validity of Kant’s point here. The basis of Kant’s predicament is the separation of reason from nature and the ensuing primacy of reason over nature. On Kant's premises, certain aspects of the internal nature of human beings are in external relation to the moral law. It can, however, be overcome by human beings transcending their natural inclinations for their rational and moral will which is not only just as natural but, in line of descent from Plato, the better part of human nature. In the recent surge of interest in ‘the body’, Kant has been criticised for his heavy emphasis upon individuals freeing themselves from the sensuous human desires which are considered to be an integral part of human nature. (see Seidler). This misses Kant’s point that these ‘sensuous desires’ serve to shackle human beings to natural necessity within and without, chaining them to an empirical world of wants, impulses and inclinations. In Verdi’s Brindisi from La Traviata, all the guests sing of their love of ‘passionate hedonism’ with the line ‘all that is not pleasure is senseless’. The point is that the rational tradition to which Kant belongs affirms a greater freedom beyond the pleasure of the senses. The ‘rational’ tradition seeks the fulfilment and flourishing of the whole nature of human being. Kant’s point is that freedom will only be achieved through the realisation of the human capacity for autonomy and independence as given by rational and moral will. The capacity of the market economy to manacle individuals to necessity in their empirical existence by manipulating their ‘sensuous desires’ is one of the most striking features of the modern world. It is this shackling of human beings by their own natural inclinations that Kant’s morality seeks to overcome.

However, if ‘sensuous desires’ are essential aspects of human nature, then a more promising strategy may be to acknowledge this fact and see them as socially and historically mediated, thus attempting to unite inclinations and moral reason. Kant's Moralitat as an inner or private dimension, posed in and of itself, has to be contextualised in connection to the public world. Whereas Kant emphasised categorical duty over against human inclination, Hegel sought to bridge the gap between finite phenomenal and infinite noumenal realms so that duty was integral to the empirical lives of individuals (Dallmayr 1993:32 33). Through public community, Hegel bridges the gap between finite phenomenal and infinite noumenal realms so that duty was integral to the empirical lives of individuals (Dallmayr 1993:32 33). In contrast, in divorcing free will from a greater whole, both Rousseau and Kant could produce only 'a pure ought to be' (Taylor 1975:430). Without public community, duty does become abstract, a pure aspiration. Whereas Kant emphasised categorical duty over against human inclination, Hegel conceived the possibility of moralising human nature via Sittlichkeit, something which involved the universality of the state as ethical agency. This becomes in Marx a project of moralising the whole socio-relational fabric of society, resolving Kant's antithesis between inclinations and the moral law. We are back here to Aristotle’s reason educating desire.

Kant's thought, nevertheless, contains radical possibilities which serve to test Hegel's claim that Sittlichkeit embodies the 'ought' within the 'is'. In the first place, Kant did not leave his categorical principle as an abstract and formal statement but sought to ground the implementation of the abstract ideal of a realm of ends through an analysis of private property, contract, and family. Kant was concerned to identify the forms of justice required by the realm of ends in the social and political world of human beings. He proceeded to derive the public institutions and private virtues required to maintain these forms of justice to realise ends and hence achieve happiness (Guyer 2006 ch 1). 
In the second place, Kant's motto of enlightenment - 'have the courage to use your own understanding!’ (WE 1991:54) - celebrates the departure of human beings from all forms of tutelage, affirming a conception of autonomy which delegitimizes all social and political institutions that are not the product of free will. Such a notion justifies liberation from all contexts or situations which are oppressive of human freedom (Yack 1986:89/133; cf Rose 1984; Lukacs 1971:108/9). This is not a repudiation of institutional mediation as such. Rather, Kant’s morality repudiates all dehumanising, alienating and oppressive conditions and institutions as denying the essential humanity and dignity of human beings. In this respect, Marx himself emerges as a Kantian in affirming the 'categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and contemptible being' (CHPR:I 1975:251). At the same time, Kant sought to realise freedom within the constraint of law, not against it as in Fichte's 'self-sufficiency and independence outside of everything' (Fichte 1982:15). There is a need here to address the question of where Yack’s notion of a libertarian Kantianism comes from.

11 LEFT KANTIANISM
That Kant’s philosophy contains a normative conception of the good political order is evident in the scathing remarks he directed against politicians: 'Instead of possessing the practical science they boast of, these politicians have only practices; they flatter the power which is then ruling so as not to be remiss in their private advantage' (Perpetual Peace in Kant On History, Lewis White Beck ed 1963:121). It is a familiar enough refrain, but Kant offers the principles according to which politics may be restructured. Kant declares: 'Let us put an end to this sophism .. and force the false representatives of power to confess that they do not plead in favor of the right but in favor of might’ (Perpetual Peace in Kant On History, Lewis White Beck ed 1963:121). Like Plato, Kant is attacking sophistry, so that right may come to rule over might, the true over the false. 

Kant's philosophy forms part of the Enlightenment struggle against the inert and the given. Kant's 'motto of enlightenment' exhibits an anti-authoritarian, emancipatory purpose: 'Have the courage to use your own understanding' (Kant What is Enlightenment? in Reiss ed 1991:54). The Kantian association of reason and freedom works to delegitimize all social and political institutions that are not the product of and do not represent human free will. Bernard Yack calls this a ‘Left Kantianism’, describing it as a revolutionary morality that preaches liberation from all contexts or situations (Yack 1986:89/133; cf Rose 1984; Lukacs 1971:108/9). This vastly overstates Kant’s position. Kant's rational freedom is a lawful freedom which attempts to realise individual freedom within a social, institutional and relational context, not against it. Yack’s words apply more to Fichte's freedom, which Kant criticised as a lawless use of reason which invites unreason. For Kant, freedom depends upon an appropriate relation being established between each individual and all individuals within a framework guaranteed by law. Fichte identifies any such framework as a constraint upon the individual, thus asserting the freedom of the individual against a lawful, institutional context. The individual is free because s/he is self-sufficient, 'conscious of his self-sufficiency and independence outside of everything’ (Fichte 1982:15). This is an individualist and, ultimately, an elitist conception. In contrast, in laying down a universal standard of conduct for all, Kant's morality possesses a democratic thrust (Smith 1991:30/1). 

Robert Wolff offers his own 'left Kantianism’ in proceeding from the assumption that all individuals possess a potential for autonomy which is frustrated when an individual submits to the dictates of another. Wolff argues that since the individual's first obligation is to be autonomous, the idea of legitimate authority is a self-contradictory notion. However, since such individual autonomy implies dissolution into complete spontaneity, Wolff is prepared to accept direct democracy, individuals being bound by decisions that they have actively-participated in taking. In making this move, Wolff shifts from a Kantian to a Rousseauan position. The authority which obliges the individual 'is not that of himself simply, but that of the entire community taken collectively'; each individual meets his better ‘If in the form of the state, for its dictates are simply the laws which he has, after due deliberation, willed to be enacted' (Wolff quoted in Dahl 1969:348).

It would seem, then, that any ‘Left Kantianism’ amounts to retracing Kant’s steps back to Rousseau and the way in which he defines the principle of self-legislation and self-obligation. Rousseau is an important and strangely misunderstood figure, frequently cited as the author of the ‘back to nature’ delusion. Rousseau’s political philosophy is wholly based upon the shift from individual liberty as licence in the natural state to a collective liberty balancing the claims of each and all in the civil state. Kant understood that point clearly. Rousseau proposed a solution to the diremptive modern condition which informed Hegel’s idea of the state as an ethical agency and Marx’s conception of communism as the stateless ethical community. In Rousseau's social contract, the natural rights of the individual are not lost but are sublimated so that the authentic will of each individual obtains a moral significance in association with the will of all other individuals. The result is that the assertion of the will of the individuals must necessarily promote the common good of all individuals; the general will prevails over the will of all to the good of all.

What one sees here is the potential to radicalise the principle of self-obligation beyond the state to achieve a self-governing social order in which consent is active as well as tacit. The problem is that the libertarian attempt to make the case for legitimate authority based upon the notion of self-assumed obligation fail on account of its abstract individualism, thus paradoxically leading to the defence of the state (Hoffman 1995:116). In truth, individualism and collectivism are two sides of the same coin, the one generating and supporting the other. What is required is a social and relational conception of the individual so that a consistent critique of the state may be combined with the retention of an authoritative public realm.

Kant's normative position does entail the repudiation of dehumanising, alienating, and oppressive social forms. Implicit in Kant’s conception of human beings as ends in themselves is a notion of essential humanity or dignity (Korner 1969:128/32; Raphael 1981:ch 6) Kant’s idea that all individuals as rational agents are equally worthy of respect affirms a democratic politics of equal dignity. Kant identifies here a universal human potential, a capacity which is shared by all human beings, and this means that each individual deserves respect (Taylor 1991:41). The progress made to the free and rational society is based upon a conception of human growth and development. 'Kant's use of the social contract is consistent with his moral theory and optimism about the capacity for human potentialities to flourish' (Boucher and Kelly 1994:7/8).

Ultimately, once reason is in control, the need for an institutional and legal framework constraining individuals to the good will be diminished, replaced by a conscious and immediate identification of the individual with the good. The crucial question is whether Kant himself makes good his normative claims. Or whether this is the responsibility of the human agents themselves, to live in political life in accordance with the moral law within.

Kant’s republic of ends, the ideal of the perfect community, exists as a goal of future society (Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith trans 1965: B836f) or as heaven. In the sensible sphere, it exists as progress towards communal autonomy as the 'real object of our willing' (Critique of Practical Reason Lewis White Beck trans 1956:121f). Within the temporal world, the republic of ends is realised as the 'ethical community' (Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone). As an ideal, this community is an ideal which is more than a standard by which to criticise existing societies but is a goal which, whilst it may never be realised, can be approached.

Ultimately, for Kant, morality is a property of the community of rational agents. The republic of ends, in contradistinction to existing states, does not rest upon coercion. But it remains a polity, a community of individuals coming together in a common purpose (Levine 1987:168/9). Whilst such a concept can critically expose the failings of actual society, there is a need to indicate how this society can be brought more in accordance with the ideal. This demands a broader conception of interaction than that available in the republic of ends, where members interact only at the level of moral legislation. Each member possesses the moral law within and, as a legislator, prescribes maxims for her/himself. This barely qualifies as interaction at all, taking a negative form of mutual noninterference. This vitiates the potential for intersubjectivity in Kant's morality. Kant dismisses interaction over and above what is required for moral legislation as 'figments of the brain' (Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith trans 1965: B 395-599).

The communality inherent in rational freedom does find expression in Kant, in the ideal republic of ends and the empirical 'culture' (Bildung) of reason. The republic of ends is an ideal that indicates what the better world would be when everyone lived in accordance with the moral law. Human beings must appreciate those purposes posited through freedom, dictated by the legislation of reason, and abstract from empirically conditioned purposes and inclinations so as to formulate a conception of the republic of ends. Kant believes the rules which guide our behaviour can be made internally consistent and universally applicable. This applies both to legal rules and rules of virtue which externally and internally respectively restrict our actions. In making these rules rational Kant thinks we can enjoy peaceful and productive relations with one another at the personal and social level, and between societies' (Williams in Boucher and Kelly ed 1994:132/3).

Kant thus proposes a principle of self-legislation. Since all activities and purposes are rationally posited, are in accordance with the moral law and are determined through this moral legislation, the members of the republic of ends obey only those laws that they themselves have made. In adjusting their purposes to the moral law, the members of the republic of ends legislate that law for themselves and are thus autonomous. Each member of this ideal community is both the legislator and the subject of the legislation. What Kant has provided in the republic of ends is the ideal political community constituted by free and equal individuals and embodying principles of self-rule. One recalls here Aristotle’s conception of the citizen as one who rules and is ruled in turn. (Aristotle Politics 1981:213).

Kant's intersubjectivity goes only so far, however. His principle of self-legislation possesses on a monadic character. This vitiates Kant’s attempt to reconcile the freedom of the self-legislating individual with other individuals so that the increase in the freedom of one is also an increase, rather than a decrease, in the freedom of another. Kant simply asserts that actions are right if they coexist with the free will of each and all in conformity to the universal law.

To acknowledge the cogency of Kant’s republic of ends is to critically evaluate the real political order according to how closely it approximates to the ideal. Kant suggests this very approach. The republic of ends shows what society would be like if all individuals followed the moral law, that is, if human beings were the pure moral agents they ought to be according to reason. To develop a conception of this ideal means abstracting from the 'empirically conditioned' purposes which individual agents pursue (e.g. the pursuit of sensory goods), so that only purposes 'posited through freedom', (i.e. legislated by reason), remain.

12 THE DEMOCRATISATION OF AUTHORITY AND MORALITY

The tradition of ‘rational freedom’ involves a conception of the social and political institutions which are integral to the actualisation of the self. In this respect, Hegel adopts the rational selfhood of Kant but repudiates his conception of the autonomous legislative self, for the reason that this entails a dualism in which one part of the self is raised above the other as a 'higher' part and comes to coerce or constrain the other part. For Hegel, selfhood is embodied in and articulated through an ethico-institutional and social context. 
Kant's self-legislating subject is the paradigm of a liberal moral and political philosophy which is predicated upon the rationality and autonomy of the subject. The most influential recent attempt to define this tradition occurs in the work of Rawls, whose work makes plain the extent to which this moral tradition rests upon the ability of the subject to abstract from particular circumstances so as to formulate the universal principles defining the moral sphere. Marx, in contrast, articulates a situated, relational subject that undermines the very possibility of the autonomous, self-legislating subject and, with it, undermines the notion of abstracted systems of politics and morality as constraints upon the individual.
Against Kantian notions of selfhood, Hegel offers an embodied morality in which ethical duties exist only in 'the development of the relationships that are necessary through the idea of freedom, and hence in their own whole range are actual only in the state' (Wood 1992 PR para 148R). Kant's external command of duty is replaced by a conception in which the ethical duties to which the individual is subject are determined in relation to other individuals and are embodied within the institutions of the rational social order, Sittlichkeit.

In recent years, poststructuralist thought has increasingly impacted on the practice and theory of politics. In the process, the universal citizen/subject, the central category of liberal political and legal thought has been subjected to damaging critical analysis. Postructuralist thought subverts the idea of the human subject as the unitary agent of intervention in the social world. In liberal political theory, agency assumes a particular form: as a participant within the political realm, the subject is a citizen conceived of in terms of possessing the capacity for autonomous action, a capacity which is shared by all citizens. Rawls's theory of justice is exemplary, identifying the rational and autonomous citizen as the very source of political and legal authority, making this conception central to the legitimation of the liberal state (Barren in Norrie ed 1993:80).

Postructuralist thought therefore has radical implications in subverting the theory and practice of liberalism.
'One example of this is the questioning of universal models of citizenship that expect all individuals to enjoy identical sets of rights or all groups to conform to the same constitutional arrangements. Another is the increasingly influential tradition of deliberative democracy, which starts from the presumption of radical difference: not the differences of opinion ...but the seemingly intractable differences of experience, values or cultural practices that get in the way of our mutual comprehension' (for example, Joshua Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', in A Hamlin and P Pettit eds The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State 1989).Phillips NLR 224 July/Aug 1997:143/4).

Marx's conception of freedom and democracy is rooted in a tradition that underlines the positive, rational and communal framework. Nevertheless, one needs to understand how Marx left this tradition to both de-authorize and democratise morality and politics whilst nevertheless upholding universal values within a conception of 'the good polity'. Marx can dissolve the institutional framework constraining individuals to the good by embedding politics and morality in individual relationships in the social world. The universal principles of right which Kant presented as an ideal for forms of government to follow ‘by analogy’ thus come to be realised at the level of social relationships.
Marx's aim is to overcome the profound grip that the dualistic Kantian view has had on moral thought, particularly the opposition between reason and nature. Marx pursued this ambition through the revaluation of essential human nature as a whole as against attempts to impose a 'higher' notion of the self externally and institutionally upon a ‘lower’ notion. Marx examined the integral human personality and sought to canalise the human essence as a whole progressively.
The relation between Kant’s external morality and the spirit of capitalism, between this rational conception of freedom and the rationalist structures of thought which characterise capitalism, is worth examining closely (Seidler 1994). This isn’t to argue that Kant’s rational morality is the same thing as capitalist rationalisation of the world. On the contrary, Kant’s morality of reason asserts that if individuals followed their natural inclinations they would be led astray. The capitalist market panders to those inclinations, whereas Kant’s morality seeks to restrain them. Kant’s denigration of nature has its origins in the Christian identification of the higher self with the spiritual self. Kant was to secularize the dualism between flesh and spirit for liberal morality in the form of a dualism between reason and nature in which humanity was identified with the rational self.
This relation of reason and nature is absolutely central to the tradition of ‘rational freedom’. One has to be careful of accusing Kantian – or Platonic – rationalism of authoritarianism, and be very wary of identifying freedom with untrammelled natural inclinations as such. It is very easy to identify liberty with licence, coming quickly to Popper’s individualist liberal assault upon the ‘enemies’ of the open society – Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx.
If things really were as simple as this, then there would be no need to distinguish the rational conception of freedom from the individualist liberal conception. Untrammelled natural inclination as registered by individual subjective choice and preference characterises the individualist liberal position in a nutshell. It is precisely because natural inclinations chain individuals to empirical necessity that the rational tradition argues for the need to set individuals within a broader moral framework and institutional infrastructure. The problem is that it is not so easy to establish the structures and patterns of moral life that raise the individual above the empirical level. It is very easy to identify rational restraint as inimical to individual freedom.

Institutionalised in external forms of authority, Kant’s view rested upon a tension between the independence of the individual as a rational subject and the necessary subordination of the individual to an external authority. Individuals as rational beings can come to know the moral law and act out of a sense of duty to do what the moral law dictates, thereby subordinating natural inclinations. Freedom is the recognition of the necessity of the moral law. This means that individuals must learn to identify happiness with the subordination of their nature. This is fine in so far as this nature refers to those inclinations – egoistic desires, wants, appetites – that chain individuals to the necessity of the empirical world. But there is more to nature than this. Kant’s morality of reason is thus a morality of self-denial. This is the appropriate morality in a rationalised social order in which the individual is subject to external processes. Like Kant's morality of duty, the laws of capitalist society are autonomous and cannot be altered by the individual. Freedom lies in subjecting oneself to these laws. In this way, liberal politics and morality come to systematise and institutionalise the fundamental fragmentation of human experience in the modern world. This is not to argue that Kant’s morality is an external morality which fits the external imperatives of capitalist society. On the contrary, Kant’s morality is designed to curb the empirical individual inclinations which a market society unleashes, Kant’s point being that such individual choice and preference falls far short of human freedom in identifying liberty at the lowest, empirical rung of human existence. However, the point is that Kant’s external morality is designed to constrain rather than transform this market society of natural inclinations. It is in this sense that Kantian morality is compatible with capitalist rationalisation, as its complement and counterpart.

The way that Marx radicalises the strong assertion of popular sovereignty in the positive conception of freedom entails the de-authorization and democratisation of morality. Marx conceives of a new morality and new politics beyond the public-private split, beyond the autonomous rational self, and beyond external systems of obligation and duty. For abstracted and autonomous morality and politics limits the power of the demos, constraining their sovereignty within 'external' government. Marx avoids the dangers of reifying the connections between individuals and the apparatuses raised above them by asserting the power of popular sovereignty to dissolve liberal legal fetishism. No external collective force can now authorize the ought to be, only the demos.

Democracy is the truth of monarchy; monarchy is not the truth of democracy. Monarchy is by necessity democracy in contradiction with itself; the monarchic moment is not an inconsistency within democracy. Monarchy cannot be explained in its own terms; democracy can be so explained. In democracy no moment acquires a meaning other than what is proper to it. Each is really only a moment of the demos as a whole. In monarchy a part determines the character of the whole. The whole constitution must adapt itself to the one fixed point. Democracy is the generic constitution. Monarchy is only a variant and a bad variant at that. Democracy is both form and content. Monarchy is supposed to be only a form, but it falsifies the content. 
In monarchy the whole, the people, is subsumed under one of its forms of existence, the political constitution; in democracy the constitution itself appears only as one determining characteristic of the people, and indeed as its self-determination. In monarchy we have the people of the constitution, in democracy the constitution of the people. Democracy is the solution to the riddle of every constitution. In it we find the constitution founded on its true ground: real human beings and the real people; not merely implicitly and in essence, but in existence and in reality. The constitution is thus posited as the people's own creation. The constitution is in appearance what it is in reality: the free creation of man. It could be argued that in certain respects this might be said also of constitutional monarchy. But the distinguishing characteristic of democracy is that in it the constitution is only one facet of the people, that the political constitution does not form the state for itself. (Marx EW CHDS 1975). 

Marx distances his 'new' politics and morality from traditional moral theory which, rooted in a commitment to the disembodied, autonomous subject legislating abstract, universal principles, is quite distinct from the embodied, situated and relational subject Marx delineates. Marx can thus deconstruct the edifice of modernity without having to proclaim the 'death of the subject'.

13 THE CRITIQUE OF KANTIAN MORALITY

For Kant, freedom is the capacity of reason, apart from all inclinations and hence of natural causality, to initiate action (Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith trans 1965: B.566ff: Lewis White Beck A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason 1960:176ff). Reason does this lawfully. In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and later writings Kant simply defines the moral law as a 'fact of reason’. The view that freedom is the causality of reason in accordance with the moral law shows 'autonomy' as the 'highest principle of morality'. This concept is a necessary one in that it is something that individuals must rather than merely could construct through the knowledge of the moral law. (Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith trans 1965:B476 585f; Critique of Practical Reason Lewis White Beck trans 1956:21-29 32).

Kant's autonomy is the ability of rational beings to 'give the law' to their actions. This is commonly considered to refer to the individual as an isolated self who only subsequently acknowledges relations with others (Habermas on 'Labor and Interaction' in Theory and Practice 1973:151f). One can understand how, historically, this became the dominant form of Kantian ethics, indeed the paradigm of modern liberal morality. It is this historical form that is being criticised in this thesis. In this process, however, this criticism builds upon the lost normative dimensions of Kant's morality, the intersubjective or communal/relational character of the republic of ends and the 'culture’ (Bildung) of reason. Recovering the intersubjective dimension of Kant's morality, however, only serves to show the problematic nature of the relation between modernity and morality, something which Kant did not resolve.

Seidler considers that socialism has in the main been trapped with Kantian moralism, too easily presenting itself in rationalist terms as an 'alternative ideal'. This entails self-denial. 'Too often the socialist vision becomes a distant image, rather than something that can be lived in our relations with others' (Seidler 1994:64). The problem is that such a socialism simply replaced one abstract and moralistic code with another. This fails to appreciate the extent to which Marx challenges the moral terms of modernity as much as the political terms, relating the split between reason and nature, to the public-private split so as to strengthen the sources of fulfilment and empowerment.

Specifically, Marx offers a way of challenging Kant's morality of the divided self. The division of the individual between the phenomenal natural world as a determined order of natural necessity and the noumenal world of moral freedom issued in the, divided self which fragments human experience and subjects the individual to a ceaseless struggle between natural inclinations and the command of duty.

The key notions of Kant's moral philosophy are the concepts of duty and of the individual's freedom to do his/her duty. There is a distinction between duty and desire which reflects the reason-nature dualism (Korner 1969:128/9). For Kant, the natural inclinations and desires of the empirical self will be invariably self-seeking and therefore require subordination to duty as obedience to a rational law that is universally binding upon all as rational selves. Kantian morality thus proceeds as continuous effort on the part of individuals to transcend the natural side of their empirical selves, the submission to natural inclinations betraying a tendency to immorality.
One has to be clear as to what Kant is driving at in targeting natural inclinations. Plato had referred to desire and appetite as the lowest rungs of human nature, the most immediate drives and impulses of individuals. These are the things which individuals are inclined to pursue to the exclusion of richer, more fulfilling aspects of their nature, chaining individuals to their immediate empirical selves, natural necessity. In contrast, reason offers the complete human good, entailing a richer, more expansive range of human potentialities and their realisation. In this context, capitalist market society clearly panders to the empirical self at the level of individual subjective preference, inducing individuals to pursue freedom at its most immediate and incomplete level. Kantian rational restraint attempts to constrain these egoistic inclinations and encourage individuals to transcend immediacy to attain a more comprehensive good. However, Kantian restraint lacks critical purchased upon empirical realities, providing a morality which contains egoistic licence rather than abolishes or transforms it.

Marx adopted the rational perspective in this manner when criticising liberal ‘independence’: ‘this is an independence which is at bottom merely an illusion, and it is more correctly called indifference’ since freedom here merely means that individuals are ‘free to collide with one another’ (Marx GR 1973:164).
Marx sums up the reasoning separating the rational conception of freedom as something more than natural inclinations from the liberal individualist conception.

This reciprocal dependence is expressed in the constant necessity for exchange, and in exchange value as the all-sided mediation. The economists express this as follows: Each pursues his private interest and only his private interest; and thereby serves the private interests of all, the general interest, without willing or knowing it. The real point is not that each individual's pursuit of his private interest promotes the totality of private interests, the general interest. One could just as well deduce from this abstract phrase that each individual reciprocally blocks the assertion of the others' interests, so that, instead of a general affirmation, this war of all against all produces a general negation. The point is rather that private interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by society; hence it is bound to the reproduction of these conditions and means. It is the interest of private persons; but its content, as well as the form and means of its realization, is given by social conditions independent of all. 

Marx Gr N1 1973

Individual rationality issues in a collective irrationality that inhibits the freedom of all. It is also worth underlining Marx’s point that the notion of individual subjective preference is not merely limited but an abstraction, since private interest is itself a socially determined interest.
For Marx, the connection between individual and collective rationality can only be achieved through the transformation of social relationships so that as to overcome the dualism of reason and nature. The bifurcation between the ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ self exists in the nature of social reality. Failure to address the social roots of this bifurcation invites the dualism of reason and nature. Kant's morality of the divided self, the way that he postulates morality independently of the empirical natures of individuals, is necessarily led to institute morality as an abstractly conceived set of rules. The gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal is unbridgeable in Kantian terms (Maclntyre 1967:197/8; Wolff 1973:ch2).
It is for this reason that Kant's morality establishes the foundations for the independence and abstraction of law, morality and politics within a liberal society (Murphy 1970; Arendt 1982). The workings of the categorical imperative enables us to discover 'right' and 'wrong' without having to address our inclinations, needs and desires and transform our nature to realise the human potentialities in full. Kant creates a realm of moral truths which are independent of our natures and invested in an abstract moral system. This leaves real natures unchanged in their limited, empirical condition.
One sees this in the neo-Kantianism of Weber, failing to get to the essence of law, but uncritically accepting law in its own terms as a rational practical form (Albrow 1975). With Weber, the dualism of moral law and the world of nature is reproduced in much narrower form.
Kant's morality of reason, institutionalised in a formal system of law, does not provide a solution to the problem of order but, rather, concedes the empirical world of natural inclination to self-interest. Kant provides a legalistic and formalistic morality for the material world of commodity production and exchange. The role of Kant's formal principles doesn't provide a new morality at all, but instead provides a framework to regulate existing activities. Such a morality is designed not so much to overcome self-interest but constrain it in such a way as to preserve capitalist structures (Poole 1991:20/1). For Unger, 'the need for rules arises from the undying enmity and the demands of collaboration that mark social life’. Since 'there are no conceptions of the good that stand above the conflict and. impose limits on it, artificial limits must be created' (Unger 1984:68). Self-interest is insufficient to keep the peace. However, the reduction of lawful freedom to the preservation of the civil peace constrains rather than alters human action.
The system of duties defined by the morality of reason furnishes capitalism with a legal framework necessary for the continuation of a diremptive social order. In this framework the individual is divided between the command of duty and the imperative of self-interest, the conflicting demands of the rational and empirical, neither of which contribute to human fulfilment.
The problem is that Kant is ultimately agnostic as regards the conception of the good life. He establishes the good life, the summum bonum as the highest end but, ultimately, fails to connect it to the political means of its realisation. His formal morality offers no criterion for distinguishing one way of life from another. The only thing he insists upon is reference to the command of duty.
Though undeveloped, and however much he pulled his political punches, Kant continually attempted to push further than the thin and attenuated concerns of a formal morality (Idea for a Universal History). However, the most influential attempts to construct a morality appropriate to modern society, especially Rawls, follow the formal and external character of Kant's morality rather than explores other possibilities.
However, matters need not be left here. The phenomenal world of the empirical self is not out of bounds for morality. Kant himself consistently pushed against the boundaries he imposed between the moral and the empirical. Indeed, even the conception of morality as duty is comprehensible in Kant's terms only when it is placed within a larger framework designed to give meaning to individual existence. Such a framework entails a vision of the good life, precisely the thing which contemporary liberal attempts to redefine Kantian morality exclude (Rawls 1971).

In the Conflict of the Faculties, Kant describes the republic of ends as the 'respublica noumenon', as distinct from the 'respublica phenomenon'. In Perpetual Peace, the former is a community appropriate a 'race of angels', but could serve even for a 'race of devils, if only they have understanding’. Civil society cannot be a 'moral' entity, though it can be justified morally. Its principle is coercion rather than freedom, since the purpose of law in this context is to compel individuals to do on prudential grounds what they ought to do on moral grounds (Introduction Metaphysics of Morals).

One has to address the notion of reason as repressive, something which deals with the character of citizenship. One is thinking here of the break with rationalism in both classical and neo-Kantian forms as repressive in its implications. The pretensions of legitimate authority and law are rejected in being connected to a 'will to power’ (Foucault 1980), entailing the denial or suppression of 'the Other’ (Derrida 'Force of the law: the "mystical foundation of authority"', Cardozo Law Review 11, 919).

14 ORDER, FREEDOM AND LAW: LEGAL FETISHISM

Marx's communism may be defined in Kantian terms as the normative democratic community which transcends the need for an institutional framework to constrain individuals to the good. This conception is opposed to the liberal fetishism of the law which makes this framework crucial to social order. In simple terms, the fetishism of the law is the belief that legal systems are an essential condition of social order and civilisation, that no such order or civilisation is possible without law. This belief is the foundation of liberal political theory and underlies all the important general theories of law. 
Hugh Collins identifies three features of legal fetishism. 

In the first place there is the thesis that a legal order is necessary for social order: unless there is a system of laws designed to ensure compliance with a set of rules which define rights and entitlements then no civilization is possible; if laws and legal institutions were abolished anarchy would immediately break out. H. L. A. Hart expresses this idea with his claim that there must be a minimum content of law. Unless there are rules governing ownership of property and enforcing prohibitions against physical violence, he says, society would be impossible. If. a legal system, or at least some kind of coercive system, failed to provide such rules, the community would disintegrate. For those who fetishize law, legal rules are at the centre of social life, forming the basis for peaceful social intercourse. Like other norms such as the conventions on which linguistic communication is based, legal rules provide the foundation for exchanges, reliance, safety, privacy, and satisfy numerous other perennial human wants…
A second contention of legal fetishism is that law is a unique phenomenon which constitutes a discrete focus of study. Legal systems are not simply types of a broader species of systems of power, but they possess distinctive characteristics…. regular patterns of institutional arrangements associated with law such as the division between a legislature and a judiciary…. a distinctive mode of discourse… as normative guides to behaviour which individuals follow regardless of the presence or absence of officials threatening to impose sanctions for failing to comply with the law...
A final aspect of legal fetishism makes a general theory of law not only interesting and possible but also crucial to political theory. This third feature is the doctrine of the Rule of Law…. The core principle of the doctrine is that political power should be exercised according to rules announced in advance. A political system is analogous to a game: it is only fair to give prior notice of the rules to all the participants and then to insist that everyone abide by them even in adversity. The Rule of Law does not require that the laws should have any particular kind of content, but simply that they should constrain the weak and powerful alike. Such a political principle inhibits arbitrary despots and authoritarian oligarchies from dispossessing citizens of their liberties without cause shown. (Collins 1984 ch 1). 

Such ideas offer a plausible, even a cogent view of reality. Many would acknowledge role that law plays in preventing the disintegration of social order and in restricting authoritarian governments. However, from a marxist perspective, legal fetishism embodies a distorted image of reality which must be corrected. The idea that society rests on law inverts the true relation between social relations and their institutional expression. Without law, informal standards of behaviour based on reciprocity would be practised, enabling an elementary form of stable community to exist. Throughout history, human communities have found informal ways for managing common affairs without recourse to law. The idea that without law, individuals would soon be resorting to violence in interpersonal affairs is implausible. Clearly the normative basis for a peaceful and prosperous society lies in the subtle relationship between the laws and the informal customs which people internalise and practise. Developing this insight encourages us to envisage the possibility of a society without law. An exposure of the extent to which organizations of power in modern society rest upon law as the consequence of a specific social relations reveals that law is instrumental in maintaining specific social orders, not social order as such. This allows us to argue that law is not an essential and unchangeable feature of human civilization. This permits us to project an alternative future society which has dispensed with legal fetishism because it is able to govern its own affairs according to the good.  This is to affirm that society can regulate its affairs from within. 

Roberto Unger is full of insight on the question of legal fetishism. Society, in the liberal conception, is held together by rules: 'Rules are the main devices for establishing order and freedom' (Unger 1984:83/4). The state appears as both 'the providential alternative to the blindness of private cupidity' but also 'as the supreme weapon of some men in their self-interested struggle against others'. Thus the separation of the public and the private is accompanied by 'the destruction of the latter by the former'.

Unger refers to the 'artificial view of society' as requiring the 'coercive enforcement' of laws. Society lacks a self-regulating or self-enforcing order since it is constituted by individuals and individual interests locked in a perpetual struggle. The absence of a 'natural community of common ends' explains 'the importance of rules and their coercive enforcement' in the liberal notion of social order. As Unger argues, 'the less one's ability to rely on participation in common ends, the greater the importance of force as a bond among individuals. Punishment and fear take the place of community' (Unger 1984:75).

As Unger notes, the aim of theories of legislation and adjudication in liberal thought is to show how freedom is possible despite the individuality and subjectivity of values. 'If objective values were available to us, if we knew the true good with certainty, and understood all its implications and requirements perfectly, we would not need a method of impartial adjudication... we would content ourselves with a regime of substantive justice, in which rules were unnecessary' (Unger 1984:93). Which begs the question as to whether a regime of substantive justice is possible (Unger 1984:98).

Unger contrasts an 'order based on rules' to an 'order based on values', regimes of legal and of substantive justice. For Unger, the theory of adjudication and the theory of instrumental rationality are inadequate (Unger 1984:98). Instrumental rationality is not sufficient to keep a social organisation together; 'hence the need for rules and more rules'. 'The study of substantive justice suggests an alternative hypothesis' (Unger 1984:100).
In the ‘rational’ tradition, the alternative society is achieved through the strengthening of community within a conception of ethical relations that connect each individual with all individuals. This offers a means of overcoming the impersonal and abstract adjudication and legislation which is an essential component of legal fetishism. Communism achieves social order through the realisation of that internal coordination of reason which exists as a normative ideal in the tradition of rational freedom.
This realises Kant’s demand that, with the achievement of definite practical principles, ‘a pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole.’ (UH Reiss ed 1991:44). The problem, as Unger notes, is that Kant's universal principle of right possesses such an abstract character that it seems impossible to derive from it 'definite conclusions about what precisely the laws should command, prohibit, or permit' (Unger 1984:85). Kant's autonomy of reason prepares the epistemological basis for the identification of modernity with an instrumental rationality which, based upon the denigration of nature and the body, establishes a continuity with the religious heritage. The association of rationalisation and religiosity enabled Marx to expose rationalisation as the secularisation of Christianity and thus complete the emancipatory, anti-authoritarian dynamic unleashed by the Enlightenment. The challenge of the autonomy of morality is also a challenge to the externalisation of authority.
Kant's identification of morality with a reason divorced from and raised above nature and natural inclinations implies individual submission to the dictates of reason. The authoritarian implications of such a submission to the moral law as an independent realm introduces the connection between rationalisation and religiosity which Marx developed by way of an analogy between religion and fetish systems of politics and production.
Secularising the Christian dualism of flesh and spirit as a dualism between the phenomenal and the noumenal, Kant's ethics sanction a legalistic and coercive institutional order over an egoistic, atomistic society which morality can constrain but cannot transform. The devaluation of nature collapses the phenomenal into a commercial society of instrumental, exchange relationships.
To repeat, this is not Kant’s intention. On the contrary, Kant is concerned to raise individuals above egoistic and atomistic empirical society. The failure to transform market relations, however, means that individuals are located within asocial relationships which split social identity between a natural egoism and an abstract altruism. It is in the context of this split that Kant’s ethics sanction a legalistic and coercive order over a society governed by empirical inclinations.

15 PUBLIC-PRIVATE DUALISM AS IMPERSONAL/PERSONAL SPLIT

The tradition of modernist rationalism is characterised by the categorical distinction between reason and nature. Reason distinct from nature is alone the source of freedom and morality. This distinction affirms that individuals need saving from their own natures and cannot be free to trust themselves. Reason alone gives access to the 'higher' self, a hierarchical and authoritarian notion.
The secularisation of Christian self-denial, religiosity as external systems of rule and regulation, took extreme form in Durkheim's subordination of the individual to the externality of social rules as embodying a higher vision of morality. In Durkheim, society takes the place of reason and the moral law. Durkheim thus considered society to be the source of moral authority. Individuals are obliged to conform to a 'higher' vision of themselves through external regulation and constraint (Durkheim 1961, 1964 and 1974; Lukes 1983; Giddens 1977).

Bellamy draws attention to the way that ethical liberalism persistently has recourse to an overarching institutional apparatus, i.e. the state, to impose an abstract vision of the good upon recalcitrant individuals. The concept of 'religiosity' as it is employed here is intended to argue that this potential is inherent in liberalism insofar as it rests upon the autonomy of morality and of politics. The ‘need for rules and more rules’, as Unger puts it, derives from the inability to ground morality at the heart of social relations. And this derives from the failure to conceive morality as immanent within the integral human personality.

One notes in Kant the contradictory character of liberal freedom and morality. Kant's moral law exists independently of human experience. Freedom as the capacity to rationally discern the dictates of this moral law through the workings of the categorical imperative entails a willingness to submit to an external authority, the voluntary nature of this submission being sufficient to define it as free, its authority as self-assumed.
Since the 'true' moral nature of human beings is identified with a rational self distinct from one's empirical or natural self, individuals had to value the rational aspect of identity whilst denying that the natural world of needs, wants, and desires could possess any rationality. In this form, Kant's morality of the rational subject becomes a matter of submitting to the authority of reason as a second nature (Seidler 1994:41). Once the moral law has been discerned by reason individuals are obliged to submit to it (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis White Beck trans 1959:397-399/13-16; Critique of Practical Reason Lewis White Beck 1956:81-4; The Doctrine of Virtue, Mary J Gregor trans 1964:389/50).

Independent of natures and leaving natural inclinations untransformed, Kant's moral law asserts a 'higher’ notion of the self, one which works to denigrate much that is essential to human dignity and fulfilment. That is, not only egoistic desires and impulses are targeted but natural needs. Individuals are induced to identify their 'selves' with external, higher rationalities, something which shapes conceptions of personal identity.

Kant and the legalistic tradition of rational freedom he has inspired – one thinks here of Rawls and his procedural interpretation of Kant - has left us with a thin and attenuated conception of the person as a rational self. Against this Marx defines a relational self. And he does so by reworking the public-private split as a split within each individual. 
What is particularly interesting is to formulate the reason/nature dualism as a masculinist/feminist and as a impersonal/personal dualism that is inscribed in the political order. Marx's reworking of the public-private separation so crucial to liberal thought thus assumes an even greater significance at the level of identity, self and subjectivity. Marx's attack upon rationalisation as religiosity exposes the way that liberal separations and dualisms involve the submission of individuals to the dictates of external authorities.
But this separation of reason from emotion leads to reason assuming 'unreasonable' forms (Seidler 1994) Weber himself is quite aware of the irrationality of instrumental rationality (Weber PE 1985), the means/ends inversion generating a nihilism which pervades the whole social and institutional fabric. The Frankfurt School took this further. 'The power of control over non-human nature and over other men ... was connected to the 'denial of nature' in man... As soon as man discards his awareness that he himself is nature, all the aims for which he goes on living - social progress, the enhancement of all material and spiritual powers, even consciousness itself - are as nothing... Man's mastery over himself, which is the basis of his self, is almost without exception the destruction of the individual as subject' (Horkheimer and Adorno in Wellmer 1974:131).

The reworking of the political and the moral terrain of modernity beyond liberalism means unmasking and abolishing the series of dualisms which characterize the modern world – public and private, reason and nature, form and content, universal and particular. This is a process begun by Hegel but which Marx took further, beyond modernity. The failure to resolve the public/private dualism represents a failure to overcome the classic liberal separation of the state from society.
Individuals can only develop if their autonomy is respected and nurtured. This means that the question of how the relationship of the self to others helps or hinders this development is ever relevant. The relation between public and private, then, is part of the social relationships between individuals.
Challenging the dualistic character of capitalist modernity develops a project capable of avoiding the twin reefs of abstract individualism and collectivism upon which the modern world flounders. This entails transcending the universal citizen/autonomous moral subject, the central category of liberal political and legal theory. In the/liberal conception, agency takes the form of citizenship, an identity assumed by the subject within the impersonal public realm of the abstract state. In this respect, the role that Kant's notion of the moral subject plays in the legitimation of the liberal state needs to be problematised, particularly given the extent to which Rawls's theory of justice continues to derive political and legal authority from the notion of the citizen as a rational and autonomous agent.
With the reason/nature dualism, Kant's moral person is characterised by will, rather than by bodily and affective existence. The body here serves as the antithesis of the Kantian subject, the paradigm of the liberal subject. Against this, there is a need to offer a materialist embodiment which is able to transcend the split between reason and nature and rework public-private dualism so as to overcome abstract universality of the modern state and the egoism of civil society.
What makes this question so important is the extent to which the rationalist conception of citizenship has been condemned from a Foucaultian or poststructuralist perspective for being repressive in its implications. Thus Connolly highlights the repressive aspects of Marx's attempts to realise the rational society, arguing that Marx's realisation of the principle of citizenship may well entail the suppression of otherness.

There is a need to make the liberal invocation of the rational, autonomous subject, crucial to the legitimacy of the state, serve a critical and emancipatory purpose that is subversive of abstraction in the world of politics and production. The category of citizenship thus requires a materialist embodiment that is in contradistinction to the liberal tradition.

For Rawls the rational, autonomous subject is the mechanism through which conflict may be both expressed and resolved. It is a potentially subversive category. For, as a criterion against which the justice of social institutions can be judged, it invites critical reflection upon 'the basic structure of society' (Rawls 1971:7). This causes little problem for Rawls, for whom the category of universal citizenship exists as a mechanism of inclusion, emphasising the rights of this citizen in the emancipatory terms of the freedom and equality of all persons.
The problem is that the assumption of universal citizenship as the category according to which political and legal institutions are organised would appear to exclude those claims which do not apply to such a subject. Postructuralist thought problematises this notion of the rational, autonomous, individuated subject as the necessary form taken by political subjectivity in the liberal conception. In particular, postructuralist perspectives are sceptical of the tendency to include and assimilate all perspectives and claims, drawing attention instead to what is negated or suppressed in the construction of this subject. What the postructuralist critique exposes is the totalising character of liberal political and legal thought in the way that it institutes a closure around 'the political'.
With the public-private dualism, the individual is divided between a public identity which is allotted in law and his/her lived experience. In this context, Rawls's 'veil of ignorance' metaphorically expresses the boundary separating the 'public' from the 'private'. This boundary needs to be reworked. By confronting the abstract identity of the universal citizen, it is possible to develop the heteronomous, plural, flexible, individual and material character of an active, socially rooted citizenship as against the autonomous, unified, fixed, collective and abstract character of liberal citizenship. This notion of a post-liberal citizenship emphasises democratic pluralisation and socialisation as against the unitary citizenship of the bourgeois public identified with the liberal state.

Connolly's Foucaultian critique has the merit of confronting liberalism with the subversive power its repressed other. The radicalisation of the liberal category of citizenship via the postructuralist critique is an attempt to argue for the conception of a reworked notion of citizenship that is able to incorporate without suppressing identities falling outside the forms of liberal political subjectivity. Such a reworking implies the dissolution of the public-private, reason-nature dualisms in the creation of a new self. One thus looks to relate citizenship to the attempt to create new mechanisms and structures in and outside of the state within postliberal political theory (Keane 1984: ch5; Melucci 1989 ch 8; I Young 1990 ch 6), affirming the 'refusal of a unitary construct of citizenship as exhaustive of the political tasks of the present’ (McClure 1992:123).
Anne Barren offers a critique of one central form of modernist rationalism: the 'rational autonomous subject as the foundation of political legitimacy' in the work of John Rawls. Through a detailed analysis and development of the work of Althusser and Lacan, Barren constructs an account of subjectivity which she uses as the basis for a critique of the Rawlsian conception of citizenship. The Rawlsian conception operates 'as a mechanism, not of inclusion, but of closure', but that it is constantly disrupted by the forces of 'the Other', forces which remain 'beyond accommodation' and haunt any attempt to close off the categories of the political realm (Barren in Norrie ed .1993:xi).
The split between the public identity assigned to the individual as a citizen and the lived experience of this individual defines liberal citizenship as a mechanism, not of inclusion, but of closure. The category of citizenship defines the qualities an individual needs to possess to participate in public life and hence fixes a boundary between the properly political and that which is excluded.
Of particular importance is the way that liberal citizenship atomizes public life for individuals. By conferring the dignity of citizenship upon the individual rather than incorporating the collectivities of which the individual may be a part precludes the view that individual identity is an achievement of inter-subjective negotiation between individuals in a social context. It also has the effect of devaluing the bodily and affective aspects of social existence by asserting public identity in the form of reason over nature. Feminists have shown how the public/private distinction has served to deny women political rights precisely on account of this split between reason and desire (see e.g. Pateman 1988 1989; A Young 1990, Phillips 1991; Dietz 1992; Barron in Norrie ed 1993:96/7). The point can be developed in broader terms than this as a demand for a new mode of politics rooted in a mode of life.

There is a need to attack this means-ends inversion by revaluing the material lives of individuals in such a way as to make needs and inclinations sources of morality. This demonstrates an awareness of the extent to which the social and political life of the modern world has been denuded of its ethical content with the rise of the capitalist economy. Abstraction in political and social relationships disconnected the socio-political world from a larger moral framework. An overarching concept of justice requires that the ethical be embedded within the socio-political order. To this end, Marx set about locating Kant's republic of ends in the historical process. With Marx, the noumenal aspect of human nature becomes species essence which, realising itself and progressing beyond alienation, is able to fill the space hitherto filled by the phenomenal aspect. Politically and socially, Marx sets about dissolving all legal, institutional and systemic constraints and authorities which are abstracted from and external to individuals. Norms, values and constraints are internalised in the relationships between individuals, abolishing all spheres extraneous to these relationships.
Marx recovers the ethical concept in modern society through the category of freedom. In a condition of unfreedom, morality is external to individuals since institutions and relationships are alienated from the people. Marx locates the problem in an alienated system of production. With the abolition of alienation, authority is no longer external but internal to the individual. Marx's communism is predicated upon a revolution in dispositions so that he can envisage the abolition of external authorities and rules and norms, institutional constraints and systemic determinations. Such a society is the ethical community but has rendered ethics as an external system and abstract constraint redundant. Communism is thus beyond justice (Heller 1989:107/8). Marx, like Nietzsche, succeeds in circumventing the paradox of freedom, though in an entirely different manner. Instead of positing the superman, he posits the supersociety, a society purely rational, intelligible (transparent) and absolutely free (Heller 1989:108). For Heller, however, 'a society beyond justice is impossible and undesirable’ (Heller 1989:223). This view requires that each individual becomes the embodiment of morality. Heller dismisses the anthropological revolution necessary for such a social transformation as an 'absurdity' (Heller 1989:224). The anthropological revolution is neither possible nor desirable as the basis or either the moral Utopia or the socio-political Utopia: 'Where there are no norms and rules, there are no institutions, no communities, no human bonds, no human existence' (Heller 1989:225).
The idea of absolute freedom, Heller concludes, was misconceived since we cannot step beyond the human bond without becoming devils or worms (Heller 1989:320). The question is whether Marx did indeed push freedom so far as to dissolve mediation into pure, immediate spontaneity. Marx's own view is closer to what Heller praises as a well conceived aspect of the Enlightenment project, 'the idea of the free and conscious construction of the human bond, of the proper distinction between the powers of domination and humane powers.., of human solidarity' (Heller 1989:320). To attain this reading, Marx has to be read in concert with Kant and Hegel rather than against them.
Marx recognises that the recovery of the self requires a different sense of morality - relational versus rational freedom. This builds upon the communal-relational core of the principle of rational freedom, emphasising it against the autonomous character of that principle.
By extracting a vision of the ethico-rational community from within the philosophical traditions which most influenced Marx, the intention is not to equate communism with either an abstract idealism or a dream of universality, external projections of 'community' and authority which have been central to modernity. Marx has no need to deny differences in favour of a noumenal realm in which individuals relate to each other as rational beings alone. Marx extracts a vision of a normative democratic community from the tradition of rational freedom that challenges the terms of liberal modernity and morality.
Marx's 'new morality’ needs to be considered in relation to his concept of praxis as the core of the ontology of the good society. Marx's morality is a morality of materialist embodiment which revalues the sensuous and relational world of individual interaction, reciprocity and solidarity against the abstracted and external institutional-systemic world.
The definition of the relational self is to be developed through the attempt to fuse the perspectives of Kant, Hegel and Marx, taking Kant’s categorical imperative and giving it concrete form in Hegel's mediated and differentiated system of representation, thus rooting the project of common humanity in the concrete differences of the plurality of human groups as against the abstract universality of traditional philosophy. This is to envisage a democracy of ends as a differentiated system incorporating social self-mediation and a cooperative mode of production. Such a democratic community proposes no spontaneous immediacy based upon the autonomous subject. This is not merely to radicalise the Kantian self but to relativise and embody it within a socio-institutional context.

'Given the crucial role that organisations play in contemporary societies, it is impossible to have self-governing communities based solely upon democratic citizen participation if this notion of democracy fails to recognize that organisations cannot be reduced to the equivalence of self-determining individuals. Hence all theories of further democratisation must dispel illusions of citizen based communities and come to terms with the complex role of organisations' (Frankel NLR Nov/Dec 1997:87)... Hence we must give up not only the Utopian notion of autonomous citizens, but also the political fictions that still determine contemporary politics (Frankel NLR Nov/Dec 1997:87). This means rejecting the ‘supersociety’ beyond laws and institutions that Heller discerned in Marx and coming to terms with Hegel’s Sittlichkeit and Kant’s realm of ends.

16 CONCLUSION
With Rousseau, Kant is a key figure in bringing an ethical imperative into the world of politics, defining the task before humanity as that of creating a free society of self-legislating citizens administering the moral law universally. In this ideal, the coercive form of society is replaced by a true community of ends in which all obey the general will as their own true will. Ultimately, however, neither Rousseau nor Kant could overcome the basic coercion rooted in civil society, having thus to envisage the expansion of reason through legality.
This thesis has sought to project possibilities for a reciprocal community out of Kant's philosophy. This community can be developed as a democracy of ends which unites each individual with all individuals within a mutual interaction. More specifically, the centrality of praxis and human self-creation in Kant’s philosophy, his conception of moral autonomy and the ideal of moral community of colegislative freedom would infuse Marx's critique of capitalism as an autonomy-denying order and influence Marx’s definition of communism as a self-governing social order beyond the state and the capitalist division of labour.
Marx would show, however, that Kant's ideal of the moral community of colegislators, each promoting the ends of all others could be realised only through social transformation abolishing private property.
Kant's premises permit such a transformation since the only natural right that Kant allows is not private property but 'freedom (independence from the constraint of another's will), insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with universal law' (CJ 1951:43/4). Socialisation ensures that the moral ideal is operative in the mechanisms of socio-economic reality.
Socialisation also overcomes the limitations of Kant's legalistic conception of reciprocity. Though Kantian reciprocity must prevail in form, it need not necessarily prevail in substance. A formal equality under law could coexist with substantive inequality issuing in an unequal power to command and rule. The only equality Kant concedes is the guarantee of an equal chance for all. Developing Kantian ethics as socialist, then, necessitates distinguishing Kant's formal reciprocity from the material reciprocity which Marx pursued.

Only with substantive equality can the perfect state realise its ultimate end, the autonomy of all citizens preparing the stage for the moral community of ends (Van Der Linden 1988:162). This requires that individuals engage in collective actions and hence cease to be atomistic, unorganised moral individuals. Since the individual is situated in social groups, morality is a cooperative and collective endeavour (Goldmann 1971:172 178). Though Kant's own conception of the individual as a social being implies that moral agency would be expressed through a multiplicity of universal institutions, Kant is weak on morality as a collective praxis. This reflects Kant's tendency to conceive the moral ideal in terms of an 'inner' unification of individual good wills as against regulation through collective 'outer' rules.
But since morality is socially as well as individually expressed, taking place in a socio-relational context, an institutional framework is required. Kant seems to have believed that any such collective endeavour contains an inherent tendency to alienation. Whilst Kant is not silent on the institutional, political and practical requirements of realising the good in the real world – Kant did seek to ground the implementation of the abstract ideal of a realm of ends through an analysis of private property, contract, family, and public institutions – this was a fairly undeveloped part of Kant’s work. 

In contrast, Hegel grounds the state within a multi-layered social fabric comprising a diversity of associations and communities, developing a concept of Sittlichkeit as a socio-institutional framework which has the promotion of universal happiness as its end. This is to recover the Aristotelian notion of political life as having the purpose of realising the good. Marx's originality here - building upon the associative conceptions of Rousseau and Hegel - is to have conceived the possibility of individual participation within a supra-individual framework that avoids institutional alienation. Kant's own conception of colegislative freedom points in this very direction.

Marx builds upon the radical possibilities in Kant's thought. Kant's motto of enlightenment - 'have the courage to use your own understanding!' (WE 1991:54) delegitimizes all social and political institutions that are not the product of free will. Yack goes so far as to refer to a 'Left Kantianism' as a revolutionary morality preaching liberation from all contexts or situations which deny the essential humanity of individuals (Yack 1986:89/133; cf Rose 1984; Lukacs 1971:108/9). It is in this Kantian spirit that Marx affirms the 'categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and contemptible being' (CHPR:I 1975:251).
Through social transformation restoring all human relations to conscious common control, Marx establishes the material conditions of Kant's moral ideal of universal human autonomy. 

All emancipation is reduction of the human world and of relationships to man himself. 
Political emancipation is the reduction of man on the one hand to the member of civil society, the egoistic, independent individual, and on the other to the citizen, the moral person. 
Only when real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself and as an individual man has become a species-being in his empirical life, his individual work and his individual relationships, only when man has recognized and organized his forces propres as social forces so that social force is no longer separated from him in the form of political force, only then will human emancipation be completed. (Marx EW OJQ 1975). 

Overall, this thesis has argued that in making reason the source of freedom and morality, Kant’s concept of 'rational freedom' is democratic in the sense of affirming all individuals to be rational beings, capable of apprehending the moral law, but also anti-democratic in its distrust of the natures of real individuals. Reason comes to be legislated in abstraction from real individuals and invested in an ideal institutional realm which alone gives access to that 'higher' morality individuals need to realise their 'true' selves. This leads to the idea that individuals could be constrained, educated, even disciplined, to the externally legislated, collective good. Reason comes to be canalised into repressive institutional channels more concerned with the regulation of individuals rather than their true fulfilment.

The great achievement of Marx is to have shown the path which vindicates the emancipatory claims made by rational freedom. Rather than continually fail when confronted by a recalcitrant reality, Kant’s universal principles of right can be actualised in a social and political context. Exposing the relations of power in the interstices of everyday social life and its institutions and practices, Marx finds a way of grounding the intersubjective community of reciprocal freedom so as to recover human subjectivity from within the rationalised world within which it is encased. Marx's critique of Hegel's institutional embodiment of the 'ought-to-be' within the 'is' recovers Kant's 'inner' orientation within a socio-relational political morality. Though this still has institutional implications, Marx's democracy is much more than periodic voting and election and resembles Kant's moral community of colegislators, a 'true' democracy of ends in which producers and citizens actively exercise their sovereign power, developing their capacities in all round fashion.
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